Verses 10–25

Chapter 7: Al-Aʿrāf (Elevations) · Printed edition: Volume 15, pp. 20–92

وَ لَقَدْ مَكَّنَّاكُمْ فِي الْأَرْضِ وَ جَعَلْنا لَكُمْ فِيها مَعايِشَ قَلِيلاً ما تَشْكُرُونَ ١٠ وَ لَقَدْ خَلَقْناكُمْ ثُمَّ صَوَّرْناكُمْ ثُمَّ قُلْنا لِلْمَلائِكَةِ اسْجُدُوا لِآدَمَ فَسَجَدُوا إِلاَّ إِبْلِيسَ لَمْ يَكُنْ مِنَ السَّاجِدِينَ ١١ قالَ ما مَنَعَكَ أَلاَّ تَسْجُدَ إِذْ أَمَرْتُكَ قالَ أَنَا خَيْرٌ مِنْهُ خَلَقْتَنِي مِنْ نارٍ وَ خَلَقْتَهُ مِنْ طِينٍ ١٢ قالَ فَاهْبِطْ مِنْها فَما يَكُونُ لَكَ أَنْ تَتَكَبَّرَ فِيها فَاخْرُجْ إِنَّكَ مِنَ الصَّاغِرِينَ ١٣ قالَ أَنْظِرْنِي إِلى‏ يَوْمِ يُبْعَثُونَ ١٤ قالَ إِنَّكَ مِنَ الْمُنْظَرِينَ ١٥ قالَ فَبِما أَغْوَيْتَنِي لَأَقْعُدَنَّ لَهُمْ صِراطَكَ الْمُسْتَقِيمَ ١٦ ثُمَّ لَآتِيَنَّهُمْ مِنْ بَيْنِ أَيْدِيهِمْ وَ مِنْ خَلْفِهِمْ وَ عَنْ أَيْمانِهِمْ وَ عَنْ شَمائِلِهِمْ وَ لا تَجِدُ أَكْثَرَهُمْ شاكِرِينَ ١٧ قالَ اخْرُجْ مِنْها مَذْؤُماً مَدْحُوراً لَمَنْ تَبِعَكَ مِنْهُمْ لَأَمْلَأَنَّ جَهَنَّمَ مِنْكُمْ أَجْمَعِينَ ١٨ وَ يا آدَمُ اسْكُنْ أَنْتَ وَ زَوْجُكَ الْجَنَّةَ فَكُلا مِنْ حَيْثُ شِئْتُما وَ لا تَقْرَبا هذِهِ الشَّجَرَةَ فَتَكُونا مِنَ الظَّالِمِينَ ١٩ فَوَسْوَسَ لَهُمَا الشَّيْطانُ لِيُبْدِيَ لَهُما ما وُورِيَ عَنْهُما مِنْ سَوْآتِهِما وَ قالَ ما نَهاكُما رَبُّكُما عَنْ هذِهِ الشَّجَرَةِ إِلاَّ أَنْ تَكُونا مَلَكَيْنِ أَوْ تَكُونا مِنَ الْخالِدِينَ ٢٠ وَ قاسَمَهُما إِنِّي لَكُما لَمِنَ النَّاصِحِينَ ٢١ فَدَلاَّهُما بِغُرُورٍ فَلَمَّا ذاقَا الشَّجَرَةَ بَدَتْ لَهُما سَوْآتُهُما وَ طَفِقا يَخْصِفانِ عَلَيْهِما مِنْ وَرَقِ الْجَنَّةِ وَ ناداهُما رَبُّهُما أَ لَمْ أَنْهَكُما عَنْ تِلْكُمَا الشَّجَرَةِ وَ أَقُلْ لَكُما إِنَّ الشَّيْطانَ لَكُما عَدُوٌّ مُبِينٌ ٢٢ قالا رَبَّنا ظَلَمْنا أَنْفُسَنا وَ إِنْ لَمْ تَغْفِرْ لَنا وَ تَرْحَمْنا لَنَكُونَنَّ مِنَ الْخاسِرِينَ ٢٣ قالَ اهْبِطُوا بَعْضُكُمْ لِبَعْضٍ عَدُوٌّ وَ لَكُمْ فِي الْأَرْضِ مُسْتَقَرٌّ وَ مَتاعٌ إِلى‏ حِينٍ ٢٤ قالَ فِيها تَحْيَوْنَ وَ فِيها تَمُوتُونَ وَ مِنْها تُخْرَجُونَ ٢٥

10. Certainly We have established you in the earth, and made in it [various] means of livelihood for you. Little do you thank.
11. Certainly We created you, then We formed you, then We said to the angels, “Prostrate before Adam.” So they [all] prostrated, but not Iblīs: he was not among those who prostrated.
12. Said He, “What prevented you from prostrating, when I commanded you?” “I am better than him,” he said. “You created me from fire and You created him from clay.”
13. “Get down from it!” He said. “It is not for you to be arrogant therein. Begone! You are indeed among the degraded ones.”
14. He said, “Respite me till the day they will be resurrected.”
15. Said He, “You are indeed among the reprieved.”
16. “As You have consigned me to perversity,” he said, “I will surely lie in wait for them on Your straight path.
17. Then I will come at them from their front and from their rear, and from their right and their left, and You will not find most of them to be grateful.”
18. Said He, “Begone hence, blameful, banished! Whoever of them follows you, I will surely fill hell with you all.”
19. [Then He said to Adam,] “O Adam, dwell with your mate in paradise, and eat thereof whence you wish; but do not approach this tree, lest you should be among the wrongdoers.”
20. Then Satan tempted them, to expose to them what was hidden from them of their shameful parts, and he said, “Your Lord has only forbidden you from this tree lest you should become angels, or lest you become immortal.”
21. And he swore to them, “I am indeed your well-wisher.”
22. Thus he brought about their fall by deception. So when they tasted of the tree, their shameful parts became exposed to them, and they began to stitch over themselves with the leaves of paradise. Their Lord called out to them, “Did I not forbid you from that tree, and tell you that Satan is indeed your manifest enemy?”
23. They said, “Our Lord, we have wronged ourselves! If You do not forgive us and have mercy upon us, we will surely be among the losers.”
24. He said, “Get down, being enemies of one another! On the earth shall be your abode and sustenance for some time.”
25. He said, “In it you will live, and in it you will die; and from it you will be raised [from the dead].”

Introduction

These verses discuss the creation of humankind, God’s command to the angels to prostrate themselves before Adam, and their abidance. They also discuss Satan’s defiance, his deception of Adam and his wife, their expulsion from the garden, and God’s decrees with respect to these events.

Commentary

وَ لَقَدْ مَكَّنَّاكُمْ فِي الْأَرْضِ وَ جَعَلْنا لَكُمْ فِيها مَعايِشَ قَلِيلاً ما تَشْكُرُونَ ١٠

(7:10) Certainly We have established you (makkanākum, from tamkīn) in the earth, and made in it [various] means of livelihood (maʿāyish) for you. Little do you thank.

Tamkīn is synonymous with iskān and īṭān (to give someone residence, to establish someone in a place, to make someone settle somewhere). The meaning is: “We have made the earth your place (makān).” Another possible meaning for tamkīn is “to give someone power and authority in some territory.” This meaning can be confirmed by making a parallel between the current set of verses and a similar account of the story of Adam and Satan in Sūrah al-Baqarah, where the story is preceded by reference to humankind’s God-given power and authority in creation: It is He who created for you all that is in the earth ().

However, the first meaning is more consonant with what we read below at the end of this story: On the earth shall be your abode and sustenance for some time (). We can say that what we read in the current verse—Certainly We have established you in the earth ()—is a brief description, which is then elaborated in the subsequent verses, until the end of the story of Adam’s garden [in verse ].

Maʿāyish is the plural of maʿīshah, which means “an instrument or means of living” such as food, drink and so on. The verse’s tone and theme is to show two of God’s favors upon humankind: (1) giving them dwelling on the earth (or giving them power and authority in it); and (2) providing them with various means of livelihood. That is why the verse ends by saying: Little do you thank.

وَ لَقَدْ خَلَقْناكُمْ ثُمَّ صَوَّرْناكُمْ ثُمَّ قُلْنا لِلْمَلائِكَةِ اسْجُدُوا لِآدَمَ فَسَجَدُوا إِلاَّ إِبْلِيسَ لَمْ يَكُنْ مِنَ السَّاجِدِينَ ١١

(7:11) Certainly (la-qad) We created you, then We formed you, then We said to the angels, “Prostrate before Adam.” So they [all] prostrated, but not Iblīs: he was not among those who prostrated.

The story of Adam starts here, until verse 25. These verses expound on the concise version of humankind’s creation mentioned in the last verse, and explain how humankind ended up being established in the earth, as we read: Certainly We have established you in the earth, and made in it [various] means of livelihood (). That is why the verse starts with the letter lām, indicating a vow for emphasis (called lām al-qasam). Likewise, the two stories mentioned in these verses—that is, the story of commanding the angels to prostrate themselves before Adam, and the story of Adam’s garden—are presented in a single thread, as opposed to being separated into two accounts. Otherwise, the two stories are really independent of one another, but they are merged together because this way the brief introduction mentioned in the last verse—Certainly We have established you in the earth… ()—matches the conclusion of the two stories joined together: He said, “Get down, being enemies of one another! On the earth shall be your abode…” ().

Certainly We created you, then We formed you…: This verse is addressed to all humankind, with a tone of describing God’s favor upon them, just like the last verse. The two verses pursue the same theme, with the difference that the current verse elaborates on the concise account of the last. Hence, the verse begins with a universal address to all humankind: Certainly We created you, then We formed you, but then it switches to a particular statement about Adam as a specific person: then We said to the angels, “Prostrate before Adam.” We can infer two points from this transition:

(i) The prostration of the angels was in fact directed toward all humankind as children of Adam. Adam was set up as a qiblah (direction) for their prostration. He was a representative of the entire human race, presented to the angels on behalf of all humans. He was much like the Kaʿbah, which is set as a qiblah. Facing the Kaʿbah in worship symbolizes facing the Lord. Therefore, their prostration was not made to Adam as a specific individual.

There are three Qur’anic proofs for this idea—that Adam is a representative of all humankind in the story of the prostration: (1) Verses , where the angels are commanded to prostrate before Adam because of his position of khilāfah (successorship, vicegerency). The khilāfah mentioned there [in verse ] is not something exclusive to Adam, but it is common to all humankind, as we explained under the verses. Therefore, the consequent prostration would also pertain to all humankind. (2) Below we read that Satan (Iblīs) says: As You have consigned me to perversity I will surely lie in wait for them on Your straight path. Then I will come at them from their front and from their rear… (). In these verses, the plural pronouns refer to all humans, without the intermediation of Adam, and without any explicit reference to humankind in the previous verses. A similar reference to them [through plural pronouns] is found in Sūrah al-Ḥijr, where Satan says: My Lord! As You have consigned me to perversity, I will surely glamorize [evil] for them on the earth, and I will surely pervert them all (). Likewise, in Sūrah Ṣād he says: By Your might, I will surely pervert them all (). Clearly if the prostration of the angels were not made to all humankind, it would not make sense for Satan to demonstrate such outright hostility against them all. (3) God addresses Adam [and Eve] in Sūrah al-Baqarah and Sūrah Ṭā-Hā [verses and ], while He makes the same address to the children of Adam in the current chapter, where He says: O Children of Adam! If there come to you messengers from among yourselves ().

(ii) The creation of Adam is tantamount to the creation of all humankind. This can also be inferred from the following verses: And He commenced the creation of man from clay. Then He made his progeny from an extract of a base fluid (); It is He who created you from dust, then from a drop of [seminal] fluid, then from a clinging mass (). These verses suggest that creation from dust pertains to the creation of Adam [while his descendants were not directly created from dust]. This point can also be deduced from another account of this story in Sūrah al-Isrāʾ, where Satan says to God: If You respite me until the Day of Resurrection, I will surely harness his [Adam’s] progeny, [all] except a few (). There is also some allusion to this point where God says: When your Lord took from the Children of Adam, from their loins, their descendants and made them bear witness over themselves… (ff), as we shall discuss below.

Other exegetes have offered a variety of interpretations for this verse. Majmaʿ al-bayān says: “God continues in this verse to describe His blessings [upon His servants] at the beginning of [their] creation: Certainly We created you, then (thumma) We formed you ().” Then it provides a list of interpretations for the word thumma (lit. then) in this verse:

1. According to al-Akhfash, the word thumma is synonymous with the letter wāw (lit. and) in this verse.
2. Al-Zajjāj has objected to al-Akhfash by saying that this is a mistake that is not permitted by al-Khalīl, Sībawayh and all reliable scholars [of Arabic grammar]. Instead, thumma is exclusively used to introduce an event that occurs after what is mentioned before the term. What is meant in this verse is: “We first created Adam, and then We fashioned him.” In other words, God began the creation of Adam from dust, and then applied a form to it afterwards. This is the meaning of We created you, then We formed you. Once Adam was created, then We said to the angels, “Prostrate before Adam” (). This interpretation is narrated from al-Ḥasan [al-Baṣrī]. It is common among Arabs to say, “We did this to you” when what they mean is, “We did this to your fathers.” Likewise we read in the Qur’an [addressing the Jews]: And when We took a pledge from you, and raised the Mount above you (), which means, “We took a pledge from your ancestors.”
3. The verse means: “We created Adam, then We formed you in his loins, then We told the angels: Prostrate to Adam.” This is narrated from Ibn ʿAbbās, Mujāhid, al-Rabīʿ, Qatādah and al-Suddī.
4. The sequence in the verse [inferred from the word thumma (then)] pertains to the sequence of God’s report of the events [not the occurrence of the events]. The meaning is: “We created you, then We formed you, then We inform you that We said to the angels: Prostrate before Adam.” This is like when someone says, “I am walking, then (thumma) I am speeding.” This is how several scholars of [Arabic] grammar have interpreted the verse, such as ʿAlī b. ʿĪsá, Qāḍī Abū Saʿīd al-Sīrāfī and others.
5. Following the same notion [that thumma sometimes indicates a sequence of expression, not a sequence of occurrence], some exegetes have interpreted the verse as follows: “We created you in the loins of men, and (thumma) We formed you in the wombs of women.” This is narrated from ʿIkrimah.
6. Another similar interpretation is: “We created you in the wombs, and (thumma) We formed you by opening ears, eyes and other organs [for you].”

(End of quote from Majmaʿ al-bayān.)

There are two problems with the interpretation narrated from al-Zajjāj [number 2]:

(1) In order to attribute the acts of fathers to their children, there must be some common quality between the two groups to validate the attribution. A mere blood tie is not sufficient for merging the two groups in one category. The fact that all humans are the descendants of Adam does not suffice to count Adam’s creation as theirs. Instead, their creation must be somehow incorporated in Adam’s.

(2) Granted that the creation and formation of Adam counts as the creation and formation of his descendants, it follows that commanding the angels to prostrate to Adam is equivalent to commanding them to prostrate to his descendants. Therefore, the verse should have been similar to the verse: And when We took a pledge from you, and raised the Mount above you (). However, the verse does not tel the angles, “Prostrate before humans,” but it says: “Prostrate before Adam” ().

As with the interpretations narrated after that, they are all weak possibilities without any textual evidence from the verse. Those who have offered these views would certainly not consent to their own speech being interpreted as such, so how come they have interpreted the most eloquent speech in this way?!

