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Philosophical: Divine Will and Human Action
The discourse on divine will and human action in Tafsīr al-Mīzān presents a comprehensive exploration of the philosophical dimensions of free will, compulsion, and the divine decree. It examines how human actions arise from a complex interplay of individual agency and a broader metaphysical framework governed by divine will. Through this inquiry, the discussion navigates the delicate balance between human responsibility and the overarching sovereignty of God.
Every species is defined by its unique characteristics and actions, which allow us to categorize and distinguish it from others. Human actions, when analyzed, can be divided into two primary types. The first are involuntary actions, such as natural processes like breathing, digestion, or reflexive responses to stimuli. These actions occur independently of conscious thought or will, relying solely on natural processes. The second type are voluntary actions, which are driven by knowledge and intentional decision-making. These actions result from the individual’s capacity to perceive, evaluate, and act in pursuit of perceived goals or perfection.
Voluntary actions are further divided into two categories. The first are actions performed by free will, where an individual consciously decides to act or refrain from acting based on their own deliberation. For example, choosing to eat or abstain from food based on ethical, moral, or practical considerations exemplifies this form of agency. The second category involves actions performed under compulsion, where external factors or coercion influence the individual’s decision. For instance, an individual who complies with a tyrant’s demands acts under duress but still exercises volition. Even in such cases, the final act originates from the individual’s decision, though heavily influenced by external pressures.
This observation leads to a profound insight: the distinction between free will and compulsion, while significant, is not absolute. Both forms of action involve the individual’s volition, albeit shaped by different circumstances. A man fleeing from a collapsing wall or complying with a threat acts from fear, but the act remains his own. The difference lies in the external context, not the fundamental nature of the decision-making process. This perspective challenges the conventional separation between free and coerced actions, emphasizing the consistency of the underlying will.
At a deeper metaphysical level, human actions are examined through the lens of causality. Every action arises from a sufficient cause, comprising material, formal, efficient, and final causes, as well as conditions like time, space, and the removal of obstacles. When an action is viewed in relation to its sufficient cause, it becomes essential—its occurrence is inevitable. However, when considered in isolation from its full causal framework, it remains transient (possible) and contingent. This dual perspective highlights the inherent complexity of human actions, which operate within a web of causality while retaining their distinctiveness as individual acts.
ʿAllāmah points out that the transient things need a cause for their existence because of their transiency. And this need would not end until the chain of cause and effect finally reaches a cause Who is the Essential Being. This observation leads to the following two conclusions: First: The need of an effect for its cause does not end on its being related to its transient cause. The need continues until it reaches the Final Cause, the Essential Being. Second: This need emanates from its transient nature. It needs a cause to bring it into existence with all its characteristics and traits, including its relationship with its various causes, fulfilling all the conditions of its existence.
The above shows that the natural world operates within two simultaneous systems: essentiality and transiency. The system of essentiality encompasses sufficient causes and their effects, leaving no room for transiency in any entity or action when viewed in relation to their complete sufficient cause. In contrast, the system of transiency governs matter and its potentialities when considered in relation to only a part of the sufficient cause. For example, a human action, when connected to its full sufficient cause—comprising the efficient cause (the individual), the final cause (knowledge and will), the material cause, the formal cause (its shape), and all relevant conditions of time and space—becomes essential. However, when the same action is related only to its efficient cause, it remains transient.
This understanding of causality leads to two critical conclusions. First, it refutes the view that human actions are entirely independent of divine will. Like all created entities, human actions depend on God’s decree for their existence. Second, it negates the idea that divine will overrides or nullifies human agency. Divine will encompasses all conditions and characteristics of human actions, including the role of human will itself. God’s will decrees that actions occur through human choice, preserving the integrity of human agency within the divine framework.
The relationship between divine will and human action is thus vertical, not horizontal. This means that God’s will does not compete with or replace human will; rather, it operates through it. For instance, when a person acts freely, their action remains their own, even as it is fully encompassed by divine will. This vertical relationship reconciles the apparent tension between divine sovereignty and human freedom, showing them to be complementary rather than contradictory.
