Appearance
Immateriality of the Soul
The nature of the human soul—whether it is material or transcendent—has long been a subject of inquiry in both philosophy and theology. In Tafsīr al-Mīzān, this issue is examined, offering a detailed exploration of the immateriality of the soul. He systematically dismantles materialistic explanations while presenting philosophical and rational evidence to demonstrate that the soul is a non-material, indivisible entity that transcends the limitations of the physical world. Through this analysis, he uncovers the unique and enduring nature of the human self, affirming its existence as an eternal reality distinct from the body.
The foundation of ʿAllāmah’s argument begins with an exploration of self-awareness. Every person possesses a continuous and unbroken sense of identity, expressed as the “I”—a simple, unified perception of self that remains constant throughout life. This persistent awareness is independent of physical changes, such as the aging of the body or the renewal of its cells. The body, with its organs and faculties, is subject to decay, division, and alteration. However, the “I” remains indivisible, constant, and unchanging. This contrast between the enduring nature of the self and the mutable nature of the body serves as the first indication that the soul transcends materiality.
To further illustrate, he explains that individuals can become temporarily unaware of parts of their body—such as a limb or organ—without losing their sense of self. For example, a person may not feel their hand while sleeping, yet their awareness of “I” remains intact. If the self were material, tied to the body, it would be subject to the same fragmentation and interruptions as bodily experiences. The persistence of self-awareness, therefore, reveals that the soul operates independently of the physical body, belonging to a reality beyond matter.
In addressing materialist objections, ʿAllāmah carefully examines the claims that the soul is a product of the brain’s physical functions or the sum of neural activities. Materialists often argue that psychological phenomena, including the perception of self, are reducible to processes in the brain. Advances in neuroscience are cited as evidence that human thoughts, emotions, and experiences arise from material interactions, rendering the concept of an immaterial soul unnecessary.
He responds to this by highlighting the limitations of materialist reasoning. Science, he argues, is inherently confined to the study of observable phenomena. It can analyze the physical functions of the brain and nervous system but cannot offer explanations for metaphysical realities, such as the immaterial self. The absence of empirical evidence for the soul does not equate to its nonexistence; rather, it reflects the boundaries of scientific inquiry. Just as the tools of science cannot measure abstract concepts like love or justice, they are equally incapable of probing the essence of the immaterial soul.
A central flaw in the materialist perspective, he explains, lies in its inability to account for the unity of self-awareness. The brain and its processes are composed of countless divisible parts—neurons, synapses, and electrical impulses—each functioning independently. If the self were a product of these material components, it would reflect their divisibility. Yet the human experience of “I” is singular and indivisible, not reducible to a collection of fragmented perceptions. The materialist claim that neural inputs combine to produce a unified sense of self fails to address the mechanism by which multiplicity gives rise to unity.
To further support his argument, ʿAllāmah draws attention to the enduring nature of self-awareness. Human beings perceive themselves as continuous, unbroken entities throughout their lives, despite the constant physical changes occurring within the body. The cells of the body are renewed, the brain develops and changes, yet the perception of “I” remains consistent. This constancy cannot be explained by material processes, which are subject to flux and decay. The soul, therefore, must be immaterial, as it possesses a unity and permanence that matter inherently lacks.
Materialists also propose that the sense of self is an illusion created by the brain—a composite image formed by rapid neural activity. ʿAllāmah challenges this assertion by pointing out that an illusion presupposes the existence of a perceiver who experiences the illusion. If the self is merely an illusion, who or what perceives it? The very experience of self-awareness, he argues, cannot be reduced to an illusion because it is foundational to human consciousness. The notion of an “I” that perceives itself cannot emerge from non-conscious, material processes.
Additionally, he addresses the argument that the soul is simply the sum of its faculties—such as thought, memory, and perception. If this were true, the self would be divisible into these faculties, and the unity of self-awareness would cease to exist. However, the human experience of “I” encompasses all these faculties without being reducible to any one of them. The soul, therefore, is not a combination of parts but a singular, indivisible reality that coordinates and transcends its faculties.
Psychologists who describe the soul as a “unified condition” produced by psychological activities are also critiqued for failing to address the essence of the soul. Psychology, as an empirical discipline, focuses on observable behaviors and mental processes but does not engage with the metaphysical nature of the self. While psychological theories may describe how faculties interact, they cannot explain the immaterial essence that perceives and unifies these interactions.
The discussion then extends to theologians who, influenced by materialist thought, argue that the soul ceases to exist with the death of the body. Such theologians claim that life is a product of physical matter and that the immaterial soul is an unfounded concept. ʿAllāmah refutes this view by emphasizing that denying the soul’s existence based on the current limitations of scientific understanding is unjustified. The absence of material evidence does not negate the reality of immaterial entities. Moreover, reducing the soul to a physical phenomenon contradicts the Qur’anic understanding of human nature as possessing both material and immaterial dimensions.
Ultimately, ʿAllāmah concludes that the soul is an immaterial entity—a simple, indivisible essence that transcends the limitations of physical matter. It is the source of self-awareness, enabling human beings to perceive themselves as continuous, unified entities despite the changes in their material form. The immateriality of the soul also explains its permanence, as it is not subject to decay or division like the body. This understanding affirms the unique nature of human existence, situating the soul as a transcendent reality that operates through the body without being confined to it.
By distinguishing the soul from material processes, ʿAllāmah highlights its central role in defining human identity, agency, and moral responsibility. The soul, as an immaterial and eternal entity, reflects the higher spiritual dimensions of existence, offering a profound reminder that human life is not limited to the material world. This understanding challenges individuals to explore the spiritual realities that lie at the core of their being, recognizing the soul as a bridge between the material and the divine.
Examples: Francis Crick – The Astonishing Hypothesis: The Scientific Search for the Soul (1994)Crick, a co-discoverer of DNA’s structure, famously stated that human experiences, including thoughts, emotions, and sense of self, are no more than the activities of neurons in the brain.
Second example: Antonio Damasio – The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness (1999) Damasio explores how consciousness and self-awareness arise from neural processes and bodily interactions, offering a materialist perspective on the origins of psychological phenomena.
Third example: Daniel Dennett – Consciousness Explained (1991) Dennett dismisses the concept of a non-material mind or soul, proposing instead that consciousness and the perception of self are emergent phenomena resulting from neural processes and material interactions. ↩︎
Muḥammad ʿAbduh (Risālat Al-Tawḥīd): ʿAbduh, a prominent modernist theologian, sought to harmonize Islamic theology with contemporary scientific and materialist perspectives. While he did not explicitly deny the soul’s existence, his works reflect an inclination to interpret metaphysical realities like the soul in a manner consistent with materialist thought. ↩︎
Here are some of the Qur’anic references that align with ʿAllāmah’s views:
Sūrah al-Isra’ (): “And they ask you about the soul. Say, ‘The soul is of the affair of my Lord, and you have not been given of knowledge except a little.’” This verse highlights the soul’s immaterial and divine nature, highlighting the limitations of human understanding.
Sūrah al-Mu’minun (): “Then We made him into another creation. So blessed is God, the best of creators.” The transition from physical creation to a unique dimension supports the distinction between the body and soul.
Sūrah al-Zumar (): “God takes the souls at the time of their death, and those that do not die (He takes) during their sleep.” This verse highlights the independent existence of the soul, even when separated from the body. ↩︎