… So they [all] prostrated, but not Iblīs: he was not among those who prostrated: All angels prostrated, which is mentioned explicitly in the verse: Thereat the angels prostrated, all of them together (). The verse excludes Iblīs (Satan, the Devil) from the list. God explains the reason for his noncompliance elsewhere: He [Iblīs] was one of the jinn, so he transgressed against his Lord’s command (). However, concerning the angels God says: Rather, they are [His] honoured servants. They do not venture to speak ahead of Him, and they act by His command ().

These verses clearly show that Iblīs was not of the same kind as the angels. This has led to a controversy among the scholars. Some have suggested that the command to the angels also included Iblīs, but only the angels are mentioned based on generalization (taghlīb), since the angels were greater in number and higher in status. This way, we can maintain the exception in the verse as a connected exception. Others have suggested that Iblīs was commanded separately, meaning that God made two commands: one to the angels, and one to Iblīs, even though the following verse suggests that God made only one command. He holds Iblīs accountable for the same command addressed to the angels: What prevented you from prostrating, when I commanded you? (). Given this interpretation [that there were two commands], the exception in the verse would be an unconnected exception.

Based on Qur’anic evidence, we can say that Iblīs was with the angels, without any distinction between them. They were all united in the station of quds (sanctity), as it can be inferred from the story of [Adam’s] khilāfah (successorship, vicegerency) in the Qur’an: When your Lord said to the angels, “Indeed I am going to set a viceroy on the earth,” they said, “Will You set in it someone who will cause corruption in it, and shed blood, while we celebrate Your praise and proclaim Your sanctity?” (). The command to prostrate before Adam was directed at that station, including anyone positioned in it. Therefore the audience of the command included anyone at that level, based on the position that they held. There is some reference to this station in what we shall read below, where God says to Iblīs: “Get down from it! It is not for you to be arrogant therein” (). The pronouns “it” and “therein” refer to either his position (manzilah), or the celestial realm (samāʾ), or the garden [of Adam]—which all reduce to his spiritual station and status. If the command were made to the audience [that is, the angels and Iblīs] irrespective of their station, the verse should have said, “It is not for you to be arrogant” [without qualifying it by “therein”].

Given the above explanations, there was no difference between Iblīs and the angels before the command to prostrate to Adam, but afterwards they divided into two groups. On the one hand, there were the angels who persisted with the same station and position that they had, which consisted of humble servitude before the Truth and obedience to God’s command. This defines the reality of the angels’ life and the kind of acts they perform, as God describes them: Rather, they are [His] honoured servants. They do not venture to speak ahead of Him, and they act by His command (). On the other hand, there was Iblīs, who left the station that he previously shared with the angels. God says: He [Iblīs] was one of the jinn, so he transgressed (fa-fasaqa, from fisq) against his Lord’s command (). The original usage of the word fisq is when a date comes out of its sheath. In like manner, an essential property of the path chosen by Iblīs was coming out of his divine position of servitude and obedience. He differentiated himself from the angels by opting for such a life.

The Qur’an has depicted this story in a way that mimics a human interaction between a ruler and his subjects. It talks about things like command, compliance, defiance, argument, expulsion and eviction. However, based on our explanation above and the verses that we quoted, we can see that these are symbolic expressions for a transcendent reality in the world of creation. What is meant is that Iblīs (Satan, the Devil) did not comply to humble himself before the reality and essence of humankind. This was a disobedience on his part, given the [spiritual and existential] station that he had. We can deduce this from God’s address to him: It is not for you to be arrogant therein (). In other words, it was fundamentally incompatible with his station [indicated by “therein” in verse ] to be arrogant. Hence, his arrogance was tantamount to exiting that level and falling to abyss.

We also explained that there was only a single command which was addressed to both the angels and Iblīs [on the account of their common station]. However, the angels are created in a way that their existence is fixed on obedience and good. This means that they do not face the option to obey or disobey. These two choices are not equally open to them, which means that they are not subject to legislative (tashrīʿī) and authoritative (mawlawī) commands. From this we can infer a similar, but opposite, point about the creation and existence of Iblīs: his essence is characterized by disobedience.

Had it not been for God’s creation of Adam, and His command to the angels and Iblīs to prostrate before him, Iblīs would have remained in his station of divine proximity without any distinction from the angels. However, the creation of Adam split that station into two: the station of proximity [to God], versus the station of distance [from God]. Thus it resulted in two paths: the path of happiness, and the path of wretchedness.

قالَ ما مَنَعَكَ أَلاَّ تَسْجُدَ إِذْ أَمَرْتُكَ قالَ أَنَا خَيْرٌ مِنْهُ خَلَقْتَنِي مِنْ نارٍ وَ خَلَقْتَهُ مِنْ طِينٍ ١٢

(7:12) Said He, “What prevented you (manaʿaka, from manʿ) from (an-lā) prostrating, when I commanded you?” “I am better than him,” he said. “You created me from fire and You created him from clay.”

In Sūrah Ṣād we read: He said, “O Iblīs! What keeps you from prostrating before that which I have created with My [own] two hands?” (), where the verse does not include the negative particle lā after the particle an. That is why some exegetes have said that the negative particle lā is is zāʾidah (extra, redundant, semantically empty) in this verse, added only for emphasis. Hence, the meaning is: “What prevented you from prostrating?” Another example of an extra lā is the verse: So that the People of the Book may (li-an-lā) know that they have no power over anything of Allah’s grace (). However, it is more appropriate to say that the negative lā indicates an implied omitted verb—like ḥaml (to make someone do something) or daʿá (to provoke)—which is implicitly included in the verb manʿ (to prevent). The meaning would be: “What was the stumbling block which made you—or instigated you—to not prostrate?”

… “I am better than him,” he said. “You created me from fire and You created him from clay.”: This is the answer of the cursed Satan to God. It expresses his first sin; rather, the first disobedience of God. All other sins can be analyzed and reduced to a similar claim of egoism and conceit, where one assumes some greatness for oneself before the grandeur of God. However, all greatness belongs to Him, and He has no partner in that. Since everything is humbled before God; the entire world of existence is subservient to Him; all heads bow down in submission to Him; and all voices are calmed before Him—a servant that is created by God is in no position to say “I” before God’s existence.

Satan’s problem was that he looked only at himself and saw his being alone, as an independent entity. He failed to look up and see the Lord Who is standing above him, and Who keeps him [and all beings] on their feet. Had he done that, his sense of selfhood and ego would have dissolved completely, such that he would no longer feel any greatness or independent existence in himself. Then, with his soul humbled, he would have submitted to God and obeyed His command willingly. In that case, instead of seeing himself as better than Adam because of being created of fire as opposed to clay, he would only concern himself with the command that had been issued from the source and origin of all beauty, majesty, magnificence and grandeur.

From a grammatical point of view, if Satan’s answer were to be commensurate with God’s question—What prevented you from prostrating, when I commanded you—he should have said: “What prevented me was that I am better than him (manaʿanī annī khayr minhu).” But instead he said: I am better than him. This subtle difference highlights Satan’s sense of ego, and also shows that this was something established and persistent in him. This is an important point, because it shows that Satan’s arrogance was against God, not against Adam.

Given Satan’s answer, what prevented him from prostration was his impression of being “better”: I am better than him. Nothing shows arrogance more clearly and strongly than saying that “I am better.”

The sentence, “I am better than him,” he said. “You created me from fire and You created him from clay” shows that Satan’s proof for being better than Adam was that he was created from fire while Adam was created from clay. God says in the Qur’an that Satan was one of the jinn: He [Iblīs] was one of the jinn, so he transgressed against his Lord’s command (); and the jinn were created from fire: Certainly We created man out of a dry clay [drawn] from an aging mud, and We created the jinn earlier out of a piercing fire (); He created man out of dry clay, like the potter’s, and created the jinn out of a flame of a fire (). Therefore, God confirms that Satan was created from fire. However, God does not confirm Satan’s claim to superiority over Adam. He does not reject this claim here, but the story of khilāfah (successorship, vicegerency) in Sūrah al-Baqarah [verses ff] clearly show the merit of Adam over Satan and the angels.

The same story is mentioned elsewhere as follows: When your Lord said to the angels, “Indeed I am about to create a human being out of clay. So when I have proportioned him and breathed into him of My spirit, then fall down in prostration before him.” Thereat the angels prostrated, all of them together, but not Iblīs; he acted arrogantly and he was one of the faithless. He said, “O Iblīs! What keeps you from prostrating before that which I have created with My [own] two hands? Are you arrogant, or are you [one] of the exalted ones?” “I am better than him,” he said. “You created me from fire and You created him from clay” (). These verses show that the angels were not ordered to prostrate to Adam due to his earthly and material creation. Rather, they were told to prostrate to him after he was proportioned and received the divine spirit. “My spirit” here is an honorific ascription to the divine; it shows that the human spirit has a unique status and a very special position in the sight of God. In the world of creation, nothing has any merit of its own, but it is only one’s position with respect to God which determines who is better.

In addition, God reprimands Iblīs by asking him: What keeps you from prostrating before that which I have created with My [own] two hands? (). Using one’s “both hands” to create something show’s the Maker’s utmost degree of attention and regard for that thing—irrespective of how we interpret the “two hands” of God. This is, in turn, a merit for Adam. In response to this question, however, Satan ignored his arrogance against God, and only referred to their initial substance of fire and clay: I am better than him. You created me from fire and You created him from clay (38: 76). Similarly, in the current chapter God asks him: What prevented you from prostrating, when I commanded you? This question shows that Satan’s problem was being arrogant against his Lord [not against Adam], since he did not comply with God’s command. But again, we see that he pays no attention to explaining the reason behind his arrogance against God, as he only says: I am better than him…

This sentence—I am better than him—is in a sense related to Satan’s arrogance against God, because it implies a claim to an independent existence for him against God’s absolute existence which overshadows all beings. This sense of independence was what led Satan to forget God’s grandeur, and instead assume a similar position for himself irrespective of his Lord. It was incumbent on him to obey God because He is God, but Satan overlooked this reality due to viewing himself as an independent entity. As a result, he assessed the two options available to him, and decided that disobedience is better than obedience, that transgression is preferred to submission. The root cause of all this was his proud assumption of some independence in existence for himself. That blinded him from seeing the truth, and led him to reason [for himself] that his origin of fire is better than Adam’s origin of clay, and it is not right for the superior to humble himself before the inferior through prostration, even if God commands him to do so. Satan ignored God’s command because he saw himself equal to God and parallel to Him in terms of independence and greatness. Thus he overlooked the Commander and decided to assess the two sides of the command.

The point is that God is the Origin and End of all things. His command is either His very act of creation, or it reduces to His creation and existentiation (takwīn). Therefore, if He creates something and decrees some merit for it, then that thing will have the merit in reality and the fact of the matter. Likewise, if He creates something and orders it to humble itself before the first being, it means that the second being is less perfect than the first one in terms of existence. His word is the truth; and it is incumbent that His order is obeyed because it is His order, not because of any interest, benefit or consideration (maslahah) that it involves. Otherwise, God would be stripped of His lordship (rubūbiyyah) and authority (mawlawiyyah), and would make considerations of interests and benefits central to everything. Since those considerations and benefits pertain to His creatures, that would set God on par with the other things.

Putting together all verses about this story, we can conclude that the root cause behind Stan’s sin was his arrogant defiance against God’s command, which qualified him for God’s curse [that is, his expulsion from his station of divine proximity]. Satan expressed his pride by saying: I am better than him [Adam]. He deemed himself better than Adam, and viewed Adam to be an abject being. However, Adam was chosen by God. God had notified the angels and Satan about Adam’s superiority over them in the story of khilāfah [verses ff], and also through expressions like: when I breathe into him of My spirit () and: I created him with My [own] two hands (). Hence, Satan was certainly arrogant against Adam, but as we explained above, what underlay his behavior was arrogance against God. What is central to this story in the Qur’an is Satan’s pride against God, not his pride against Adam. We can see this in the verse: When We said to the angels, “Prostrate before Adam,” they prostrated, but not Iblīs. He was one of the jinn, so he transgressed against his Lord’s command (). Note that the verse does not say, “He refused to humble himself before Adam” but it only refers to his transgression against God’s command.

To summarize, the verses about this story are primarily concerned with Satan’s arrogant defiance against his Lord. His arrogance against Adam and his arguments to this effect are rather the consequences and implications of this root problem. This seems to be the reason why God does not give any direct answer to Satan’s justification [that I am better than him…]. There is only some allusion to this matter in certain verses, such as: when I breathe into him of My spirit () and: I created him with My [own] two hands ().

Objection: According to the above interpretation, the command to prostrate before Adam was a takwīnī (existential, creational, causal) order. This, however, contradicts the idea of Satan’s “sin” and “disobedience” because disobedience is only applicable with respect to tashrīʿī (legislative, imperative) orders. God’s takwīnī command results in the inevitable creation and occurrence of the event. If His takwīnī will is applied to any event, then it is impossible for it not to occur. He says: All that We say to a thing, when We will it, is to say to it “Be!” and it is ().

Response: As we explained above, even though this story is expressed in a way that mimics common human interactions—including command, compliance, disobedience, expulsion and so on—it represents existential and creational realities that exist between humankind, the angels and the Devil. In other words, the story explains the creation and makeup of the angels and Satan, which have some relationship with humankind. It shows us the inherent inclinations of each side [the angels and Satan] with respect to human happiness and misery. This, however, does not mean that the command to prostrate before Adam was a takwīnī command.

This is the story of creation, expressed in a worldly picture, based on social interactions that we are accustomed to. It resembles a king who observes one of his subjects to have a special aptitude and capacity for growth, so he chooses him for himself, pays exclusive attention to him, makes him his vicegerent in his territory, and gives him priority over his courtiers. The king commands his courtiers to respect the special subject’s position and be in his service. Most of them respond positively to this call and obey the king, which makes him pleased with them and lets them maintain their position. One of them, however, refuses to obey on the account that the king was wrong to make that directive. He argues that he is higher than the chosen subject in terms of inherent worth and record of service. As a result, the king is enraged by him, expels him from his court, and brands him with humiliation and dishonor. The reason is that [in a context of absolute monarchy,] a king is to obeyed because he is the central authority, the affairs are in his hands, and all commands issue from him, not because of his commands corresponding with some real benefit, interest or consideration. The latter corresponds to an advisor or counsellor whose job is to show others the way to [their] good and growth.

In this analogy, the courtiers of the king—including those who obey his command and the one who does not—are all positioned at the same level of proximity, honor and presence, without any distinction between them. Then, after receiving the king’s command, their ways branch into two and they form two groups: (1) a group that is obedient and docile; and (2) a group that is disobedient and proud. The command also provides the grounds for the king to manifest his will, his power, and some of his hidden qualities. As a result, he shows mercy to some, and wrath to others; he brings some near to himself, and expels others from himself; he pardons and forgives some, and captures and avenges others; he encourages obedience with good promise, and discourages disobedience with threat; he rewards those who obey, and punishes those who disobey. Events like this can be compared to a touchstone that is applied to a metal to determine how genuine it is in reality.

