Appearance
Verses 27–32
The verses describe the story of the two sons of Adam, and make it clear that envy sometimes drives son of Adam to a stage where he slays his brother unjustly, then he becomes a loser and he regrets when no remorse can do any good. In this sense, the verses are conjoined with preceding ones, which describe how the Children of Israel had an aversion to believing in the Messenger of God; their rejection of the true call had no reason except envy and transgression. Thus does envy pushes man to slaughter of his brother, then throws him in a remorse and regret from which he can never be free; so they should take lesson from this story, and should not persist so much in envy and then disbelief.
وَاتْلُ عَلَيْهِمْ نَبَأَ ابْنَيْ آدَمَ بِالْحَقِّ إِذْ قَرَّبَا قُرْبَانًا فَتُقُبِّلَ مِنْ أَحَدِهِمَا وَلَمْ يُتَقَبَّلْ مِنَ الْآخَرِ قَالَ لَأَقْتُلَنَّكَ ۖ قَالَ إِنَّمَا يَتَقَبَّلُ اللَّهُ مِنَ الْمُتَّقِينَ ٢٧
(5:27) And relate to them the story of the two sons of Adam with truth when they both offered an offering, but it was accepted from one of them and was not accepted from the other. He said: “I will most certainly slay you.” (The other) said: “Allah only accepts from those who are pious.
Watlu (translated here as: “And relate”) has its root in al-Tilāwah (to read, to recite), which in its turn is derived from al-Tulūw (to follow); because a relater describes a news or story in stages one after another; al-nabāʾ (news which has some benefit); al-qurbān (offering with which one wants to come nearer to God or someone else), it is an infinitive verb/gerund, it has no dual or plural form; al-Taqabbul (to accept with more care accorded to the accepted thing). The pronoun, “them,” (in, “relate to them”) refers to the People of the Book, because the speech concerns them.
“Adam” refers to the same person whom Qur’an introduces as the progenitor of the mankind. An exegete has said, “It refers to an Israelite who had two sons who quarrelled regarding an offering, and one of them, called Qābīl (Cain), killed Hābil (Abel); and that is why God says at the end of the story: For this reason did We prescribe to the Children of Israel ...” But it is wrong, because:
First: Qur’an has nowhere mentioned any other Adam except the one who was the progenitor of mankind. If someone else were the subject of this verse, it was necessary to place here some indication, in order to remove any confusion.
Second: Some details of the story, example, sending of a crow, conforms with the condition of the primitive man who possessed simple thoughts and rudimentary perceptions, who gradually went on accumulating informations through experiences which he got from incident to incident. The verse clearly shows that the killer did not even know that a dead body could be covered in the earth. Obviously, this characteristic fits on the son of Adam, the progenitor of mankind, not on a person from the Children of Israel, who were civilized, advanced, and nationally refined in culture; and such matters could not be unknown to them.
Third: This exegete, by saying that “and that is why God says at the end of the story: For this reason did We prescribe to the Children of Israel,” wants to reply to a question levelled against the verse. That question says: “Why the said prescription was reserved particularly to the Children of Israel, while the moral of the story covers the whole humanity—that whoever kills a person it is as though he killed all men, and whoever kept alive one person it is as though he kept alive all men.”
So the said exegete tried to reply that the killer and the killed were not sons of Adam who was progenitor of mankind, and this story was not among the initial events taking place at the dawn of humanity, so that it could provide a lesson to all succeeding generations. Rather this event had concerned two sons of an Israelite, and the story describes an Israeli incident, which had a particularly national character; and that is why its lesson was especially confined to the Children of Israel.
However, this reply does not settle the argument; the question even now remains unanswered. The principle that killing one man is tantamount to killing all men and keeping one person alive is like keeping all men alive, is applicable to all killings taking place in human species; it is not reserved to any particular killing; and innumerable murders had taken place before the era of Israelites and even in Israelites before the one mentioned in this verse. Then why was this principle enunciated from this particular murder? And why was it confined to a particular nation?
Moreover, if the matter were as he says, it was better to say, ... that whoever “among you” slays a soul, so that it would have been reserved for them, and in that case the same question would arise as to that reservation; and the notion in itself was not sound.
The reply to original question is as follows: The words: whoever slays a soul ... it is as though he slew all men; and whoever keeps it alive, it is as though he kept alive all men, do not enact a legislative order; they enunciate a deep principle. Therefore, the prescription to the Children of Israel denotes that this principle was explained to them, although its benefit was comprehensive and covered Israelites and non-Israelites both. It is not unlike the admonitions and wisdom the Qur’an explains to the ummah of Muḥammad although their benefits are not confined to it.