ʿAllāmah critiques materialist philosophies that argue for absolute compulsion within the natural world. While it is true that all effects are essential when related to their sufficient causes, they remain transient when viewed within the broader framework of contingency. This dual nature of causality highlights the foundation of human life. Actions like teaching, nurturing, and training depend on the belief in freedom and contingency; without these, the fabric of human hope and effort would collapse.
ʿAllāmah further addresses the theological extremes of delegation (tafwīḍ) and compulsion (jabr). Delegation, as upheld by the Muʿtazilites, denies any relation between human actions and divine will, asserting complete human autonomy. This view, however, disregards the dependence of all creation, including human actions, on God. On the other hand, the view of compulsion, espoused by the Mujabbirah, asserts that divine will nullifies human agency, rendering humans mere instruments of divine action. This perspective, too, is flawed, as it undermines the moral responsibility and dignity inherent in human agency.
By attributing human actions to both divine will and human choice, the discourse maintains the integrity of both perspectives. Divine will, in this framework, decrees that human actions occur through the individual’s free will. This dual attribution ensures that human actions remain both fully willed by God and genuinely enacted by individuals, preserving the coherence of the divine-human relationship.
In conclusion, this profound discussion by ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī offers a comprehensive framework for understanding human action within the context of divine will. It reconciles the apparent paradox of freedom and compulsion, demonstrating that human agency operates within a divinely ordained system of causality. By emphasizing the vertical relationship between divine will and human action, this discourse not only addresses theological and philosophical debates but also highlights the practical implications of freedom in human life. It affirms that human actions, though contingent and transient, are meaningful and purposeful within the divine order, reflecting the profound harmony between creation and Creator.
This perspective considers human actions as not merely isolated occurrences but as outcomes within a chain of interconnected causes. Each action is viewed in relation to its sufficient cause, which includes all necessary factors—material, formal, efficient, and final—required for its existence. This lens provides a comprehensive understanding of human actions, integrating both their voluntary aspects and their ultimate dependence on higher principles, such as the divine will. ↩︎
A transient (possible) thing has equal relation with existence and non-existence. It, therefore, needs a sufficient cause to tip the balance in favor of existence, so that it may come into being. ↩︎
Philosophically, the statement that “the relationship between divine will and human action is vertical, not horizontal” highlights the ontological hierarchy between God and creation, rather than a competitive or parallel interaction. In a horizontal relationship, entities exist on the same level, suggesting mutual exclusivity or competition between their actions. For example, if two people are painting a canvas together, each person’s contribution might limit or compete with the other’s. If divine and human wills operated on this level, any divine involvement in human actions would negate human freedom, and vice versa. In contrast, a vertical relationship recognizes a fundamental difference in the modes of existence between God and human beings. God’s will operates as the ultimate cause of all that exists, including human free will. This does not mean that God’s will overrides or negates human action. Instead, divine will encompasses and sustains human will, enabling it to function within its domain. Human action proceeds freely within the framework of divine decree because the divine will establishes the conditions and possibilities for human freedom. For instance, when a person wills to perform an action, their ability to will, choose, and act is itself contingent on God’s creative and sustaining power. This vertical relationship ensures that God’s will is not competing with human will but rather underpins and actualizes it. In this view, God’s will is the metaphysical ground of all actions, while human will operates as an intermediate, freely functioning cause within the created order. Thus, divine omnipotence and human freedom are not contradictory; rather, they coexist in a layered causality, where the divine will operates at the ultimate, transcendent level, while human action unfolds at the contingent, immanent level. This layered understanding preserves human accountability while affirming the sovereignty of God over all existence. ↩︎
Refer to the previous section on “Compulsion, Delegation and Determination” regarding the extremes of delegation and compulsion. ↩︎
For further reading on this discourse, see al-Mīzān Eng. vol. 1 under verses . ↩︎