The story of the angels’ prostration and Satan’s refusal represents certain realities that can be compared to the above picture. The command to prostrate before Adam represents God’s honoring Adam with the station of divine proximity, divine khilāfah (successorship, vicegerency), and divine wilāyah (guardianship, authority, mastership). The angels submitted to this honorable position of Adam, while Iblīs turned away from it because he was inherently opposed to human perfection and felicity. For this reason, whenever he comes in contact with humankind, he causes mischief for them; and whenever he approaches them, he leads them astray: About him [Satan] it has been decreed that should anyone take him for a friend, he will lead him astray ().

God’s act of creation and giving existence (takwīn) is mentioned in several verses in the form of a verbal order or a similar form, such as: And He said to it [the heaven] and to the earth, “Come! Willingly or unwillingly!” They said, “We come willingly” (); Indeed We presented the Trust to the heavens and the earth and the mountains, but they refused to bear it, and were apprehensive of it (). This is expressed in the most comprehensive way in the verse: All His command, when He wills something, is to say to it “Be,” and it is ().

Objection: We cannot renounce the apparent form of the story and interpret it as merely pointing to some aspect of the creation [of Adam, Satan and the angels], because that would subject the Qur’an to ambiguity and subjective interpretations. If we sanction such interpretation in this story, then other teachings of the Qur’an—about God and the hereafter, as well as all Qur’anic stories, lessons and laws—may be taken to be figurative as well. That would completely destroy the religion.

Response: We follow wherever evidence takes us. In some cases we have evidence [from the Qur’an, sunnah and reason] that the apparent and literal meaning of the text is intended, as in the case of the principle beliefs, the primary teachings of the Qur’an, the stories of the past prophets with their people, legal rulings, and their subsequent rewards and punishments. In some other cases, we have evidence against a literal meaning, such as the current story of discussion, as well as the realm of pre-existence (ʿālam al-dharr) [in verses ] and the offering of divine covenant to the beings [in verse ]. In these cases we can opt for a symbolic interpretation [referring to a reality about God’s creation]as long as it does not contravene an essential religious belief, a decisive verse, an authentic tradition (sunnah), or a proven rational argument.

Satan’s argument for not prostrating to Adam was: I am better than him. You created me from fire and You created him from clay. This is a case of qiyās (reasoning by analogy, comparison), which is an argument not based on certainty, but based on probabilistic personal opinion. Such arguments are not strong enough to prove any fact. Exegetes have discussed many points to show why his argument was flawed, but as we explained above, the Qur’an does not address this issue. Instead, God reprimands him for showing arrogant defiance in a position that was only compatible with submission and compliance. That is why we will skip the discussions of the exegetes in this regard.

قالَ فَاهْبِطْ مِنْها فَما يَكُونُ لَكَ أَنْ تَتَكَبَّرَ فِيها فَاخْرُجْ إِنَّكَ مِنَ الصَّاغِرِينَ١٣

(7:13) “Get down from it!” He said. “It is not for you to be arrogant (tatakabbara, from takabbur) therein. Begone! You are indeed among the degraded ones (al-ṣāghirīn).”

Takabbur means “assuming greatness for oneself and expressing it to someone else.” Kibar (greatness, bigness, grandeur) and ṣighar (smallness, littleness, insignificance) are relative qualities which are usually used for non-physical matters. If one says or does something which implies that he is better and more important than another person, then he is counting himself great and the other side small. This is called takabbur. If any being has any advantage or significance with respect to another being, it is through a quality that is due to God and from Him. This means that no one is entitled to express greatness of oneself (takabbur) except God. Hence, this is one of the exclusive attributes of God, Who is absolutely Great and Superior [to the entire existence]. Therefore, we can classify two types of takabbur (arrogance, pride): (1) rightful and praiseworthy pride, which belongs to God or traces to Him in some way, such as acting proudly against the enemies of God, for that is in reality seeking superiority from God; (2) wrong and blameworthy pride, which is found among others, where they claim some baseless greatness and significance for themselves.

Ṣāghirīn is the plural of ṣāghir (abased, degraded, humiliated), which is derived from ṣaghār, meaning “abasement and dishonor.” Ṣaghār is like ṣighar (smallness, littleness, insignificance), except that the former is used as a non-physical attribute, while the latter is used as a physical property. The humiliation mentioned here was Satan’s penalty for being arrogant. The last statement in the verse—Begone! You are indeed among the degraded ones—interprets and emphasizes the first sentence: Get down (fa-ihbiṭ, from hubūṭ) from it. Hubūṭ means “to descend and go down from one’s position.” Therefore, Satan’s hubūṭ (descent, relegation) was not a physical movement from one location to another, but it was a spiritual descent to a lower status. This confirms what we said previously—that the pronouns “from it” and “therein” refer to Satan’s position of divine proximity, not the heavens or the garden, unless the heavens and the garden are also meant in a spiritual sense.

The meaning is: God said to Satan, “Get down from your station because you did not prostrate when I ordered you. This is a station of humbleness and submission to Me. You are in no position to show pride here. Thus, you must leave, for indeed you are among those who are degraded and abased.”

قالَ أَنْظِرْنِي إِلى‏ يَوْمِ يُبْعَثُونَ ١٤ قالَ إِنَّكَ مِنَ الْمُنْظَرِينَ ١٥

(7:14-15) He said, “Respite me till the day they will be resurrected.” Said He, “You are indeed among the reprieved.”

Here Satan asks for a deferral [of his judgment and punishment], and God gives him respite. The Qur’an has discussed this more elaborately elsewhere: He said, “My Lord! Respite me till the day they will be resurrected.” Said He, “You are indeed among the reprieved until the day of the known time” (). These verses show that God did not grant Satan’s wish in the unconditional way that he requested. He did not respite Satan until the Day of Resurrection, but appointed a term before then, called “the day of the known time.” We shall discuss this, by the will of God, in Sūrah al-Ḥijr [under verses ].

Satan asked for his term to be extended until the Day of Resurrection, which means that he wanted to be able to deceive and tempt humankind throughout their existence in this world and the barzakh (the intermediate realm between this life and the Resurrection). However, God did not grant his wish all the way to the Resurrection. Instead, He only gave Satan freedom to operate until the end of this life, but not during the barzakh. Hence, Satan cannot deceive and tempt the people after their death, although he may be with some people in the realms after this world as a mate and companion, as we can infer from these verses: Whoever turns a blind eye to the remembrance of the All-Merciful, We assign him a devil who remains his companion. Indeed they bar them from the way while they suppose that they are [rightly] guided. When he comes to Us, he will say, “I wish there had been between me and you the distance between east and west! What an evil companion [you are]!” “Today that will be of no avail to you. As you did wrong, so will you share in the punishment” (). This is also what is apparently meant [by “mates”] in the verse: Muster the wrongdoers and their mates and what they used to worship ().

قالَ فَبِما أَغْوَيْتَنِي لَأَقْعُدَنَّ لَهُمْ صِراطَكَ الْمُسْتَقِيمَ ١٦ ثُمَّ لَآتِيَنَّهُمْ مِنْ بَيْنِ أَيْدِيهِمْ وَ مِنْ خَلْفِهِمْ وَ عَنْ أَيْمانِهِمْ وَ عَنْ شَمائِلِهِمْ وَ لا تَجِدُ أَكْثَرَهُمْ شاكِرِينَ١٧

(7:16-17) “As You (fa-bi-mā) have consigned me to perversity (aghwaytanī, from ighwāʾ),” he said, “I will surely lie in wait for them on Your straight path. Then I will come at them from their front and from their rear, and from their right and their left, and You will not find most of them to be grateful.”

Ighwāʾ is to “cast someone into ghayy,” where ghayy (which is synonymous with ghawāyah) means “error, loss, failure and destruction.” Exegetes have suggested all of these meanings for ghayy in Satan’s statement: As You have consigned me to perversity. However, what is meant here by ghayy is the first meaning [that is, error], based on a similar verse in Sūrah al-Ḥijr: He [Satan] said, “My Lord! As You have consigned me to perversity (aghwaytanī), I will surely glamorize [evil] for them on the earth, and I will surely pervert them (la-ughwiyannahum) all” ().

The letter bāʾ in fa-bi-mā indicates either causality or reciprocation. It means: “Because of You casting me into error, I will surely lie in wait…” or “In return to Your casting me into error, I will surely lie in wait…” Some exegetes have suggested that the letter bāʾ here indicates a vow, but this is not correct. Apparently they said this in order to match the current verse with what Satan says elsewhere [with a vow]: He said, “By Your might, I will surely pervert them all” ().

… I will surely lie in wait (la-aqʿudanna, from quʿūd) for them on Your straight path: What is meant here by the verb quʿūd (lit. to sit) is to constantly be present on the path and wait in ambush there in order to lead astray those who travel on this way. The meaning is: “I will surely sit for them [that is, to abduct and despoil them] on Your straight path, which is the level way that leads them to You and to their happiness.” Everyone is necessarily on a journey to God and pursues His straight path [according to their initial makeup and innate nature].

Then I will come at them from their front and from their rear, and from their right and their left…: This is what Satan will do to the people as he lies in wait on the straight path. He approaches them from all four sides which surround them. The path where Satan lies in ambush for the people is not a physical path, but a spiritual one. Therefore, the sides from which he approaches people are also immaterial, not physical. We can infer these sides from the other verses in the Qur’an about what Satan does: He makes them promises and gives them [false] hopes, yet Satan does not promise them anything but delusion (); That is only Satan frightening his followers (); and do not follow in Satan’s steps (); Satan frightens you of poverty and prompts you to [commit] indecent acts (). Given these and many other similar verses, we can say:

(1) “Their front” refers to future events that lie ahead of them in this life, such as: (a) their hopes and desires which they like to achieve; (b) the pleasures which they seek; (c) the difficulties which they fear and wish to avoid, like becoming poor due to spending in the way of God, or being blamed by others due to entering a certain path—which is in reality good and praiseworthy.

(2) “Their rear” refers to their children and descendants. People tend to have certain hopes and fears with respect to their children, who will remain and live after them. People effectively feel that they will live indefinitely in this world, because they imagine themselves living through their children. Therefore, they find the pleasure and pain of their children to be their own pleasure and pain. This motivates them to accumulate wealth and make all preparations for them through any means possible, whether lawful or unlawful. But by so doing, they kill themselves for the sake of their children.

(3) “Their right (yamīn)” means what is auspicious (maymūn) and conducive to their [true and eternal] happiness, which is religion. Satan makes it appealing to them to exaggerate in certain religious acts, and to impose on themselves certain practices that have not been commanded by God. This is what God calls “following the footsteps of Satan.”

(4) “Their left” is the opposite of “their right”; it refers to Satan decorating indecency and wrong in the eyes of people. He tempts them to disobey God, commit sins, and pursue their desires.

Al-Zamakhsharī says in al-Kashshāf:

You might ask about the difference between the two prepositions used in this verse, where the verse uses min (from) for “front” and “back” but ʿan (from) for “right” and “left.”

The answer is that both prepositions are used to introduce the place or location of the verb “come” in the verse. There is more than one preposition used to introduce the place where a verb occurs (called mafʿūl fīhi), just as there is more than one preposition used to make a verb transitive and introduce its object (called mafʿūl bihi). We should take these from how Arabs employ their language; these things are not open to comparison and logical inference. We can only discuss whether a preposition is used properly or not [according to the common usage and convention of Arabs].

For instance, the verb “sit” is used with two prepositions: (1) “he sat ʿalā (over) his right”; and (2) “he sat ʿan (by) his right.” The former is used when someone sits on the right side of someone in a way that he has a dominant position over him and overshadows him. The latter is used when the person sits next to a person with some distance between them, without touching him. However, due to frequent usage, the latter is also used in other meanings [where there is no distance between the two individuals]. This is similar to the word taʿāl, which we discussed before.

… and You will not find most of them to be grateful: Here Satan states the outcome of what he is planning to do with humankind: I will surely lie in wait for them on Your straight path. Then I will come at them… (). Elsewhere in the Qur’an, God describes this in a different way. Instead of saying and You will not find most of them to be grateful, Satan says: Do You see this one whom You have honoured above me? If You respite me until the Day of Resurrection, I will surely destroy his progeny, [all] except a few (). As we see, there too Satan excludes “a few” from his temptation and deception, much like what we see in the current verse. In two other places Satan says: I will surely pervert them all, except Your chosen servants among them (, ).

Matching these verses shows that “the grateful” (al-shākirīn) in the current verse are the same as “the chosen ones” (al-mukhlaṣīn) [in verses and ]. We can indeed confirm this if we deeply reflect on what the two terms mean. Mukhlaṣūn are those who are purely dedicated to God and exclusively chosen by Him. This means that their servitude and worship are only for God, without associating any partners with Him whatsoever. No one other than God has any share of them. All they care about is God; they have forgotten everything and everyone other than their Lord, including themselves. There is nothing in their heart other than God. They lack the required medium for Satan and his temptations.

Shākirūn are those in whom the quality of gratefulness is rooted and established. Whenever they use anything, they express—verbally and practically—that what they have is from their Lord, Who has blessed them with that bounty. This is the meaning of gratefulness. As a result, they are constantly mindful of their Lord in their dealings with anything, including themselves and others. They see every being as a possession of God in its entirety, without having any independent control over any aspect of its existence. This is their mind-set before, during, and after they deal with anything or anyone. Since they are mindful of their Lord in such a manner, they have no room to be mindful of others. After all: Allah has not put two hearts within any man ().

Given the above explanations, if we analyze the true meaning of the two terms, “the grateful” (al-shākirīn) are the same as “the chosen ones” (al-mukhlaṣīn), who are necessarily exempt from Satan’s deceptions and temptations. He has no way to mislead them because they lie outside his purview. Therefore, the exclusion of these people from Satan’s temptations is based on their real characteristics, not based on some decision by Satan who could have decided otherwise. It is not a favor and kindness of Satan to some humans.

Satan said to the Almighty God: As You have consigned me to perversity, I will surely lie in wait for them on Your straight path… and You will not find most of them to be grateful (). He said that he will assault humankind from every possible angle and will cast them into perdition by leading them away from the straight path. However, he did not explain how he operates and what he will do to achieve this. Nevertheless, we can infer two points from what he said:

(1) He will deceive and mislead humankind by means of his own perversity—which he claimed to be an act of God. In other words, he approaches the people with his perverted soul, which means that what he transmits to them is perversity. This is like a fire that is placed next to some water: the fire heats up the water by its own heat. We can clearly see this idea in the following verses: Muster the wrongdoers and their mates and what they used to worship… Some of them will turn to others, questioning each other. They will say, “Indeed you used to accost us peremptorily.” They will answer, “Rather, you [yourselves] had no faith… So we perverted you, for we were perverse [ourselves]” ( and ).

(2) What Satan affects in humankind is their mental faculty of conception and confirmation of what should and should not be done. This is the nature of Satan’s activity and interaction with humans. We will elaborate on this in our discussion below on Iblīs and his function.

قالَ اخْرُجْ مِنْها مَذْؤُماً مَدْحُوراً لَمَنْ تَبِعَكَ مِنْهُمْ لَأَمْلَأَنَّ جَهَنَّمَ مِنْكُمْ أَجْمَعِينَ١٨

(7:18) Said He, “Begone hence, blameful (madhʾūman), banished (madḥūran)! Whoever of them follows you, I will surely fill hell with you all.”

The adjective madhʾūm (in the accusative case) is derived from the verb dhāmahu yadhāmuhu yadhīmuhu, which is used when someone reproaches and disparages someone. The adjective madḥūr (in the accusative case) is derived from the verb daḥarahu, which is said when someone repels and rejects someone with humiliation and degradation.