Why does this verse say that this maxim was prescribed to the Israelites? It is because the verses are concerned with admonishing them, reminding them and rebuking them for their envy and jealousy against the Prophet; their intense hatred of the Prophet led them to fanning the fire of mischief, instigating others to fight the Muslims and active participation in many such wars. That is why this speech is followed by the words: and certainly Our messengers came to them with clear proofs, but even after that many of them certainly act extravagantly in the land.
Add to all this fact that the story as mentioned by that exegete has no basis at all—neither in tradition nor in history.
Now, it is clear that “the story of the two sons of Adam” is related to the sons of that Adam who was the Father of mankind. The clause: “with truth” is related either to “the story” or to “relate”; in either case it is a notice or declaration that the story as was prevalent in their society was not free from distortion and omission. Actually the story as presented in the Genesis (Ch.4) does not mention the event of the crow and its digging up the earth; also it clearly presents God as having a body—Far exalted be He from such things!
The context of the clause: “when they both offered an offering, but it was accepted from one of them and was not accepted from the other,” obviously shows that each of the two had offered an offering to God; but the word, al-qurbān (offering) was used in singular number, because, as mentioned earlier, it being a masdar, does not accept dual or plural form.
The clauses: “He said: ‘I will most certainly slay you.’ He (the other) said: ‘God only accepts from those who are pious.’” The first speaker is the killer and the second, the killed one. It shows that they both knew that the offering of one was accepted and of the other rejected. But the verse does not say as to how they came to know it or which evidence led them to that deduction.
However, the Qur’an in another place mentions that among the ancient nations, or particularly among the Israelites, customarily the acceptance of an offering was known through its consumption by fire. God says: (Those are they) who said: “Surely Allah has enjoined us that we should not believe in any messenger until he brings us an offering which the fire consumes.” Say: “Indeed, there came to you messengers before me with clear proofs and with that which you said; why then did you kill them if you are truthful?” ().
Offerings are well known among the People of the Book till today. Possibly in this case too the same method was used to indicate the offering’s acceptance—especially keeping in view that the story was narrated to the People of the Book who believed in that method. Be it as it may, the killer and his victim both knew that the one’s offering was accepted and that of the other rejected.
Obviously, the one who said, “‘I will most certainly slay you,’” was that brother whose offering was not accepted; and he thus spoke only because of envy and jealousy, as there was no other reason, nor the victim had committed any crime by his own will and power so that he should be confronted with such talk and threatened to be murdered. The killer threatened: “‘I will most certainly slay you,’” merely because of envy that the victim’s offering was accepted and the killer’s rejected. The victim replied: “‘God only accepts from those who are pious. If you will stretch forth your hand towards me to slay me, I am not one to stretch forth my hand towards you to slay you; surely I fear God, the Lord of the worlds.’” By this reply he made it clear that:
First: He (the victim) had nothing to do with the acceptance or non-acceptance of any offering, nor had he committed any crime. If anyone was to be blamed, it was the killer who did not fear God, and consequently God refused to accept his offering.
Second: If the killer wanted to kill him and stretched his hand toward the victim for that purpose, the victim was not going to stretch his hand towards him with intention of killing him. Why? Because of his piety and fear of God. In this situation, the killer would return (in the next world) with the victim’s sin and his own, so that he would be among the inmates of the Fire, and that is the recompense of the unjust.
“God only accepts from those who are pious.” It asserts that acceptance is reserved only for the offering of the pious—it excludes that of not pious. Or, perhaps the killer arrogantly or ignorantly was thinking that his own offering would be accepted and that of the victim rejected—thinking that it does not depend on piety; or that God did not know the real position and probably He would be confused as human beings become sometimes; therefore it was established that the killer’s offering was not acceptable at all.
This episode contains many important principles: It describes how and when acts of worship and offerings are accepted; admonishes about murder, injustice and envy emphasizing their seriousness; confirms the system of divine retribution and shows that it is an integral part of the Lordship of the Lord of the worlds, for, Lordship cannot be complete without a well organized system interlinking various parts of the world, which would lead to just evaluation of deeds, and would recompense injustice with painful chastisement; so that the oppressor should desist from oppression, or should receive the retribution which he had arranged for himself, and that is the Fire.
لَئِنْ بَسَطْتَ إِلَيَّ يَدَكَ لِتَقْتُلَنِي مَا أَنَا بِبَاسِطٍ يَدِيَ إِلَيْكَ لِأَقْتُلَكَ ۖ إِنِّي أَخَافُ اللَّهَ رَبَّ الْعَالَمِينَ ٢٨
(5:28) If you will stretch forth your hand towards me to slay me, I am not one to stretch forth my hand towards you to slay you; surely I fear Allah, the Lord of the worlds.”
The preposition, “l” in lain (if) is for oath; stretching forth the hand alludes to preparing for murder and making its arrangements; the reply to this conditional clause begins with a negative connected to a nominal clause: “not one to stretch my hand”—in original Arabic, it is not a verb but an adjective, the negative is strengthened with ‘bi’ and the whole speech with the earlier mentioned oath. All these devices were used to show that the victim was far removed from intention of killing his brother; such thought had never come to his mind.