…Whoever of them (la-man) follows you…: The letter lām here indicates vow [for emphasis]. The complement of the vow is: I will surely fill hell… Satan said this as a threat to take revenge against humankind. While the purpose of their creation was for them to be grateful, Satan claimed that he would not let that materialize. Since Satan’s statement revolved around humankind, God also replied by first outlining what He will do to humankind: Whoever of them follows you. But then He also included Satan in His punishment in what follows next: I will surely fill hell with you (minkum) all, where the plural pronoun “you” refers to Satan and his followers among humans. This last part of the verse also bears a sign of God’s mercy and grace, because instead of including all of Satan’s followers, He said minkum (of you, from you), where the particle min (of, with, from) is partitive.

وَ يا آدَمُ اسْكُنْ أَنْتَ وَ زَوْجُكَ الْجَنَّةَ فَكُلا مِنْ حَيْثُ شِئْتُما وَ لا تَقْرَبا هذِهِ الشَّجَرَةَ فَتَكُونا مِنَ الظَّالِمِينَ ١٩

(7:19) [Then He said to Adam,] “O Adam, dwell with your mate in paradise, and eat thereof whence you wish; but do not approach this tree, lest you should be among the wrongdoers (al-ẓālimīn, from ẓulm).”

Here God specifically addresses Adam, but then adds his wife in His directive.

… and eat thereof whence you wish…: Although this statement is in the form of a command, it indicates permissibility [not obligation] of consuming everything except what is excluded: but do not approach this tree.

What is meant here by ẓulm (wrongdoing, injustice, oppression) is wronging and hurting oneself, not disobeying an authoritative command, because what God said was rather an advisory command.

فَوَسْوَسَ لَهُمَا الشَّيْطانُ لِيُبْدِيَ لَهُما ما وُورِيَ عَنْهُما مِنْ سَوْآتِهِما وَ قالَ ما نَهاكُما رَبُّكُما عَنْ هذِهِ الشَّجَرَةِ إِلاَّ أَنْ تَكُونا مَلَكَيْنِ أَوْ تَكُونا مِنَ الْخالِدِينَ٢٠

(7:20) Then Satan tempted (fa-waswasa) them, to expose to them what was hidden (wūriya, from muwārāh) from them of their shameful parts (sawʾātihimā), and he said, “Your Lord has only forbidden you from this tree lest you should become angels, or lest you become immortal.”

Waswasah means “prompting someone to an act with a soft quiet voice.” Muwārāh means “concealing something by placing it behind something that covers it.” Sawʾāh is the plural of sawʾah, which means “a body part that would disgrace and distress (yasūʾu) the person if it were to be revealed and seen.”

… Your Lord has only forbidden you from this tree lest you should become (an takūnā) angels (malakayn)…: The literal meaning here is, “Your Lord has only forbidden you from this tree in order that you become angels or become immortal”; however, the implied meaning is: “in order to avoid that you become angels or become immortal.”

The common recitation of the verse is with the word malak (angel, in its dual form malakayn), but it also implies mulk (kingdom, sovereignty) based on the verse: He [Satan] said, “O Adam! Shall I show you the tree of immortality, and an imperishable kingdom (mulk)?” ().

Majmaʿ al-bayān has narrated from the late al-Sayyid al-Murtaḍá:

Another possible interpretation for what Satan said—lest you should become angels…—is that he suggested to Adam and Eve that the prohibition on eating from the tree is only applicable to the angels and the immortals, not to them. This is like when we say, “You have not been prohibited this unless you are so-and-so” (mā nuhīta ʿan kadhā illā an takūna fulānan), where what we mean is that “only so-and-so has been prohibited.” This makes Satan’s deception stronger and more cunning.

However, we should reject the above possibility based on the verse from Sūrah Ṭā-Hā [], which we just quoted above.

وَ قاسَمَهُما إِنِّي لَكُما لَمِنَ النَّاصِحِينَ ٢١

(7:21) And he swore to them (qāsamahumā, from muqāsamah), “I am indeed your well-wisher (al-nāṣiḥīn, from nuṣḥ).”

Muqāsamah [from the root qasam (vow, swear), in the verbal pattern mufāʿalah] indicates exaggeration in vow and swearing. Nuṣḥ (sincerity, honesty, sympathy) is the opposite of ghishsh (deception, cheating). The meaning is: “Satan swore to them and accentuated that he only wishes them well and gives them good counsel.”

فَدَلاَّهُما بِغُرُورٍ فَلَمَّا ذاقَا الشَّجَرَةَ بَدَتْ لَهُما سَوْآتُهُما وَ طَفِقا يَخْصِفانِ عَلَيْهِما مِنْ وَرَقِ الْجَنَّةِ وَ ناداهُما رَبُّهُما أَ لَمْ أَنْهَكُما عَنْ تِلْكُمَا الشَّجَرَةِ وَ أَقُلْ لَكُما إِنَّ الشَّيْطانَ لَكُما عَدُوٌّ مُبِينٌ ٢٢

(7:22) Thus he brought about their fall (fa-dallāhumā, from tadliyah) by deception (bi-ghurūr). So when they tasted of the tree, their shameful parts became exposed to them, and they began to stitch (yakhṣifāni, from khaṣf) over themselves with the leaves of paradise. Their Lord called out to them, “Did I not forbid you from that tree, and tell you that Satan is indeed your manifest enemy?”

Tadliyah means “to bring something closer to something else and make it reach the other thing.” It is similar to tadallī, which is “to be loosened and drop down.” Apparently these terms are used metaphorically, derived from the idea of suspending and sending down a bucket, where one says: dalawtu al-dalw (I unleashed the bucket). Ghurūr means “to express well-wishing while intending to cheat.” Khaṣf is “to gather and join.” One of its usages is khaṣf al-naʿl (cobbling, shoemaking, stitching a shoe).

… Their Lord called out (nādāhuma, frim nidāʾ) to them, “Did I not forbid you from that (tilkumā) tree, and tell you that Satan is indeed your manifest enemy?”: Nidāʾ means “calling from a distance.” The use of this term shows that at this point Adam and Eve were far from their Lord. Likewise, tilkumā (that) is a demonstrative pronoun that is used for objects at a distance. This shows that they were also distanced from the forbidden tree, unlike the beginning of their entrance into the garden, when God told them: but do not approach this tree () [where the demonstrative pronoun “this” (hādhihi) indicates an object that is near].

قالا رَبَّنا ظَلَمْنا أَنْفُسَنا وَ إِنْ لَمْ تَغْفِرْ لَنا وَ تَرْحَمْنا لَنَكُونَنَّ مِنَ الْخاسِرِينَ ٢٣

(7:23) They said, “Our Lord, we have wronged ourselves! If You do not forgive us and have mercy upon us, we will surely be among the losers.”

This prayer by Adam and Eve shows their utmost level of humility and earnest petition before their Lord, such that they did not explicitly request anything. They only expressed their dire need for God’s forgiveness and mercy, and the risk of their eternal failure. They expressed these points and left the rest to God’s will.

قالَ اهْبِطُوا بَعْضُكُمْ لِبَعْضٍ عَدُوٌّ وَ لَكُمْ فِي الْأَرْضِ مُسْتَقَرٌّ وَ مَتاعٌ إِلى‏ حِينٍ٢٤

(7:24) He said, “Get down, being enemies of one another! On the earth shall be your abode and sustenance for some time.”

Apparently the verse has a consistent theme, which means that all its plural pronouns refer to Adam, his wife, and Satan. God addresses them with two decrees: (1) They shall be enemies of one another—according to their evident difference of nature and makeup. (2) They shall have an abode on the earth until the end of the life of this world (dunyā).

قالَ فِيها تَحْيَوْنَ وَ فِيها تَمُوتُونَ وَ مِنْها تُخْرَجُونَ ٢٥

(7:25) He said, “In it you will live, and in it you will die; and from it you will be raised [from the dead].”

This is a third decree that God made, but it is likely that this was specifically addressed to Adam, Eve, and their descendants, because the verse is separated from the last verse by the repetition of the word qāla (He said) [which could have been left out]. God decreed that they should be bound on the earth until the Resurrection. We discussed the story of Adam’s garden elaborately in Sūrah al-Baqarah. Interested readers should refer to there.

Discourse

The discussions “Iblīs and his Function”; “Clarifying the Problem”; “Back to Iblīs”; “Summary” appear here in the printed volume. Read them in the Al-Mizan App.

The Objections of Satan against the Angels: A Qur’anic and Rational Discussion

Key Debate: Satan's Objections →

Rūḥ al-maʿānī says:

There is a debate that hypothetically took place between the Devil and the angels after the story of prostration. Al-Shahrastānī has quoted this from one of the commentators of the four Gospels, and it is also mentioned in the Torah. According to this account, the cursed Devil told the angels: “I admit that I have a God Who has created me and brought me to existence. However, I have some questions with respect to His wisdom:

1. What was the point of creation? Especially with respect to the disbelievers, since God knew that they will end up in hell.
2. What is the point of religious obligation? After all, no benefit or loss reaches God. If it is about some benefit accruing to His creation, He could have given it to them directly, without needing the channel of their obedience.
3. Granted that He obligated me to know Him and obey Him, why did He oblige me to prostrate myself to Adam?
4. When I refused to prostrate, why did He curse me and decree my punishment, even though there is no benefit in that for Him or anyone else, but there is the greatest loss in it for me?
5. When He cursed me, why did He still give me authority over Adam’s children and enable me to deceive and mislead them?
6. When I requested Him to respite me for such a long time, why did He grant my request, even though clearly a world without evil would have been better?”

The commentator of the Gospels says: Then God revealed to Satan from His station of glory and holiness: “O Iblīs! You do not know Me! Had you known Me, you would have realized that no objection can be raised to any of My acts. For indeed I am Allah, there is no god but Me, and I am never held accountable for what I do.”

Then al-Ālūsī quotes from al-Imām al-Rāzī:

If all people are gathered from the beginning of creation until its end, they would not find any way out of these objections as long as they advocate independent rational values. They would have to concede all of these problems.

Al-Ālūsī then adds:

Here I shall present an account which I find quite fascinating. It is narrated that once Sayf al-Dawlah b. Ḥamdān met his entourage and said, “I have composed a line of poetry that I cannot conceive of anyone being able to add a second line to it—except perhaps for Abū Firās.” Incidentally, Abū Firās was sitting there in the crowd. They told him, “What is your poem?” He recited:

لَكَ جِسْمِي تَعُلُّهُ فَدَمِي لِمَ تَطُلُّهُ‏

You keep striking my body,

Which is yours, I agree;

But why spill my blood?

This is my plea!

Then Abū Firās improvised:

قَالَ إِنْ كُنْتُ مَالِكاً فَلِيَ الْأَمْرُ كُلُّهُ‏

He said, “If I’m the owner

Then it’s all up to me!”

Detailed Response to Satan’s Objections

Our explanations above would answer all of these six objections, without needing the entire creation to gather from the beginning to the end—as al-Imām [al-Rāzī] has claimed—and still being unable to solve them. For further clarification, we shall discuss the six questions one by one:

(1) The first objection is about the wisdom behind God’s creation. This refers to the aspect of good and benefit in an act which makes an agent perform the act. In the case of God, one can ask about the wisdom behind the creation of all beings in general, or the wisdom behind the creation of humankind in particular.

If the question is about God’s act of creation in general, then it has been proven in its place that God is a perfect agent Who is absolutely needless of anything beyond Himself. He does not depend on anything to complete His agency (fāʿiliyyah) or divinity (ulūhiyyah). He is the origin of everything other than Him and the source of all good and mercy by the virtue of His essence. His very existence necessitates the creation, because one of His essential qualities is that He is the Origin, and it is senseless to demand a reason for a necessary property. We can compare this to one who is inherently generous, meaning that generosity has become a malakah (second nature, natural disposition, permanent quality) to him. Such nature necessitates—by the virtue of itself, not by anything external to it—to manifest certain signs, effects and blessings. If it manifests because of any consideration other than the quality itself, then that would not be a malakah. It is a necessary consequence of this essence to have certain expressions, where everyone would benefit from it according to their receptive capability and capacity. If the containers differ in terms of their capacity to receive blessings, then that difference goes back to them, not to the essential property of the agent, which is only a source of good.

It is often said that there must be some wisdom—meaning a purpose or beneficial aspect—in the act of an agent, where the agent does the act for that purpose. In the case of imperfect agents, this would be a benefit that accrues to the agent who lacks it before doing the act, and grows to perfection by achieving that objective. However, in the case of an Agent Who possesses all good and perfection, His purpose in His acts would be His very essence. He is not motivated to act in order to achieve anything beyond Himself, just as we saw in the case of generosity when it becomes an established property in the person. It is true that the acts of such an Agent have numerous benefits, and that God’s blessings never end, but these benefits and blessings are not primary objective that God aims for in His acts [as imperfect agents aim for objectives in their acts]. They are rather secondary objectives and by-products of His agency. This is what we can say about God’s creation overall.

The question, however, seems to be about the wisdom behind creating humankind, because it points to God’s knowledge that disbelievers would end up in hell. As we said above, the point in God’s creation cannot be interpreted as something that He gains and benefits from. God is rich and needless of all things by the virtue of His essence. He is not perfected by achieving anything. What is meant by wisdom in the case of God is the perfection of His act to full fruition. His wisdom in the creation of humankind is to take the abject earthly material and make a special composition of it which will be able to journey toward a degree of perfection that is above the perfection of all other beings in existence. He has created a being of dust which can reach a degree of proximity to his Lord that cannot be achieved by anything else. This is the ultimate purpose of the human species.

Meanwhile, we should bear in mind that this creature is made of earthly material, which [inherently and necessarily] consists of opposites. It grows in a realm of multiplicity and conflict, and is surrounded by favorable and unfavorable phenomena. This entails that not all members of such a species would be spared of the opposing forces in this life. Hence, only a subset of them will come to fruition and succeed in making it to their desired happy end.

This is nothing exclusive to humankind. Rather, all material beings in this world are like this, including all animals, plants, and inorganic objects. There are millions of various species in this world, and all of them have a certain perfection which they pursue as a species. However, not every member of the species reaches that goal. They achieve their perfection collectively as a species, but not individually. There are many members which perish along the way, due to unfavorable causes and events which stop their growth. They fail to reach the end that is intended for them. We cannot even assume a being in the world of nature which is secure from these opposing factors. All species in the world of nature are surrounded by such factors, and these factors will inevitably have their impact on the species. Suppose a plant that is unaffected by forces that are against its natural composition—such as heat, cold, light, darkness, moisture, dryness, poison and harmful minerals. That would contradict the assumption that it is a plant with a special natural composition, and also the universal law of causality. Such expectation of a species is against the order of the entire universe [which has the universal law of causality at its core].

If the acts and efforts of some members of a species go to waste, that is not necessarily vain and contrary to wisdom, as long as the entire setup leads other members to their intended goal and perfection, meaning the ultimate end of that species. This is the most that can come out of material creation. Moreover, it is worthwhile to spend large amounts of matter—which is at the base of all planes of existence and the least worthy of them all—in order to acquire a few sublime jewels that top all existential perfections. That would be a real gain rather than a loss or waste of resources.

The objective in the creation of humankind is the perfect human being who reaches the pinnacle of felicity in this world and the next. However, humans are a material species, in that they are composed of matter and exist in the world of nature. This composition means that they are subject to the laws of the material world which govern all beings in the realm of nature. They are born and grow in a realm with various forces at work and different factors that affect each other. A necessary consequence of such a mode of existence is that some members of this species (the homo sapiens) would fail to reach the desired human perfection. Hence, the achievement of maximum human perfection is the primary and essential purpose of creation of humankind, while the failure of some members is intended secondarily as an unavoidable consequence of the first objective.

God’s purpose in the creation of humankind is for them to achieve their ultimate perfection. He knows that many of them will be disbelievers and thus end up in hell, but this does not harm His primary objective in the creation of the entire species. Moreover, what makes someone a disbeliever—and thus subject to punishment in the hereafter—is not the fact that they are created by God, but there are numerous factors which determine this end for a person, the last of which is the person’s choice [to disbelieve and do evil voluntarily]. Because of this element of choice, they are responsible for their disbelief. Their disbelief is a result of several constituent causes, where only some of these constituent causes can be ascribed to their Creator. Finally, one may say that God has indeed willed their disbelief, but God has willed so only through their choice and volition. His will does not render them compelled to act in a certain way—like a rock that falls toward the earth involuntarily.

(2) Questioning religious obligations on the basis that “no benefit or loss reaches God” is a fallacy because it assumes that the same laws which govern imperfect agents are applicable to a Perfect Agent Who is completely rich and needless in His essence. It is a rule of reason that for any act to be wise and sensible, it must have some benefit for the actor, but this rule is only applicable to imperfect agents which seek to perfect themselves and gain some benefit through their act. It is not applicable to God, Who is assumed to be an essentially needless agent. There is no rational argument for either of the following claims: (i) All agents must derive some benefit from their act, including agents that are needless by the virtue of their essence. (ii) If an agent is needless by the virtue of its essence, then it is impossible for it to perform any act.

Religious obligations pertain to the domain of iʿtibār (convention, social contract, mental construction), which is distinct from the domain of ḥaqīqah (existential reality, external world). Nevertheless, it is through social and religious conventions and laws that the individuals move from one mode of existence to a more complete mode of existence. Hence, religious obligations are a link between two real external entities.

To further clarify this, we know both experimentally and rationally that all species in the realm of nature are subject to “motion” in its metaphysical sense, meaning that they follow a path that extends from a state of potentiality to a state of actualization. This connected line of growth is what marks the continuation and subsistence (baqāʾ) of that being which is ever changing. The different links in this chain of growth have a real and organic connection with one another, such that one leads to the next. The being pursues these links as stages of its growth, and aims toward the final destination from the very onset of its existence.

For example, a grain of wheat is headed toward a full wheat plant from the very beginning when it splits and sprouts. Similarly, the zygote of an animal is on the path to become a mature animal with everything that makes that species complete. The human being is no exception to this universal law. Every individual, from the very beginning of their conception, are directed toward the stage of maximum human perfection and eternal happiness. Sometimes the beings reach their intended objective, and sometimes their growth is interrupted by certain obstacles.

Now, human beings have a kind of existence that requires them to live socially, and social life is only possible under certain laws and norms that are accepted among the members of the society. This is called social contract. It is a set of conventional views, values and laws, whether rooted in religion or not. Acting in accordance to these principles will develop a set of beliefs and traits in the individuals, which result in their happy life in this world. Likewise, their happiness in the hereafter is a consequence of their adherence to these conventional matters, which results in either reward or punishment.

Hence, the wisdom in religious obligation is that it bears with itself a gradual transformation for humans toward their ultimate perfection, according to their individual traits and personalities. By acting upon these injunctions, they advance step-by-step toward an end that is better and more lasting for them. In case they neglect these instructions, they will fail to achieve that end. In this sense, humankind is just like any other species: they have a path which leads them to their perfection as long as the means and requirements are there; but if the conditions of their growth are not met, they will not reach their intended goal. If one asks, “what is the point of religious obligation?” it is like asking “what is the point of nourishment for plants?” or “why should animals mate even though it has no benefit [for God]?”

Another part of Satan’s objection was: “God could give any benefit to His creatures directly and without the intermediation of religious obligations.” This is also a fallacy. Based on what we said above, we are talking about a species whose creation is such that it must follow a gradual path toward perfection. Religious obligations are directed at humans (and other similar beings that are subject to religious legislation) because that is their path from potentiality to actualization. They need these injunctions for their existential transformation toward their full development. Satan’s objection can be interpreted in two ways:

(i) “Why the path of religious obligation and not another path?” We can answer this question in two ways: (a) A destructive answer (al-jawāb al-naqḍī), which would be: “Why not?” That is, there must be some path and intermediation for beings that grow gradually, and any perceivable path would be identical to any other path inasmuch as they are all intermediary stages. If another path had been set for humankind, then one could equally ask, “Why this path and not another?” (b) A constructive answer (al-jawāb al-ḥallī), saying that the laws and factors which govern humankind are such that they require a set of religious obligations for this species to reach its perfection. They need to purify their souls and purge their inside by persistent adherence to these obligations. Their creation is such that they need these injunctions in order to grow.

(ii) “Why any intermediation at all? Why not create them from the beginning in an actualized state, at full perfection and eternal bliss? Why should there be some movement and gradual growth?” The answer is: That would negate existential transformation, materiality and potentiality, all of which are necessary properties of a contingent creation [in the world of nature]. A being like that would be a being that is created from day one in a state of immateriality, perfection and happiness. That is not the case of humans, which are created from the earth as imperfect beings, which should then actualize their potentialities gradually. In other words, the proposed scenario is self-contradictory.

(3) Satan said: “Granted that He obligated me to know Him and obey Him, why did He oblige me to prostrate myself to Adam?” The answer to this question is obvious: God’s order served to complete and actualize Satan. If he chose to prostrate himself to Adam, then his quality of servitude and obedience to God would be completed. And if he refused to do so, then that would manifest his pride and defiance. Either way, this order entails a perfection of a quality in Satan by God, either in the direction of fortune or misfortune. Satan chose the latter.

Moreover, commanding Satan and the angels to prostrate to Adam laid out the straight path which Adam and his descendants should follow. This path requires some helpers who call them to good, which are the angels; and some enemies who call them to deviation and error, which are Satan and his hosts. We already discussed this quality [of the straight path] and these two roles [of angels and devils].

(4) Satan said: “Why did God curse me and decreed my punishment when I disobeyed His command, even though that does not benefit Him?” The answer is that God’s curse and punishment are not an arbitrary assignment, but they signify a reality. They are an inevitable consequence of having a sense of arrogance and defiance against God, which is the root of every disobedience. As we said above, God does not act in pursuit of some gain or interest, so it is irrelevant to question His deeds on this account.

His objection is like saying: “Why should one who drinks poison die by it? Why doesn’t God make that a source of healing for the person, given that He does not benefit from the person’s death, while the person suffers a great loss? Why doesn’t He make poison quench his thirst, nourish his body, and please his senses?” All these expectations are due to ignorance about the system of cause and effect, which God has placed in the world. Every phenomenon in this world is connected to its specific causes and means, such that it necessarily occurs as a result of those causes, without any change or failure. This is a universal law.

When a soul defiles itself by committing a sin, that act of disobedience necessitates punishment for that soul. This necessary consequence can be avoided only if the soul is purified through repentance, intercession, or a good deed that necessitates an overriding forgiveness. If the punishment is revoked without any of these required means, that would be a violation of the universal law of causality. If this law is violated, then there will be no basis for anything.

(5) Satan said: “When He cursed me, why did He still give me authority over Adam’s children and enable me to deceive and misguide them?” The answer to this objection should be clear based on what we said above. Obedience, acting upon the truth, and following guidance, only make sense in contrast to disobedience, acting upon falsehood, and falling into misguidance. The full actualization of a call to truth hinges on the existence of some call to falsehood. If there is to be a straight path, there must be other ways that deviate from the desired destination.

Therefore, as long as there is human life and the species continues to exist through its consecutive generations, there must necessarily be a caller to falsehood who leads the people toward the punishment of hell. This means that Satan serves humankind as a species overall. Besides, the only authority that God has given him is that of calling and tempting the people, as the Qur’an states expressly and also narrates from him—when he addresses the people on the Day of Resurrection.

6) Satan said, “When I requested Him to respite me for such a long time, why did He grant my request?” Our answer to the last objection should clarify this question. He also said, “Clearly a world without evil would have been better.” Again, as we explained above, having a world without evil and corruption means having an immaterial world. This is against the assumption that we are talking about material existence in the world of nature. It is meaningless to have a material world where there is actuality without potentiality, good without evil, gain without loss, stability without change, obedience without disobedience, or reward without punishment.

God cannot be Questioned about His Actions

It was narrated above [in al-Ālūsī’s quote from the commentator of the Gospels] that God responded to Satan’s objections by saying: “O Iblīs! You do not know Me! Had you known Me, you would have realized that no objection can be raised to any of My acts. For indeed I am Allah, there is no god but Me, and I am never held accountable for what I do.” This is a paraphrase of what God says in the Qur’an: He is not questioned concerning what He does, but they are questioned (). Apparently what is narrated from God here is a brief and general response to Satan’s objections, not a detailed explanation of them one-by-one. It means that all these points mean calling God into question and objecting to His actions, but He is not liable to any question or objection, because He is God, besides Whom there is no god.

Apparently the second part of God’s answer—that “I am never held accountable”—is stated as a consequence of the first part: “Indeed I am Allah, there is no god but Me.” This amounts to a demonstrative argument which we can elaborate as follows: He is “God,” meaning the Origin and End of everything. Therefore, one cannot ask for any other agent (fāʿil) or objective (ghāyah) to justify God’s actions. He is the ultimate agent above all agents, and the final end beyond all ends. We cannot assume there to be any other agent behind God’s actions, because that agent would need some power in order to act, while all power belongs to God. Similarly, We cannot assume there to be any objective in God’s actions besides Himself, because any objective is sought due to some good in it, while all good is in the hands of God.

That is why He cannot be questioned concerning what He does, because questioning an action means asking either “where did this come from” or “for what purpose was this done?” Neither of these are applicable to God because He is the cause of all causes, and the objective of all objectives. As with other agents, their power to act comes from God, and any good or interest that they gain is bestowed upon them by God, in the sense that He has set up the system of causes and means which bring one’s objective to fruition. Hence, agents other than God can be questioned why they perform a certain act. The most common questions concerning one’s actions pertain to the purpose of the act, meaning its aspect of good and benefit. This is especially the case with respect to voluntary acts in a social context, where the act can be described as good, bad, praiseworthy and blameworthy, according to how it serves social welfare.

What we said above is a sound explanation [of why God cannot be questioned about His acts], supported by both rational proof and scriptural evidence. The theologians, however, have differed widely on this topic due to their opposing views about whether or not the acts of God can be justified by a purpose. The Ashʿarite view is that it is possible for God to act arbitrarily, and that one can ascribe evil, sin and misfortune to Him. They hold that God can do whatever He wants, whether His act comprises of some purpose and benefit or not. Human reason cannot judge Him as it judges other agents, where reason dictates that the agent’s action must include some purpose—meaning a benefit that results from that act.

The Muʿtazilite view is that it is impossible for God to do something without a purpose, because that means that God’s acts can be vain and haphazard, which is certainly not true. They hold that God is not questioned concerning what He does because He is All-Wise, meaning that He bestows upon everyone and everything according to its capacity and worth. Questioning one about their acts pertains to agents whose acts may sometimes be evil, futile or random. However, since God is a wise agent, He is not questioned concerning what He does, while other agents are.

This is a lengthy debate that has continued between the scholars from the two parties and other schools for centuries. An elaborate treatment of the topic is beyond the scope of this book. However, I should bring up an important point that would help to clarify the fact of the matter in this regard.

Two Forms of Human Knowledge

We can classify our knowledge into two kinds of propositions:

(1) There are certain propositions which do not pertain to our actions. These are descriptive statements about external truths, regardless of whether we, as individuals and societies, live and act in this world or not. Some examples are: “four is even,” “one is half of two,” “the world exists” and “there is a sun and a moon.” These are either self-evident propositions, or analytic propositions which can be traced back to axioms and proven thereby.

(2) There are other propositions which pertain to our actions and interactions in this world. These are normative statements which are constructed through social contracts and are applicable to the human world. We rely on these principles to organize our life in the society, make plans about what we should do, and justify our voluntary acts. These propositions do not reflect the external world as a primary function, unlike the first type of propositions. It is true that we impose and implement them in the external world, but they are conventional by nature, not real. Some examples are conventional rules and guidelines that we agree upon in our social interactions, governed by titles like “manager,” “head,” “king,” “owner,” and so on. When we say that “Zayd is the head,” we refer to a position that has been assigned a him based on social contract. It is a conventional quality (called iʿtibārī) which exists only in our mind, as opposed to a real attribute (called ḥaqīqī) which has a real referent and instance in the external world. What we have out there is only Zayd as a human. His managerial position is not like real qualities such as his height and color. “Zayd is the head” is not like “Zayd is tall” or “Zayd is black.” We have mentally derived, constructed and conceptualized the title “head” for Zayd from our social institutions. We humans gather to function together because of some common need in life, and then agree to entrust the management of our affairs to Zayd. He is assigned to place everything where it belongs, and direct things according to his discretion. Seeing this setup, we conclude that the relation of Zayd to our group is that of “head” to the body. We assign this title to him in order to maintain the collective functioning of the group and benefit from it.

The title “head” only exists in our mind, not in the external world. However, we treat it as a real quality for the welfare and interest of the society. The same thing applies to all other conventional qualities and titles that we have set up to govern our social life. All of these are constructed and assigned by humans based on social contract, for the functioning of our life in this world. They do not have any corresponding reality or existence beyond the mind.

These are the two types of knowledge. The difference between them is that the first type is derived from the external world and has a real connection with it. Thus it can be called either true or false, based on whether or not it matches the external reality. “Truth” means that what we have in our mind is exactly the same as what there is in the outside, and vice versa. The second type exists only mentally, without any counterpart in the real world. However, we treat it as a real quality which corresponds to the outside world for the purpose of social welfare and interest (maṣlaḥah). It is hypothetically assumed to have some reality in the external world, even though it really does not.

Saying that “Zayd is the head” based on a social consideration is like saying, “Zayd is a lion” as a figurative expression or a poetic image. Calling him a “head” among people is like a poet calling him a “lion.” The same can be said about anything that is conventionally constructed, including both concepts and propositions. These conventional meanings are a result of a mental making, as opposed to being derived from the outside world and corresponding to an external reality. Nevertheless, they are based on an external reality in another sense: these titles and notion show a certain need and deficiency in humankind which has led them to construct these concepts and laws. It was due to some real material or spiritual goal that humans had to assume these meanings, in order to give direction to their activities, so that they may reach those goals and find happiness thereby.

Here is where we can see why social contracts differ from one society to another: it is because they ensue from a need for different goals. For example, there may be many actions and traits that are approved by communities near the North Pole, but not by communities near the equator. Similarly, there are differences between eastern and western societies, and between urban and rural communities. Moreover, it could be that in a single society, the majority of the people approve of something, while a minority do not. The same can be said about how social roles are viewed and defined in different societies, with respect to rich versus the poor, master versus servant, employer versus the employee, old versus young, male versus female. Meanwhile, there are some conventional laws and matters that are unanimously agreed upon by all societies, such as the necessity of having a social setup to begin with, the goodness of justice, and the evilness of injustice.