This claim of his innocence is emphasized by the clause: “‘surely I fear God, the Lord of the worlds.’” When the pious ones, those who fear God, remember their Lord, God, the Lord of the worlds, Who, they know, recompenses every sin with its prescribed punishment, the fear of God is awakened in them, and it does not allow them to commit any injustice which would throw them into perdition.
Then comes the reality of this sentence: “‘If you will stretch forth your hand towards me ...’ ,” and its true interpretation. In short, the events had reached a point where the victim had only two alternatives before him: Either he should kill his brother or his brother kills him; if he opts for the first alternative then he would become unjust oppressor, would carry sins of both on his shoulders and would enter the Fire; if on the other hand his unjust brother kills him all the above consequences would come to that brother. Obviously, the victim did not opt for the first alternative because in that case his own felicity would be jeopardized; he rather opted for the second alternative—that his unjust brother should suffer infelicity by killing him while he himself attains felicity without being unjust or oppressor. Thus, in the clause: “‘Surely I wish that you should bear my sin ...’ ,” the word, “wish,” denotes option in case of there being two alternatives.
This verse gives the interpretation of the clause: “‘If you will stretch forth your hand ... ‘” in the same way as had happened in the story of Moses and his companion when the latter had killed a boy they had met; Moses objected saying: “Have you slain an innocent person otherwise than for manslaughter? Certainly you have done a horrible thing” (). His companion later gave him its interpretation in these words: “And as for the boy, his parents were believers and we feared lest he should oppress them by disobedience (to them) and disbelief (in God). So we desired that their Lord might give them in his place one better than him in purity and nearer to having compassion” ().
Likewise, in this case, the victim “wished” that is, he opted for death joined with his felicity even if it resulted in his brother’s infelicity as he had wrongly preferred life joined with infelicity which pushed him into the band of oppressors; exactly as the companion of Moses preferred the boy’s death in felicity (although it would cause grief and sorrow to his parents) over his continued life which would make him oppressor and disbeliever who would go astray and lead his parents into error; and he desired that God would give them in his place another boy better than him in purity and nearer to having compassion.
The son of Adam who was murdered was pious and God fearing and had gnosis of God. His piety is shown in his reply: “God only accepts from those who are pious.” It contains the claim of his own piety, and God has quoted it without rebutting it. As for his knowledge and gnosis, it is inferred from his speech, surely I fear God, the Lord of the worlds. Here he openly claims that he feared God, and God has again quoted him without rebuttal; and God says in another place: ... verily fear Allah only those of His servants endued with knowledge ... (). So when God endorsed his claim that he feared God, it was as though He also confirmed that he was a man of knowledge, as He has also portrayed the Moses’s companion as a knowledgeable person and said: ... and whom We had taught knowledge from Ourselves (). The victim’s talk with his unjust brother is enough to show the extent of his knowledge; you will find in it deep sagacity, wisdom and good sermon. He showed with his clean disposition and pure nature that human race was bound to multiply, and their bands would contain individuals of diverse characters, some would be pious, others unjust and transgressors. However, there is one Lord Who is their Owner and the Owner of all the worlds and He manages their affairs. It is an aspect of His perfect management that He likes and loves justice and beneficence, dislikes and hates injustice and transgression. It follows that man must fear God and acquire piety—and this is religion. There are acts of obedience that bring man nearer to God, as there are acts of disobedience and injustice. Obedience is accepted when it springs from piety. Disobedience and injustice are sins the burden of which lies on the shoulders of the sinner. All this makes it clear that there should be another life—the resurrection—where everyone would be recompensed for his deeds, and the recompense of unjust and oppressors is the Fire.
As you see, these are the roots of the religious gnosis, confluence of the knowledge of genesis and resurrection, which this good servant of God explained to his foolish brother who did not even know that a thing could be hidden from people by burying it in the earth—until he learned it from the crow. The victim, however, did not say to his threatening brother: If you want to kill me I’ll throw myself before you without defending myself or repulsing your attack; he had only said: “I am not going to kill you.” Nor did he say: ‘I wish to be killed by you anyhow, so that you will become an oppressor and will go to the Fire.’ To cause someone to go astray and fall into disgrace is in itself an injustice and error; and it is the verdict of natural law, not confined to one shariah or the other. He only said: “If you stretch forth your hand towards me to kill me, I shall accept it and opt for it.”
Keep in mind this fine point; and then listen to this objection on this event: “No doubt the killer went beyond the limit through his oppression and transgression; but the victim too fell short in his duty by not standing up to the killer and by accepting the oppression; instead of boldly facing the adversary and defending himself, he meekly submitted to the killer and said: ‘If you will stretch forth your hand towards me to slay me, I am not one to stretch forth my hand towards you to slay you; ...’”