Overall, our second type of knowledge also depends on the external world, although it is not a reflection of outside reality, unlike the first type. This means that all our knowledge is based on God’s action, because external reality—which is a source and point of reference for all our propositions—is a creation of God’s. Therefore, when we say, “one is half of two by necessity,” it means that “God has set this as a fixed relationship between one and two.” Similarly, when we say that “Zayd must be respected as the head” it means that “God has created humans in a way that leads them to assume such conventions and act upon them.” In the same light we can trace all statements to God’s making.

This means that any assertion made by human reason—including theoretical reason and practical reason—is derived from the plane of divine actions and depends on that. In terms of theoretical reason, there is no difference in this regard between propositions that state a fact as a necessity and those that state a fact as a possibility. Likewise, in terms of practical reason, it does not make a difference whether the proposition classifies something as good or evil. The rulings of practical reason are based on beneficial and harmful consequences, which are again part of God’s making.

Our theoretical reason decides what is necessary, possible or impossible; and our practical reason discerns what is good or bad. However, all of these qualities are derived from the very act of God Himself. So how could our reason take precedence over Him? How could we hold God subject to the rulings of our reason? Any judgment by our reason would confine and qualify God’s absolute essence. This is a most egregious injustice which some theologians [that is, the Muʿtazilites] have committed. If we let theoretical reason make statements about God, it means that God can be defined. This is impossible in the case of God, because being defined means being subject to external limits that determine the boundaries of something. It is logically impossible for anything to delimit itself; thus having defining limits means being subject to an external force, to something beyond the thing itself. Likewise, we cannot let practical reason make statements about God, because that implies that there is some deficiency in God which must be filled with the conventional laws and customs that practical reason assumes. This is based on the function of the two types of human knowledge that we explained above. The reader is encouraged to pause and reflect here.

Nevertheless, it is also a most egregious injustice if we claim that human reason has no way to understand the acts of God, whether His creation [of the universe] or His legislation [of religious laws]. In other words, we cannot dismiss the rulings of our theoretical reason and practical reason [which are inferred from God’s creation and legislation, respectively]. We cannot make any exceptions to rational laws. We shall clarify this in two stages, according to our two types of knowledge:

(1) In terms of facts, our theoretical reason deduces certain universal laws from God’s action [which is the world of existence]. That is how it proves God’s existence to begin with. Now, having derived this conclusion, we cannot then turn our back to this faculty and reject its other necessary conclusions on the account that our intellect is too inferior to encompass the essence of God or comprehend His attributes. Putting a hold on theoretical reason, some theologians [that is, the Ashʿarites] have argued that God’s acts are not a necessary consequence of His essence, but are only backed by His will. Some corollaries of this are: (i) God may do or not do any given act. The doing or not doing of any given act has an absolutely equal relation to His essence. (ii) He has no purpose or objective in His acts. (iii) Both good and evil can be ascribed to Him.

The problem is that if we reject our intellect’s capability of discerning and classifying God’s actions [as good and bad, or possible and impossible], then we have rejected its capability of discerning God’s existence in the first place. Furthermore, this implies a contradiction that is even more problematic, because it means that our rational inferences do not match the source from which they are inferred. It means that we deduce a conclusion from certain premises, then we claim that our conclusions are not applicable to those very premises. This is nothing but sophistry, which leaves no place for any kind of knowledge, and which is also counter-intuitive (it is against our fiṭrah). If any of God’s actions or attributes could violate our rational principles, it would mean a mismatch between reason and the external world—which is an act of God, while our rational principles are deduced from the external world. If we concede that even one of these certain conclusions which are deduced by our reason could be doubted and rejected, then we must accept that all of our rational inferences could be wrong. This cancels human knowledge altogether, and that is the meaning of sophistry.

(2) In terms of actions, our practical and normative statements are certain laws and conventions that we mentally construct and assume in order to reach some goal and betterment in life. Any act that is conducive to that felicitous end is classified as good, and our practical reason commands to it. Any act that is an obstacle to that goal is classified as evil and wrong, and our practical reason prohibits it. In other words, what makes an act good or evil is its contribution or lack of contribution to a certain objective in life. In the first place, we come up with such classifications of good and bad because of some consideration of a certain interest or welfare. We construct our conventional statements—in the form of social laws and contracts—to serve that end in our mind. Hence, in the realm of normative knowledge, it is rather senseless to talk about any law or conventional statement that is neutral toward good and evil, or that is not backed by any objective.

When we talk about God’s legislation, we are talking about the same type and nature of statements that we have in our societies. For example, when we talk about God’s prescriptions, proscriptions, commands, prohibitions, promises and warnings, they are of the same nature as human prescriptions, proscriptions, commands, prohibitions, promises and warnings. This is obvious. These are conventional meanings that our minds conceive and claim. Meanwhile, mental claims are prone to error, while God is free from that. Therefore, when He makes a legislation—which is a conventional matter with only mental existence—its aspect of uncertainty is on the side of humans only. This is much like God’s statements of wish (tamannī) and hope (tarajjī): they do not indicate any uncertainty on God’s part, but they show ignorance on the part of the audience. Otherwise, His legislations are like our legislations, in the sense that they pertain to humans—as social animals—that have to move from deficiency to perfection and achieve human happiness through the intermediation of their actions. This proves that God’s actions in the realm of legislation are never devoid of some purpose or objective. Good and evil are also applicable to His commands and prohibitions, according to whether they lead to a benefit or a loss.

This should clarify the problem with two statements [made by the Ashʿarites]: (1) “God’s legislations cannot be justified by any objective.” This is like saying: “God has made a path that does not lead to any destination.” The problem is that a “path” by definition is what leads to some destination, and an “intermediary” is what connects two things at its two ends. (2) “Good is whatever God commands, and evil is whatever God prohibits. Hence, if God commands something that is evil by the necessary rule of reason—such as injustice—then that would be good; and if He prohibits something that is good by the necessary rule of reason—such as justice—then that would be evil.” This statement is like saying: “If God leads humankind toward their loss and perdition, then that would be their prosperity and happiness; and if He stops them from their true and eternal bliss, then that would transform bliss into wretchedness.”

The Validity of Human Reason

With respect to theoretical reason, which is concerned with declarative statements, the truth is that there is some place for what human reason discerns and states about God. We ascribe to God certain qualities of perfection which we find in ourselves, such as knowledge, power and life. We also ascribe to Him the creation and direction of all beings, and affirm other qualities for Him such as mercy, forgiveness, provision, blessing and guidance. Human reason establishes all of these for God based on demonstration. However, our qualities of perfection are limited, while God is far exalted above all limits. Any concepts is also limited, because every concept is different from other concepts, which implies a certain demarcation. This contravenes the absoluteness of God’s essence. Hence, human reason complements its assertions by negating limitation from God. It admits that God is greater than being described by any description, and is far higher than being enclosed by any condition or limit. Therefore, our reason does justice to Him and brings us close to His knowledge through coupling tashbīh (anthropomorphism, comparison, resemblance) with tanzīh (transcendence, incomparability, abstraction). We quoted a few profound sermons from Imam ʿAlī which clarify and prove this point rationally in the clearest way, under our discussion of the verse, They are certainly faithless who say, “Allah is the third [person] of a trinity” (). Readers are encouraged to consult that discussion.

With respect to practical reason, which is concerned with imperative statements, there is some place for what human reason states about the legislative acts of God. However, it should be clarified that what God legislates and enacts conventionally are not because of some need on His part. Rather, they are His means of bestowing some benefit and blessing upon humankind, in order to fulfill their needs, for indeed Allah is dispenser of a great grace [, , , , , ]. Therefore, on the one hand, there is some purpose and objective behind God’s legislations; while on the other hand this objective pertains to humankind, not to God. There is always some benefit that justifies God’s command, but the beneficiary is humankind, not God. We explained this point above.

This means that we are entitled to inquire about the rational justification and purpose behind God’s legislations, and search for their underlying good, evil, benefit or loss. However, this does not mean that human reason can impose anything on God as it imposes on humans. We cannot command or prohibit something upon God as either obligatory or forbidden, because He is absolutely needless of achieving any perfection. That is why He is not subject to any command, unlike us. We stand before Him like servants and subjects before a mighty and powerful king. All of our affairs are in His hands, including our life, death, sustenance, direction, actions, accounts, rewards and punishments. It is in this light that He has legislated certain codes and enacted certain injunctions for us. That is why His treatment of us is entirely based on proof: There is a valid justification behind anything that He commands us; He does not accept any excuse from us unless there is a legitimate explanation for it; and all His retribution is completely justifiable. This is reflected in verses that talk about His argument against the people and the jinn on the Day of Resurrection, such as: so that humankind may not have any argument against Allah, after the [sending of the] messengers (); so that he who perishes might perish by a manifest proof, and he who lives may live on by a manifest proof (). This entails that from the perspective of practical reason, God’s actions are according to the same criteria that apply to the acts of others, and all these are laws that He has set up Himself [as the Creator of human reason].

It is in this light that God negates all vices—that count as vices according to social conventions—from Himself in numerous verses, such as: Indeed Allah does not wrong people in the least (); Indeed Allah does not break His promise (); We did not create the heavens and the earth and whatever is between them for play ().

There are also many verses which confirm that the rulings of both theoretical and practical reason are applicable to divine actions:

(1) Concerning statements made by theoretical reason [which are factual statements that do not pertain to human actions] the Qur’an says: The truth is from your Lord, so do not be among the skeptics (). The verse does not say that “the truth is with your Lord” because true statements and facts are rather inferred from His acts. Unlike the case of our deeds, God’s actions do not follow the truth as a source of their legitimacy. Another verse is: Allah judges, and there is none who may repeal His judgement (). This means that He has absolute authority to judge, without any rational impediment or any other impediment that may qualify His judgment. All impediments and qualifications are rather a result of His acts, which makes them subsequent to His acts. God’s actions are not subject to the influence or authority of anything that takes precedence over them. The Qur’an also says: He is the One, the All-Paramount (); Allah has [full] command of His affairs (); Indeed Allah carries through His command (). He is the All-Paramount, the Defeater, and the Executer that is not overcome by anything, is not defeated in any matter, and cannot be stopped from anything by any opposing barrier. Another verse is: Look! All creation and command belong to Him (). There are also many other verses in this regard that are stated in an absolute way, without being qualified by any condition.

It is true that human reason can inquire about the details and unknown aspects of divine acts, but this is not because of God being subject to rational justifications. Rather, it is because all rational laws are deduced from external reality, which is nothing but God’s action and behavior. He is not a follower, but a leader and source of all rational principles. This can be confirmed by the numerous verses which urge the people to think, remember, contemplate, and investigate about God’s actions [that is, the world of creation]. If our reason were not valid and applicable in this regard, then these verses would be meaningless.

(2) Concerning statements made by practical reason [which pertain to human actions] the Qur’an says: O you who have faith! Answer Allah and the Messenger when he summons you to that which will give you life (). This verse shows that there is a benefit in acting upon the divine law, and that is the resulting happy life. Another verse is: Say, “Indeed Allah does not enjoin indecencies” (). This verse clearly shows that there are certain things which are inherently indecent, and God does not enjoin them. This is diametrically against the idea that if God enjoined them, then they would no longer be indecent. There are many other verses which justify a commandment—such as prayer, fasting, charity and jihad—by stating their underlying benefit and gain. The Qur’an is so replete with these verses that we feel no need to quote them. One example is: Do not associate any partners with Allah. Polytheism is indeed a great injustice ().

Examining Narrations

1. Imam Ṣādiq said: The angels were under the impression that Iblīs was one of them, but it was inscribed in God’s knowledge that he was not. God disclosed what was hidden in his soul when he said arrogantly: You created me from fire and You created him from clay ().
2. [Imam] Jaʿfar b. Muḥammad narrated from his father, from his grandfather, that the Messenger of God said: “The first person to apply qiyās (reasoning by analogy, comparison) in religious matters according to his personal opinion was Iblīs. God commanded him, ‘Prostrate yourself to Adam,’ but he said: ‘I am better than him. You created me from fire and You created him from clay’ ().” [Imam] Jaʿfar then added: “So whoever applies his personal opinion to make comparison in religious matters, God will couple him with Iblīs on the Day of Judgment, for the person has followed Iblīs in performing qiyās.”
3. Once Abū Ḥanīfah went to see Imam al-Ṣādiq. The Imam told him, “O Abū Ḥanīfah, I have been told that you exercise qiyās (reasoning by analogy, comparison).”

He confirmed, “That is right, I do qiyās.”

The Imam admonished him, “Do not do qiyās, for indeed the first one who did qiyās was Iblīs, where he said: You created me from fire and You created him from clay ().”

1. Imam ʿAlī said: Indeed Iblīs was the first one to disbelieve, and thus kufr (disbelief, infidelity, heresy) was initiated.
2. Imam al-Ṣādiq said: The first sin which came out of anāniyyah (egotism, selfhood; lit. “I-ness”) was from Iblīs.

Author’s comment: We discussed this idea in our exposition above.

3. Imam al-Ṣādiq said: Pride was the first disobedience against God.

Author’s comment: Pride also traces back to anāniyyah, as per our exposition above. Therefore this hadith matches the one before it.

4. Imam ʿAlī said in a sermon about the creation of Adam: God demanded from the angels what He had entrusted them and requested His previous injunction to them: to submit to prostrating before him and humbling themselves in order to honor him. Thus He said: Prostrate before Adam. They prostrated, but not Iblīs (, , , , ) and his hosts: self-importance withheld them and wretchedness overcame them…

Author’s comment: This sermon shows that the command to prostrate before Adam included not only Iblīs, but also his hosts. This confirms what we said above, that Adam in this story is a representative of all humanity. The story is not limited to him as a specific individual in history. It also confirms the idea that the story is about the takwīn (creation, makeup) of humankind.

5. Concerning verse (Then I will come at them from their front and from their rear, and from their right and their left) Imam al-Bāqir said: From their front: I will belittle the hereafter to them. And from their rear: I will order them to accumulate wealth and not pay their obligatory dues, so that their wealth may remain for their children. And from their right: I will ruin their religion by decorating errors and adorning doubts for them. And their left: by promoting pleasures and making lusts conquer their hearts.
6. Imam al-Ṣādiq said: By the One Who sent Muḥammad [as His Messenger], the devils and demons that attack a believer are more than the bees that gather around a piece of meat.
7. Imam al-Riḍā said: Satan is called Iblīs because he has despaired (ublisa) from God’s mercy.
8. Once Imam al-Ṣādiq was asked about Adam’s garden: “Was it a garden in this world or in the hereafter?” The Imam replied, “It was one of the gardens of this world, where the sun and the moon shone. If it were one of the gardens of the hereafter, he would never leave it.” Tafsīr al-Qummī adds: Then God settled Adam in the garden and made everything lawful to him except the forbidden tree. That was because his creation was such that in order to survive, he required command, prohibition, food, clothes, shelter and sex. He did not know his benefit and loss except through God’s instruction and aid. Then Iblīs went to him and said, “If you two eat of this tree—which God has forbidden you—you will turn into angels and remain in this garden forever. But if you do not eat of it, then God will expel you from the garden.” He swore to them that he is giving them sincere advice, as God narrates from him: “Your Lord has only forbidden you from this tree lest you should become angels, or lest you become immortal.” And he swore to them, “I am indeed your well-wisher” (). Adam took his word for it, and there happened what God describes: their shameful parts became exposed to them (). That is, the heavenly garments that God had clothed them with fell off from them, so they began to cover themselves with the leaves of the garden. Then their Lord called out to them, “Did I not forbid you from that tree, and tell you that Satan is indeed your manifest enemy?” (). They replied as God narrates: “Our Lord, we have wronged ourselves! If You do not forgive us and have mercy upon us, we will surely be among the losers” (). God responded to them: “Get down, being enemies of one another! On the earth shall be your abode and sustenance for some time” () which refers to the Day of Resurrection.
9. Imam al-Ṣādiq said: When Adam was expelled from the garden, Gabriel came to him and said, “Adam! Didn’t God create you with His own hand? Didn’t He breathe into you of His own spirit? Didn’t He make the angels prostrate before you? Didn’t He marry you His bondwoman Eve? Didn’t He settle you in the garden? Didn’t He directly prohibit you from eating of that one tree, while making the rest of the garden lawful to you? So how could you eat of it and disobey God?” Adam replied, “Gabriel, Satan swore by God that he is my well-wisher. I didn’t know that anyone of God’s creatures may swear by God falsely.”