You will realize that this objection is baseless. He had not said, “I shall not defend myself and shall let you do whatever you want to do with me;” he had only said, “I do not wish to kill you.” The verse does not say that he was killed and knowingly did not defend himself. May be, he was waylaid or ambushed, or was killed while defending or protecting himself.
Someone has looked at this episode in a wrong perspective, saying: The victim intended to give his brother power over himself, so that he would kill him, and thus fall into eternal perdition, while he (the victim) would get felicity and bliss, as he himself had said: “Surely I wish that you should bear my sin as well as your sin, and so you would be of the inmates of the Fire.” As in these days, some ascetics think that they should adhere to their acts of worship and denial of self; if someone oppresses him or does injustice to him, that unjust oppressor would himself bear the burden of his oppression and injustice, and the victim should not stand up to defend his right, rather he should bear it patiently hoping to get its reward from God. But it is nothing but stupidity, because it is helping the sinner in his sin, and it makes both the helper and the helped partners in sin, so it will not make the oppressor to bear the burden of sins of both alone.
However, the explanation we have written above, of the words: Surely I wish that you should bear my sin as well as your sin ..., clarifies this objection. Some people have replied to the above-mentioned two objections with some absurd answers; there is no benefit in mentioning them.
إِنِّي أُرِيدُ أَنْ تَبُوءَ بِإِثْمِي وَإِثْمِكَ فَتَكُونَ مِنْ أَصْحَابِ النَّارِ ۚ وَذَٰلِكَ جَزَاءُ الظَّالِمِينَ ٢٩
(5:29) “Surely I wish that you should bear my sin as well as your own sin, and so you would be of the inmates of the Fire, and this is the recompense of the unjust.”
Tabūa translated here as “bear” literally means, stay; that is, you should stay with my sin. al-Rāghib has said:
“al-Bawāʾ actually means equality of parts in a place, in contrast to al-nabwah that is, disagreement of parts; they say: a bawwāʾ (agreeable) place, when it is not repulsive; also they say: ‘I bawwaʾtu lahu (prepared for him) a place ...’ And the Qur’an says: Surely I wish that you should bear with my sin as well as your own sin; a poet has said: “I rejected her falsity and stayed with her right.”
Therefore, its explanation with “return” looks at its inseparable connotation.
The clause: “‘that you should bear my sin as well as your sin,’” denotes that the sin of unjustly murdered person is transferred to his killer, thus he shall bear two sins while the victim will come to God without any sin in his account. This is the apparent meaning of this clause and traditions support it; also reason justifies it. This topic has been discussed to a certain extent in the second volume of this book.
Objection: This theory compels us to admit that a person may be held responsible for another man’s sin; but reason rejects it, and God has said: That no bearer of burden shall bear the burden of another ().
Reply: This matter is not within the purview of theoretical wisdom (so that reason could declare that it was impossible); rather it is within the jurisdiction of practical wisdom that follows the changing pattern of human social order and its exigencies. It is quite in order if the society lays the burden of one person’s deed on another person, and considers the latter responsible for it; or if it decides that the deed done by a man was not done by him. For example, someone kills a man and the society had some rights upon the murdered man; now the society is justified in demanding those due rights from the killer. Likewise, if someone rebels against the society and creates disturbance in law, order, and mischief in the land, then the society has the right to consider all his good points as if they did not exist at all. And so on.
In the above-mentioned examples, the society looks at the bad deeds of the oppressed and puts them in the account of the oppressor. At this juncture, that bearer of burden bears the burden of the deeds which are now assigned to him—now it is not someone else’s load; it is now transferred to his account because he had committed injustice to his victim, and in lieu of that injustice the victim’s bad deeds have come to his door. It is not unlike a business transaction when the seller gives the goods to the buyer and accepts a price in its place; now the new owner of the goods uses it as he likes, and nobody would object to it simply because at one time it had belonged to someone else—because now the previous ownership has ceased. In the same way, the verse: That no bearer of burden shall bear the burden of another, cannot prevent the killer being charged with sins that were committed by the murdered man in his life, because now they have been transferred to the killer’s account, and the previous responsibility of the murdered man is no more operative. It does not mean that the verse: That no bearer of burden ..., has lost its validity or effect because a new reason has caused its transfer to a new doer; it is like the hadīth, “A Muslim’s property is not lawful to another except with his pleasure”; if the previous owner sells the property, he will lose all rights in it as his rights have been transferred. But no one can say that the above-mentioned hadīth has lost its validity or effect.