Author’s comment: We also presented many narrations about this story in Sūrah al-Baqarah [under verses ]. We will quote more later on in its appropriate place, by God’s will.

10. Imam al-Ṣādiq said: Iblīs complained to God, “My Lord! How can this be?! You are All-Just and never wrong anyone. Now will the reward of all my acts [of worship] be void?” “No,” God replied. “Request from Me whatever you want in this world as a reward for your deeds, and I shall grant you.”

The first thing that he asked for was to live until the Day of Judgment. God said, “Granted.”

He demanded, “Give me dominance over Adam’s descendants.” God said, “Granted.”

He asked, “Make me diffuse through them as blood diffuses through their veins.” God said, “I will perfuse you [as you requested].”

He demanded, “For any child that is born to them, two shall be born for me. I shall be able to see them but they should not be able to see me. I shall be able to appear to them in any form that I want.” God said, “Granted.”

Then he said, “My Lord! Give me more!” God replied, “I will make their breasts a home for you and your descendants.”

Satan said, “That is all I want, My Lord!” At that point Satan said: By Your might, I will surely pervert them all, except Your chosen servants among them ().

Author’s comment: What we said above in the exposition of the verse should clarify the meaning of this hadith. His request that “I shall be able to appear to them in any form that I want” means that he can manipulate our senses and cognitive faculty such that we see him in any form that he wants. It does not imply that he can transform his substance and essence. Some scholars have said,

Muslim scholars unanimously agree that Iblīs and his descendants are of the jinn, and the jinn are ethereal bodies made of air, which can take any form including the forms of dogs and pigs. The angels are also ethereal bodies that can transform into anything except for dogs and pigs.

Apparently what is meant by this claim is essential transformation of the jinn and the angels. This, however, is not supported by any decisive rational or transmitted proof. The claimed consensus (ijmāʿ) does not prove it either, because it reduces to unanimity in interpretation [as opposed to unanimity in transmission, which is where consensus could be credible, if at all]. Even if it is ascertained that such consensus really exists, it will not be an authoritative proof in such discussions, let alone a merely claimed consensus. As we have said before, only the Qur’an and the sunnah would be valid transmitted sources in these matters [which pertain to beliefs and roots of religion, as opposed to its practices and branches].

Another subject is the issue of Satan’s descendants and their number. All we can say is that they are abundant in number, and they have ensued from Iblīs himself. But we do not know how. It could be through procreation as in humans, or through laying eggs, or through another channel. We have no way to know. This is among things that remain unknown to us.

Here is a list of what some scholars have narrated:

11. Satan copulates with himself and lays eggs.
12. He has the male organ on one thigh and the female organ on the other, which he uses to mate with himself.
13. He gives birth to ten children every day.
14. All of his children are male, and there is no intermarriage between them.
15. They marry and procreate as animals mate.

There is no evidence to support any of these, except for some solitary reports that are weak in terms of their authenticity (called ḍaʿīf), with incomplete chains of narration from the Prophet (called mursal), or chains of narration that end with the Prophet’s Companions (called mawqūf) or their Followers (called maqṭūʿ). In discussions of this sort [which pertain to beliefs and roots of religion], we can only rely on a Qur’anic verse with a decisive meaning (muḥkam) or a narration that is either mass-transmitted (mutawātir) or otherwise accompanied by some decisive indication (qarīnah qaṭʿiyyah). Nor can we verify these reports by matching them with the Qur’an, because they have no clear Qur’anic equivalent.

16. Imam al-Ṣādiq said: Every heart has two ears. Next to one of them there is an angel who guides [the person] to rectitude. And next to the other one there is a devil who tempts and deceives [the individual]. One commands and the other prohibits: the devil commands to sins, and the angel prohibits from it. That is the meaning of God’s words: seated on the right hand and on the left: he says no word but that there is a ready observer beside him ().
17. The Messenger of God said: Indeed Satan runs through the children of Adam like blood.
18. The Prophet said: “Everyone has been tied to his companion from the jinn [that is, a devil].” The Companions inquired, “Even you, Messenger of God?” He said, “Even I, except that God assisted me against him until he surrendered (aslama). Thus he only commands me to good.”

Author’s comment: Some scholars have read this hadith with aslama (he surrendered) and some have read it with aslamu (I am secure).

19. Jamīl b. Darrāj says: Once I asked Imam al-Ṣādiq about Iblīs, “Was he one of the angels? Or was he in charge of some part of the celestial matters?”

The Imam replied, “He was not one of the angels. The angels used to think that he was one of them, but it was inscribed in God’s [eternal] knowledge that he is not one of them. He was not in charge of anything in the celestial realms, and did not hold any position that is worthy of honor.”

Then I [Jamīl] went to al-Ṭayyār and told him about what I had heard. He denied that and said, “How could he not be one of the angels when God says to the angels: ‘Prostrate before Adam.’ So they [all] prostrated, but not Iblīs ()?” So al-Ṭayyār went to see the Imam and ask him about this, and I was there with him. The Imam explained: “When God addresses the believers in several places by O you who have faith, does this address also include the hypocrites?” He said, “Yes, it also includes the hypocrites and those who err; it includes anyone who apparently attests to faith.”

Author’s comment: This hadith refutes the claimed narrations which say that Iblīs was one of the angels, that he was a guardian in the fifth heaven, or that he was one of the guardians of Paradise.

There are countless narrations through both Shia and Sunni chains of transmission about Satan’s works. These can be classified into two groups: some only state what he does without any explanation, while others also provide some explanation. The next seven reports [from number 18 to 24] are of the first type.

20. Imam ʿAlī said [narrating from the Prophet]: Do not keep a cloth bag of meat inside the home, because that is a place for the Devil. Do not gather dust behind the door [of homes] because that is where the Devil will reside.
21. Imam al-Ṣādiq said: On top of every bridge there is a devil. Whenever you get there say, “In the name of God (bism Allāh)” and it will retreat from you.
22. The Messenger of God said: The home of Satan in your homes is the cobwebs.
23. Either Imam al-Bāqir or Imam al-Ṣādiq said: Do not drink while standing. Do not urinate in standing water. Do not defecate at any grave. Do not stay alone in a house. Do not walk with a single shoe. For indeed Satan gets a hold of a servant fastest when he is in one of these conditions.
24. Imam al-Ṣādiq said: If one names God [at the time of intercourse] Satan withdraws. If one engages in the act [of intercourse] without naming God, Satan will insert his male organ [in the middle] and the act will occur from both of them, although there will be only one seed [which is attributable to the man].
25. Tafsīr al-Qummī says: Whatever is purchased by unlawful money is Satan’s part.
26. There is a hadith [from the Prophet] which says: Whoever sleeps drunk, sleeps as Satan’s ʿarūs (groom, bride).

Author’s comment: The Qur’an says: Indeed wine, gambling, idols and the divining arrows are abominations of Satan’s doing (). This verse is also among the first type of reports [which mention Satan’s doing without further elaboration]. The following five hadiths [from number 25 to 29] are of the second type [which provide some explanation for what is meant by Satan’s acts].

27. Imam al-Bāqir said: Anger is indeed an ember from Satan, which kindles in the heart of Adam’s children.
28. The Prophet said: Indeed Satan flows through the children of Adam like blood. So constrict his vessels by hunger.
29. Imam ʿAlī said: His [Satan’s] kohl is sleep; his pulverized medicine is anger; and his liquid medicine is lie.
30. It is narrated that once Prophet Moses saw Satan while he was wearing a burnus (tall hat or hooded robe worn by ascetics). Prophet Moses inquired him about his hat. He replied, “With it I ensnare the hearts of Adam’s children.”
31. Imam al-Riḍā narrated from his fathers: Iblīs visited the prophets from the time of Adam until when God sent the Messiah. He would talk to them and ask them questions. Among all of them, he was most intimate with John son of Zechariah. Once John told him, “O Abā Murrah [Satan’s kunyah (title)]! I have a request from you.” Satan said, “You are so great that I would never decline your request. Ask me whatever you wish, for indeed I will never oppose what you want.”

“Abā Murrah! I want you to show me the snares and tethers by which you catch the children of Adam.”

“With pleasure,” Satan replied. “It will be an honor!” So he promised to do so the next day. Next morning John stayed home, firmly locked up the door, and waited for Satan to show up at his rendezvous. It was not long before Satan appeared in front of him through the window. He had the face of a monkey and the body of a pig. His eyes opened vertically. His teeth and mouth also opened vertically on a single bone, without having a chin or beard. He had four hands: two extending from his chest and two from his shoulders. His heels were in the front and his toes were behind. He was wearing a cloak, fastened with a belt at his waist, with strings of all different colors—like red, yellow and green—hanging from it. He was holding a great bell in his hand. He was wearing a helmet, and there was a piece of iron, like a hook, hanging from it.

After studying him thoroughly, John asked, “What is this belt at your waist?”

Satan said, “This is majūsiyyah (dualism, paganism). I’m the one who founded it and made it appealing to the people.”

John asked, “What are these colorful threads?”

“These are all colors that women use. A woman tries them one after another until she finds one that matches her pigment. Thus are people tempted with these colors [or with her].”

“What is this bell in your hand?”

“This represents all [auditory] pleasures like ṭanbūr (the bandore), barbaṭ (the lute), miʿzafah (the psaltery), ṭabl (the drum), nāy (the pipe) and ṣurnāy (the oboe). When people meet up to drink, they don’t enjoy the wine [as they should] until I ring this bell among them. When they hear the music, they erupt in ecstasy, where some start dancing, some snap their fingers, and some tear their clothes.” John asked, “What is the most delightful [of these snares] to you?” “Women,” Satan replied. “They are my snares and tithers. Whenever I am overwhelmed by the prayers of the righteous people and their cursing of me, I turn to women and that soothes my soul.”

John asked, “What is this helmet on your head?”

“This is my protection against the imprecations of the believers.” John asked, “What is this hook that I see on it?”

“With this I overturn the hearts of the righteous.”

John asked, “Have you ever gained the upper hand over me, even for a moment?”

Satan replied, “No, but you have a trait that I like!”

“And what is that?”

“You’re a crapulous man. When you break your fast [at the end of the day], you eat to satiation, and that sometimes prevents you from part of your night vigil and prayers.”

John stated, “I take a solemn vow with God to never eat to satiation anymore until I meet Him.”

“And I make a solemn vow with God,” Satan retorted, “to never give advice to a Muslim [that is, a believer] until I meet Him.” Then he left and never went back to visit John.

Author’s comment: This account has been narrated in a more elaborate way through Sunni chains of transmission. There are also other narrations about Satan’s meetings and conversations with Prophets Adam, Noah, Moses, Jesus and Muḥammad. As we said before, there are countless narrations through both Shia and Sunni chains of transmission about the types of Satan’s temptations and the variety of ways by which he makes different sins appealing to people. It is more than clear that the descriptions mentioned in these narrations are all symbolic representations that match various sins in terms of their quality and form. They are like the images that one sees in a dream according to one’s circumstances and beliefs.

If we reflect on the second type of narrations quoted above [from number 25 to 29, which provide some explanation for what is meant by Satan’s acts], we can infer that narrations of the first type [from number 18 to 24, which do not provide any explanation] point to a link that exists between Satan and a certain thing, where he employs it as an instrument for temptation and deception in relevant circumstances. What we should emphasize is that all these are imaginal embodiments (tajassumāt mithāliyyah) that represent a certain act or thing, not a physical embodiment, as thought by the literalists (ḥashwiyyah) and some scholars of hadith. For instance, they would interpret the above narration as follows: “While majūsiyyah (dualism, paganism) is a belief system among humans, it is at the same time a leather belt that Satan wears.” They would also conclude that Satan really transforms into other beings with all their faculties, and becomes a member of that species—sometimes a human, sometimes an animal, and sometimes an inanimate object. Alternatively, they would say that Iblīs to these species is like matter (māddah) to form (ṣurah), where matter can assume different forms [and thus be actualized as a different species]. However, the narrations are completely foreign to such possibilities.

There are numerous narrations in this regard, which proves their authenticity as a group, but not individually. Likewise, the Qur’an confirms their overall idea, which is that Satan appears to our senses in various forms. This is what we can say about these narrations collectively. As with each narration individually, it should first be authenticated. Even if it is found to have an authentic chain of narration—which is not the case about all of them—then it would be a solitary report (khabar al-wāḥid), and we cannot rely on solitary reports to infer our beliefs and roots of religion. At most it can be used in Islamic law, where a jurist may infer from it that a certain act is either mustaḥabb (recommended) or makrūh (reprehensible, disapproved).