An exegete has written: The words: my sin as well as your own sin, mean ‘the sin of my murder if you did it, and your sins which you had previously committed.’ It is narrated from Ibn Masʾūd, Ibn ʿAbbās and others. Another interpretation: ‘the sin of my murder and your previous sin because of which your offering was not accepted.’ It has been narrated from al-Jubbāʾī and al-Zajjāj. A third explanation: ‘the sin of my murder and your sin of slaying the whole mankind.’ It has been narrated from others.
But all these interpretations are devoid of support from the wordings of the Qur’an, and reason too does not agree with them. Moreover, if any of these interpretations were correct, there was no reason to put both sins side by side—when both were committed by the killer—and then ascribe one to the victim and the other to the killer.
فَطَوَّعَتْ لَهُ نَفْسُهُ قَتْلَ أَخِيهِ فَقَتَلَهُ فَأَصْبَحَ مِنَ الْخَاسِرِينَ ٣٠
(5:30) Then his mind facilitated to him the slaying of his brother, so he slew him; then he became one of the losers.
al-Rāghib says:
“al-Tawʾ means obedience; its opposite is al-kurh (dislike). al-Tāʾah synonymous to al-Tawʾ, but it is mostly used for obeying an order and displaying a drawing. The [Qur’anic] clause, fa-tawwaʾat lahu nafsuhu, means his mind allowed him and seduced him; tawwaʾat used in the verse is more appropriate here than simple atāʾat (obeyed); the Qur’anic clause is opposite to taʾbbat ʿan nafsuhu kadhā (his mind declined it).”
It does not mean that tawwaʾat includes the connotation of obedience and seduction. It actually means that al-Tatwīʾ (masdar of tawwaʾat) indicates graduality, while al-itāʾah indicates promptness, and it is the usual difference between the stems of ifʾāl and tafʾīl. Tawwaʾat, used in the verse, therefore, implies that he was gradually pushed towards that deed through insinuations and temptations coming successively one after another, until he submitted to it and obeyed. Meaning: His mind submitted to that evil plan and he gradually succumbed to the temptation to kill his brother. The phrase: “slaying of his brother,” stands for “the order of slaying of his brother.”
Sometimes it is said that tawwaʾat here means, ‘made attractive’; in that case, slaying of his brother will be its object—that is, his mind made slaying of his brother attractive to him. Another explanation: tawwaʾat means ‘his mind acceded to him in slaying of his brother’; in this case qatla is given the vowel a in place of i because the preposition, fī (in) has been omitted.
Someone has inferred from the phrase: fa-asbaha (became one of the losers) that he had slew his brother at night [because asbaha literally means entered upon morning]. But this is not correct, because although literally it gives this meaning, but Arabs generally use it in the meaning of “became” without looking at its root or time. Even in the Qur’an there are several sentences where time factor is not relevant at all. For example: ... so by His favor you became brethren; ... (). so that they shall be regretting on account of what they hid in their souls (). Hence there is no way of taking the above phrase in its literal sense.
فَبَعَثَ اللَّهُ غُرَابًا يَبْحَثُ فِي الْأَرْضِ لِيُرِيَهُ كَيْفَ يُوَارِي سَوْءَةَ أَخِيهِ ۚ قَالَ يَا وَيْلَتَا أَعَجَزْتُ أَنْ أَكُونَ مِثْلَ هَٰذَا الْغُرَابِ فَأُوَارِيَ سَوْءَةَ أَخِي ۖ فَأَصْبَحَ مِنَ النَّادِمِينَ ٣١
(5:31) Then Allah sent a crow digging up the earth so that he might show him how he should cover the dead body of his brother. He said: “Woe me! Do I lack the strength that I should be like this crow and cover the dead body of my brother?” So he became of those who regret.
al-Bahth (means searching for something in the earth; then it is said: ‘I thoroughly searched’ [that is, made research] about this matter. This meaning is given in Majmaʾ al-bayan. al-Muwārāt (to hide); from this root come al-Tawārī (to hide oneself) and al-warāʾ (behind). al-Saw Majmaʾ al-bayan ah (what makes one annoyed, displeased); al-wayl (woe, perdition), ya waylata (exclamatory expression used for disaster, perilous situation); al-ʾajz (weakness; opposite of power).
The context shows that the killer had spent a considerable time in bewilderment and perplexity; while he was wary lest others come to know of his deed; he could not understand what device to use in order to hide the dead body of his brother; this continued until God sent the crow. If the sending of the crow and his digging the earth had occurred close together with his slaying of his brother, he would not have lamented in these words: “‘Woe me! Do I lack the strength that I should be like this crow and cover the dead body of my brother?’”
Also it appears from the context that the crow had buried something in the earth after digging it; clearly it wanted to demonstrate the method of burial, not the way of digging. Mere digging could not teach him how to bury the dead body, because he was so simple minded that he did not understand the purpose of digging; how could he go ahead from digging to burial as the two things are not concomitant. His mind perceived the method of burial when he saw the crow digging the earth and burying something in it.
Among the birds, the crow has a habit of storing for future use a part of what he obtains through preying [or lifting away] by burying it in the earth. Although other birds which feed on grain, etc. sometimes dig the earth, but their purpose is to find out things like grain and worms, not to bury and store.
The pronoun, “he” in “so that he might show him,” stands for the crow, as it is the nearest noun. Some people have claimed that it refers to “God”; this too may be correct, but it seems a bit farfetched; however, meaning is correct in both cases.
The words: “He said: ‘Woe me! Do I lack the strength that I should be like this crow’ ,” were uttered by the killer when he realized how easy was the method used by the crow to bury something. He found that he too was able to do as the crow had done and bury the dead body—now he had seen the connection between digging and burial. Then he felt remorse for not thinking about it himself, so that he could understand that digging the earth was the easiest means of hiding the body. So he expressed his regret: “Woe me! Do I lack the strength that I should be like this crow and cover the dead body of my brother?” It was a sort of a soliloquy between him and his mind in the style of a question implying negation. It is as though he was questioned—implying negation: ‘Did you lack the strength to be like this crow and cover the dead body of your brother?’ The reply would be: ‘No.’ Then he would be asked second question in the same style: ‘Then why did you remain oblivious to it? Why did you not resort to this method although it was so obvious, and put yourself in such trouble without any reason for such a long period?’ There was no answer to it. And this caused the remorse. Remorse is a psychological emotion, a mental agony that particularly affects a human being when he realizes that he has neglected some means, which have led to loss of a benefit or appearance of a loss. You may say that it is a feeling that affects man when he remembers that he has neglected making use of a possibility.
This is the condition of man, when he commits an injustice or oppression, which he does not want people to know about. Such deeds and behavior are not acceptable to the society with its well-laid system whose parts are interlinked. The effects of such anti-social deeds are bound to appear before public eyes, even if they remain hidden in the beginning. The unjust criminal wants to compel the society to accept his crime, but it does not accept it at all. It is not unlike a man eating or drinking poison, wishing that his digestive system would digest it, but it does not digest it. And even if that injustice remains hidden in this life, there is a meeting place, which he cannot avoid, and your Lord is on watch. At this juncture man will know that his plans were defective and he did not properly observe what was required of him; then he will feel remorse. Even if he were given a second chance, he would damage some other parts. It would continue like that until God disgraces him before the whole world.
The above discussion makes it clear that the words: “So he became of those who regret,” indicate his regret for not hiding and burying the dead body of his brother. Also it may possibly be said that the words show his regret for the slaying itself, and it is not wide of mark.
Discourse
The discussion “A Talk on Perception and Thought” appears here in the printed volume. Read it in the Al-Mizan App.
مِنْ أَجْلِ ذَٰلِكَ كَتَبْنَا عَلَىٰ بَنِي إِسْرَائِيلَ أَنَّهُ مَنْ قَتَلَ نَفْسًا بِغَيْرِ نَفْسٍ أَوْ فَسَادٍ فِي الْأَرْضِ فَكَأَنَّمَا قَتَلَ النَّاسَ جَمِيعًا وَمَنْ أَحْيَاهَا فَكَأَنَّمَا أَحْيَا النَّاسَ جَمِيعًا ۚ وَلَقَدْ جَاءَتْهُمْ رُسُلُنَا بِالْبَيِّنَاتِ ثُمَّ إِنَّ كَثِيرًا مِنْهُمْ بَعْدَ ذَٰلِكَ فِي الْأَرْضِ لَمُسْرِفُونَ ٣٢
(5:32) For this reason did We prescribe to the Children of Israel that whoever slays a soul, unless it be for manslaughter or for mischief in the land, it is as though he slew all men; and whoever keeps it alive, it is as though he kept alive all men; and certainly Our messengers came to them with clear proofs, but even after that many of them certainly act extravagantly in the land.
Majmaʾ al-bayan says:
“al-Ajl literally means felony.”
al-Rāghib says:
“al-Ajl is that felony (retribution of) which is feared immediately; thus every ajl is a felony, but not every felony is ajl; it is said: ‘I did it because of him.’”
Then it was used for describing the cause; it is said: ‘I did it for this cause,’ that is, this is the cause of my action. Probably its use for description of cause began in the context of felony and crime, as we say: ‘Zayd did evil and for this crime [ajl] I punished him with hitting,’
That is, my hitting Zayd sprang from his crime which was his evil-doing, or from crime of his evil-doing; then it was used for general cause and reason, as for example, I visited you for the reason of my love to you, or because of my love to you.