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1. The connection is that the letter lām (lit. certainly, indeed) conveys a sense of justification and explanation. In other words, it shows that what follows next is an explanation for what was mentioned before. (Trans.) ↩︎

2. Verse starts with a dual pronoun—corresponding to Adam and Eve—but it continues with a plural pronoun. Verse also uses a plural pronoun. Given verse , these plural pronouns most likely refer to all humankind (that is, Adam, Eve and their progeny). (Trans.) ↩︎

3. In other words, thumma marks a temporal separation between what is mentioned before and after it. (Trans.) ↩︎

4. According to this interpretation, only the second thumma pertains to God’s report of the event, but the first thumma pertains to the occurrence of the event. (Trans.) ↩︎

5. In expressions like this, thumma means “rather.” The meaning is: “I am walking; rather I am speeding.” It could also mean “and”: “I am walking and speeding.” Put simply: “I am walking fast.” (Trans.) ↩︎

6. In this interpretation, and the next one, thumma can also mean “then,” indicating the temporal sequence of events, which is the most apparent and primary meaning of the term. (Trans.) ↩︎

7. Taghlīb is when a mixed group is entirely described by the quality of some of them, even though that quality does not apply to all of them. (Trans.) ↩︎

8. A “connected exception” (istithnāʾ muttaṣil) is an ordinary exception, where what is excepted is a member of the original group. Its opposite is “unconnected exception” (istithnāʾ munqaṭiʿ, istithnāʾ munfaṣil), where what is excepted is not a member of the original group. Such exception effectively conveys two independent statements. (Trans.) ↩︎

9. If we include the negative particle lā in the meaning, the verse would be saying: “What prevented you from not prostrating?” which is clearly not the intended meaning in the verse, especially given verse . A similar extra lā is found in verses . (Trans.) ↩︎

10. Translated literally (including the negative particle lā) the verse would mean: “So that the People of the Book may not know…” (Trans.) ↩︎

11. Manaʿanī annī khayr minhu is a verbal sentence (fiʿliyyah) which proves only a single occurrence of the verb (“to prevent”) in the past. However, I am better than him is a nominal sentence (ismiyyah) without a verb in Arabic. Thus it indicates that the predicate (“am better than him”) is established for the subject across time. (Trans.) ↩︎

12. This is based on the view that God’s commands are not arbitrary or merely conventional (called iʿtibārī), but they are based on some reality in the world of existence (called ḥaqīqī). Our laws are based on social contract and convention, while His laws are based on the relative position of different entities on the graded chain of existence. This is the reason why “it is incumbent that His order is obeyed because it is His order,” and also the reason why He is not questioned concerning what He does (). That is because Allah is the Truth (, , ); The truth is from your Lord (, ). (Trans.) ↩︎

13. In other words, he transgressed against his Lord’s command () is used interchangeably for “he refused to prostrate.” This shows their equivalence. (Trans.) ↩︎

14. In verse Satan says to God, “Because You cast me into ghayy, I will cast humankind into ghayy.” What Satan does to humankind is that he misleads them and casts them into error. Therefore, since the word appears in the verse twice in apparently the same meaning, what Satan effectively meant was to accuse God for his error. (Trans.) ↩︎

15. For example, deciding to dedicate one’s life to pursuing the path of religious knowledge, or to waging jihad in God’s way. (Trans.) ↩︎

16. See verses , , , . (Trans.) ↩︎

17. The entire quotation from al-Zamakhsharī pertains purely to the Arabic of the verse. His point is that even though two different prepositions are used in the verse (min and ʿan), they convey the same meaning. Taʿāl literally means “come up, ascend” in the imperative, and was originally used to call someone when the caller was in a higher position. Notwithstanding its provenance, it was later used to simply mean “come,” which is what it means nowadays and is also what it means in the Qur’an. (Trans.) ↩︎

18. This means that shākir here serves as ṣifah mushabbahah (also called ṣifah mushbihah), which is an adjective that is similar to an active participle. It serves as an adjective, and indicates the establishment, subsistence, and strength of a quality in the subject. (Trans.) ↩︎

19. This point is apparently inferred from what is narrated from Satan elsewhere in the Qur’an, where he talks about embellishing the pleasures of this life and prolonged hopes in the sights of humankind (, , ). (Trans.) ↩︎

20. The meaning would be: “Whoever of them follows you, I will surely fill hell with some of you.” However, this interpretation clearly contradicts the word “all” (ajmaʿīn) at the end of the verse. Therefore, the particle min is prefatory (ibtidāʾiyyah) not partitive (tabʿīḍiyyah). The translation above is according to this more apparent and coherent interpretation. (Trans.) ↩︎

21. An “authoritative command” (al-amr al-mawlawī) is like what a master says to his servant, where the servant is accountable for fulfilling the master’s command, and the master will mete out punishment to the servant if he disobeys. An “advisory command” (al-amr al-irshādī) is like a prescription that a doctor gives a patient. The doctor only informs the patient that if he does not follow the prescription, he will suffer pain or death as a consequence of his disobedience, not that the doctor would come and inflict that suffering as a punishment. The patient is not responsible toward the physician as the servant is toward the master. In both types of command, disobedience results in a painful consequence, but they differ in terms of responsibility and classification. (Trans.) ↩︎

22. In other words, the word karāhata (to avoid, being unwilling) is implied in the verse. This is already incorporated in the translation above. (Trans.) ↩︎

23. Another similar verse is: He [God] said, “Get down both of you from it, all together, being enemies of one another…” (). Here God addresses Adam and Eve using a dual pronoun, but then switches to plural pronouns and uses the word jamīʿan (all together). This strengthens an alternative possibility that the current verse () is addressed to Adam, Eve and their descendants, not Satan. Also see my first note under verse above. (Trans.) ↩︎

24. See volume 1, pp. 213ff of the English translation, under verses . (Trans.) ↩︎

25. Al-Shahrastānī has quoted seven questions from Satan, but the fifth one is not narrated by al-Ālūsī. It is: “Once God cursed and repelled me, why did He then let me enter the garden and deceive Adam with temptation? And why did He expel Adam with me from the garden? Had He not let me enter the garden, Adam would have been secure from me and could have stayed in the garden eternally.” The answer to this is to be found in the author’s discussion above, just before the section entitled “Back to Iblīs.” (Trans.) ↩︎

26. This refers to the historical debate between Ashʿarite and Muʿtazilite theologians concerning the root of moral values and the divine command theory in ethics. (Trans.) ↩︎

27. Sayf al-Dawlah (d. 967 CE) was the founder of the Emirate of Aleppo. Abū Firās al-Ḥārith b. Saʿīd al-Ḥamdānī (d. 968 CE) was a renowned Arab poet and governor. (Trans.) ↩︎

28. This would be like asking, “Why does x = x?” The answer is: “Otherwise, it would be something else.” It is logically incoherent to demand a cause or reason for an essential property. For the same reason, one cannot demand a reason for what necessarily issues from an essential property. (Trans.) ↩︎

29. In these discussions, benefit (maṣlaḥah), purpose (gharaḍ), objective (ghāyah) and wisdom (ḥikmah) are interdependent and concurrent. An act done out of wisdom is never devoid of some purpose and objective, which is some maṣlaḥah (benefit, betterment, advantage, interest) at some level. (Trans.) ↩︎

30. Ḥaqīqī (real) is an adjective for an entity or property that exists in the absence of a thinking mind. It is something objective that does not depend on a subject to conceive or construct it. Iʿtibārī (conventional, socially constructed, mentally posited) is an adjective of a concept or proposition that is a result of a mental operation. It exists in the mind of an intelligent subject. The relation between the two can be compared with the relation between objective and subjective. “Good,” “bad,” “saint,” “sinner,” “obedience” and “disobedience” are all labels that our mind applies to external events. What is out there is only that which is. It is an objective occurrence that is neutral with respect to our legal and moral classifications. That is the real existence of any event, and that is what is attributable to God, Who is absolute existence. Not mixing between the external existence of things and our mental commentaries on them is the key to realizing oneness (tawḥīd). (Trans.) ↩︎

31. Such as the jinn. (Trans.) ↩︎

32. It is self-contradictory because it is proposed about human beings, but it entails that they should be other beings. Humankind is a material creation, and such creation cannot be divested of gradual transformation. (Trans.) ↩︎

33. See the eighth paragraph under the section entitled “Back to Iblīs.” (Trans.) ↩︎

34. Indeed as for My servants you do not have any authority over them, except the perverse who follow you (); Even if Satan be calling them to the punishment of the Blaze? (). (Auth.) ↩︎

35. I had no authority over you, except that I called you and you responded to me (). (Auth.) ↩︎

36. See verse . (Trans.) ↩︎

37. See verse . (Trans.) ↩︎

38. See volume 11, pp. 110ff of the English translation. (Trans.) ↩︎

39. The distinction between thubūt (existence, subsistence) and ithbāt (affirmation, proof) would help better understand this discussion. Thubūt pertains to the field of ontology; ithbāt pertains to epistemology. The latter is necessarily subsequent to the former and is deduced from it, and therefore can never rule over it. God’s actions are absolute and unsurpassed at the level of thubūt, because nothing else exists to serve as a criterion for His acts. The existence of anything is itself an act of God. Anything that our reason comprehends is our cognition and establishment (ithbāt) of the world of existence (thubūt). Our proofs and arguments (at the level of ithbāt) are deduced from external realities that are created by God (at the level of thubūt). This is why our reason cannot determine or dictate what God ought to do, or whether His actions are good or not, because all our notions of “ought to” and “good” are themselves deduced from the world of creation, which is an act of God. He is not questioned concerning what He does (). Nevertheless, having proven that God is the Absolute Truth, we can assert that His acts are all true and good, not on an arbitrary basis, but according to the reality of truth and goodness, which is His essence. That is because Allah is the Truth (, , ); The truth is from your Lord (, ). That is why our notions of true and good are also valid, because they are derived from the acts of God. This goes as far as our decisive and necessary statements, within the limitations of our reason. (Trans.) ↩︎

40. The author’s long discussion above was a response to the long-lasting dispute between the Ashʿarite and Muʿtazilite theologians concerning the idea that He is not questioned concerning what He does (). In short, divine actions are not subject to any judgment, because any rational principle or essential value that we may have is itself deduced from God’s actions. Nevertheless, God, as a perfect being, is Wise, and the acts that emanate from His wise essence are all purposeful and calculated. Even though He does whatever He wishes without being subject to any question, He never acts in a random or whimsical way. This can be summarized by two divine qualities that are often used together in the Qur’an: al-ʿAzīz (the All-Mighty) and al-Ḥakīm (the All-Wise). His might refers to His aspect of power and dominance, which is emphasized by the Ashʿarites, while His wisdom refers to His aspect of justice, which is emphasized by the Muʿtazilites. Hence we can reconcile the two views. Overall, we can hold the Ashʿarite view, with one clarification: that there is always some wisdom in what God does, even though we may not know what that is. All His actions are right, good and just, and that is why He is not liable to any question. (Trans.) ↩︎

41. Tafsīr al-ʿAyyāshī, on the authority of Dāwūd b. Farqad. ↩︎

42. Al-Durr al-manthūr, on the authority of Abū Nuʿaym’s al-Ḥulyah and al-Daylamī. ↩︎

43. Al-Kāfī, via its chain of narration, on the authority of ʿĪsá b. ʿAbd-Allāh al-Qurashī. ↩︎

44. Al-ʿUyūn. This has also been narrated from Imam al-Ṣādiq in Tafsīr al-ʿAyyāshī. ↩︎

45. ʿIlal al-sharāʾiʿ, part of a longer hadith. ↩︎

46. Tafsīr al-Qummī. ↩︎

47. Nahj al-balāghah. ↩︎

48. This is based on the plural pronoun “them” in the last part of the quote above. However, this is apparently a mistake in transcription. The sermon has also been reported with a singular pronoun “him” and without the addition of “his hosts.” This reading is more consistent with the rest of the sermon, which refers to Iblīs alone using singular pronouns. Nevertheless, it does not negate the author’s generalization of the command to include Satan’s hosts, especially given his symbolic interpretation of the story. (Trans.) ↩︎

49. That is, the story is meant to depict the two opposing forces of good and evil that humans face. It is not about a legislative or authoritative command directed at the angels and Satan. In other words, God’s command and their prostration should not be taken literally. (Trans.) ↩︎

50. Majmaʿ al-bayān. ↩︎

51. Tafsīr al-ʿAyyāshī. ↩︎

52. This refers to God’s curse upon him until the Day of Resurrection, as stated in verses and . It does not refer to an act of giving up hope in God’s mercy by Satan, but only indicates his utmost wretchedness, to the extent that there is no hope of his deliverance. Although narrations like this are apparently about the etymological roots of the terms, they often involve other layers of meaning. Therefore, the above narration does not necessarily negate the derivation of the word Iblīs from diabolus in Greek, not to mention that some of these languages may trace back to common roots. (Trans.) ↩︎

53. Maʿānī al-akhbār. ↩︎

54. This is about the nature and kind of the garden. (Trans.) ↩︎

55. Tafsīr al-Qummī, on the authority of his father, via an unconnected chain of transmission (marfūʿ). ↩︎

56. Al-Kāfī, on the authority of ʿAlī b. Ibrāhīm. ↩︎

57. This may sound contrary to what the Qur’an narrates from Satan, where he addresses the wrongdoers on the Day of Resurrection: I had no authority over you, except that I called you and you responded to me (). The verse does not reject Iblīs’s authority outright. It actually proves that Iblīs has as much authority as calling, tempting, and provoking humankind, but not more than that. Previously we read from the author: “The only authority that God has given him is that of calling and tempting the people, as the Qur’an states expressly [in verses and ] and also narrates from him—when he addresses the people on the Day of Resurrection [in verse ].” He also adds below: “The control and authority that the devils have over humans is inasmuch as tempting and deceiving them. Once one falls for their temptation and deception, they take control of the person as they wish.” The ultimate answer is that there are different degrees of authority. The apparently contradictory verses and narrations in this regard pertain to different levels of authority. Some are affirmed about Iblīs and some are rejected. (Trans.) ↩︎

58. Tafsīr al-Qummī, part of a longer hadith. ↩︎

59. Al-Kāfī, on the authority of ʿAlī b. Ibrāhīm, on the authority of his father, on the authority of Ibn Abī ʿUmayr, on the authority of Ḥammād. ↩︎

60. Biḥār al-anwār, on the authority of Shihāb al-akhbār. ↩︎

61. Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, on the authority of Ibn Masʿūd. ↩︎

62. Tafsīr al-ʿAyyāshī. ↩︎

63. ʿIlal al-sharāʾiʿ. ↩︎

64. Al-Kāfī. ↩︎

65. Al-Kāfī, on the authority of Imam ʿAlī. ↩︎

66. Al-Kāfī. ↩︎

67. Al-Kāfī. ↩︎

68. The author has assumed this to be a hadith, but it is not. The statement refers to the verse , where God says to Satan: and share with them in wealth and children. The previous hadith also refers to the same verse. (Trans.) ↩︎

69. Al-Kāfī. ↩︎

70. Another version of the hadith says saʿūṭ (medicine administered through the nose) instead of safūf (pulverized medicine), which makes the hadith more coherent. A more modern rendition of the three items would be: “eyewash, nasal drops, and medicinal syrup.” There is remarkable literary elegance in identifying the organs where these acts appear as the entrances of Satan’s remedy. In light of the ʿAllāmah’s discussions on Satan, the hadith is saying: “Torpor, anger and lying are ways of supporting the evil force which pulls us toward darkness and distances us from the Truth.” (Trans.) ↩︎

71. Biḥār al-anwār, on the authority of al-Maḥāsin, on the authority of Imam al-Riḍā, from his fathers, as a part of a longer hadith. ↩︎

72. One of the meanings of majūsiyyah, as used in verse , is Zoroastrianism or Magianism, which is apparently listed among divinely revealed religions. However, sometimes the term is used in a more general sense to indicate deviation from monotheism, not Zoroastrianism or any other religion in particular. (Trans.) ↩︎

73. These are traditional eastern musical instruments which do not have exact English equivalents. The first three are stringed instruments; ṭabl is a percussion instrument; and the last two are wind instruments. (Trans.) ↩︎

74. That is: “I can tempt righteous men and break their resistance with women.” ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī says in a mystical lyric:

    The love of the dears tends to take away

    One’s heart and faith, and anything that you say.

    The rook (rukh) of chess cannot ever win

    What a lovely face (rukh) can win and take away.

    For the full poem see Ḥusaynī Ṭihrānī, Shining Sun (London: ICAS Press, 2011), pp. 63-64. (Trans.) ↩︎

75. Al-Ṭūsī’s al-Majālis. ↩︎

76. This means the representation of a reality in the imaginal world (ʿālam al-mithāl), where existents do not have matter, but have the properties of matter like shape and form. A good example of it would be the forms that one observes in a dream. (Trans.) ↩︎