The context apparently shows that the phrase, “For this reason,” refers to the story of the two sons of Adam given in the preceding verses. That is, the occurrence of that distressing event was the reason of our prescribing to the Children of Israel this and this. Some people have said that this phrase is a part of the preceding sentence: So he became of those who regret; that is, this was the cause of his regretting. This in itself is not far-fetched, as we see in the verses –20: ... Thus does Allah make clear to you the signs, that you may ponder (219) about this world and the hereafter. And they ask you concerning the orphans ... But in that case the words: “We prescribed,” would begin a new sentence, and the usual style of the Qur’an would demand a (wa) for recommencement of another sentence, as we have seen in the above-mentioned verse .
Why does this phrase refer to the story of the two sons of Adam? It is because the story shows that this human species by nature is entangled in desire and jealousy; thus he hates people for things that are beyond their power [that is, are gifted by God]. This jealousy for even ordinary things instigates him against divine decrees for negating the purpose of creation; it blinds him so that he kills another human being, even his own brother.
Individual men belong to a single species and have the same essence and reality. Each of them possesses [in miniature] the same humanity that is possessed by all others, and vice versa. God created so many individuals and multiplied the human race in order that this reality should survive, in view of the fact that individuals remain alive only for short periods; by this increase in population, new generations will replace the old, and the worship of God will continue. In this background, destroying an individual by murder is tantamount to doing mischief in creation and negating the divine aim of keeping the humanity alive through increased population and succeeding generations. To this fact the killed son of Adam had pointed while talking to his brother: “I am not one to stretch forth my hand towards you to slay you; surely I fear Allah, the Lord of the worlds.” Thus he indicated that slaying someone without genuine reason was tantamount to waging war against God’s Lordship.
As the human nature is such that a trivial cause incites him to commit injustice and oppression, which in the long run, negates the laws given by the Lord and contradicts the purpose of creation of humanity in general; and as the Children of Israel were sunk in jealousy and envy, pride and haughtiness, pursuit of desire and rejection of truth—as the preceding verses have described and their narrated stories show—God explained to them the reality of this heinous oppression and its position in depth, and informed them that in His eyes slaying one man was equal to slaying all people, and conversely keeping one person alive was tantamount to keeping alive all of them.
The phrase: “We prescribed to the Children of Israel,” does not indicate any laid down law, yet it is not without emphasis looking at its importance and approach; and it has effect in provoking the divine wrath in this world or the next.
In short, the verse means: As man, by nature, is pushed even by a trivial motive to commit this great oppression [that is, murder], and peculiar characteristics of the Children of Israel were well-known, We described to them the gravity of manslaughter, in order that they should desist from extravagance, and there came to them Our messengers with clear proofs, but even after that they certainly act extravagantly in the land.
The sentence: “whoever slays a soul, unless it be for man-slaughter or for mischief in the land, it is as though he slew all men.” Here God has made exception of two categories of killing: (i) In punishment, that is, for retribution, as He says: ... retaliation is prescribed for you in the matter of the slain; ... (). (ii) In punishment of mischief in the land, as He says in the next verse: The punishment of those who wage war against Allah and His messenger and strive to make mischief in the land is only this, that they should be killed or crucified or their hands and their feet should be cut off on opposite sides ... ().
The seriousness of killing is elaborated by the phrase: it is as though he slew all men. We have already explained that each individual man possesses the same reality and quiddity, which is found in all members of the species, this reality lives and dies with him. All human beings, be he an individual or the whole species, one man or a multitude, all are one in this reality. Naturally, murdering one soul should be tantamount to killing the whole species. Conversely, keeping alive one man should be equal to keeping all men alive, as the verse says.
First Objection: This equalization leads to nullification of the main purpose of the verse. The verse aims at showing the seriousness and gravity of slaying a soul and its great sin and dire consequences. Obviously, the more men one kills the more serious and grave its consequences should be. If one slaying is made equal to slaying all men, then what would be said for a man who kills ten men? One victim’s murder becomes equal to murdering all men; and the remaining nine victims are left without anything to compare with.
This objection cannot be removed by saying that: ‘Killing ten persons is equal to ten times murdering all men; and killing all of them is equal to murdering all multiplied by the total number of all’; because it means multiplication of punishment number, and the text of the verse does not support it.
Moreover, the total is made of units each of which is equal to the total, which is again made of such units; and this computation is not going to end at any point, and such a total is meaningless, because it has no unit, and there is no total without unit.
Apart from that, God says: ... and whoever brings an evil deed, he shall not be recompensed but only with the like of it, ... ().
Second Objection: What is the meaning of saying that killing one person is equal to killing all? If this “all” includes this one person who is killed, it means that the said person is equal to a collection of himself and others taken together. But it is obviously impossible. If “killing all” connotes killing all persons accept this one, it means that whoever killed a man, it is as though he killed all men except this one. Obviously, it is a rotten claim that contradicts the purpose of speech, that is, elaboration of the extreme seriousness of this oppression. Moreover, the phrase: “it is as though he slew all men,” is unconditional and without any exception; so it does not allow this hypothesis.
This objection cannot be cleared by saying that: ‘The aim is to show equality as far as punishment is concerned, or in other words, multiplication of punishment or other such matters.’ And it is clear.
The reply to both the above objections is this: The divine words: “whoever slays a soul, it is as though he slew all men,” are an allusion to the fact that all men have one single reality, that is humanity in which all are united, and one and all are equal in it; whoever attacks the humanity found in one of them, he attacks the humanity found in all of them. For example, there is water divided in numerous glasses; whoever drinks from one glass he drinks the water—and he desires the water because it is water—and what is found in all other glasses is no more than water; thus it is as though he has drunk from all glasses. Therefore, the above-mentioned sentence is an allusion in the form of a simile.
In this way both objections are removed, because those objections have treated it as a simple simile in which the factor of similarity intensifies when the number of a side of simile increases; obviously if in this case one is equalized with all the meaning will be disturbed and objection will arise, as if someone says: One of this group of people is like a lion, and one among them is like all in bravery and valor.
As for the sentence: “and whoever keeps it alive it is as though he kept alive all men,” it will be explained in the same way as the preceding sentence was. Keeping alive alludes to what the sane persons would call giving life, like delivering a drowning person and freeing a captive. God in His Book has counted guiding to the truth as giving life, as He says: Is he who was dead then We raised him to life and made for him a light by which he walks among the people, ... (). Therefore, one who guides a soul to the true faith has raised him to life.
The clause: “and certainly Our messengers came to them with clear proofs,” is related to the beginning of the verse, that is, ‘Certainly, Our messengers came to them warning them against murder and other related ways of making mischief in the land.’ The next sentence: “but even after that many of them certainly act extravagantly in the land,” completes the speech, and its addition gives the intended result of this talk—a clear idea that the Children of Israel were extravagant, persisting in their arrogance and impertinence. We certainly described to them the gravity of murder, and Our messengers came to them with proofs, explaining this and other related topics. They clearly described it to them and warned them of its consequences; even then they did not desist from their haughtiness and insolence. They certainly acted extravagantly in the past, and continue to do so even now.
Extravagance means going beyond the boundary and exceeding this limit in all activities, although it is mostly used in monetary context. God says: And they who when they spend, are neither extravagant nor parsimonious, and (keep) between these the just mean (), as al-Rāghib has said.
Examining Narrations
- Hishām b. Sālim narrates through Habīb al-Sijistānī from Abū Jaʾfar that he said, “When the two sons of Adam offered (their) offerings, and it was accepted from one of them and was not accepted from the other; [the Imam] said, ‘It was accepted from Hābīl and not accepted from Qābīl. Because of it he (Qābīl) was overcome by intense jealousy and he committed outrage against Hābīl. He was lying in wait for him, watching when he would be alone, until he got the better of him, away from Adam; so he attacked and killed him. A part of their story is what God has described in his Book concerning their talk before his killing ...’” (al-Tafsīr, al-ʿAyyāshī)
Author’s comments: This is one of the best traditions narrated about this story. It is a lengthy tradition in which the Imam describes: the birth of Hibatullāh Shīth after this event, Adam’s will for him; and continuation of will among the prophets. We shall write it in some appropriate place.
The tradition clearly shows that Qābīl assassinated Hābīl when Hābīl was unaware of it, and he did not submit himself to the killer’s design, as it agrees with reason; and we have elaborated it in the preceding Commentary.
It should be noted that our traditions give the names of the two sons as Hābīl and Qābīl, while the prevalent Bible says: Abel (Hābīl) and Cain (Qābīl). But there is no authenticity in it, because the narration of the Torah ends on one person whose details are unknown, apart from the alterations in the Torah, which are widely known.
- al-Qummī narrates from his father, from al-Hasan b. Mahbūb, from Hishām b. Sālim, from Abū Hamzah al-Thumālī, from Thuwayr b. Abī Fākhitah that he said, “I heard ʿAlī b. al-Husayn, talking to some Qurayshites. He said, ‘When the two sons of Adam offered (their) offering, one of them offered the fattest ram which he kept, and the other offered a bunch of ear of grain; so it was accepted from the owner of the ram—and he was Hābīl—and not accepted from the other one. Thus Qābīl was angry, and said to Hābīl, “By Allah! I will most certainly slay you.” Hābīl said, “Allah only accepts from those who are pious. If you will stretch forth your hand towards me to slay me, I am not one to stretch forth my hand towards you to slay you; surely I fear Allah, the Lord of the worlds. Surely I wish that you should bear my sin as well as your own sin, and so you would be of the inmates of the Fire, and this is the recompense of the unjust.” Then his mind facilitated to him the slaying of his brother; but he did not know how to kill him until Iblīs came and taught him, saying, “Put his head between two rocks, then crush it.” So when he killed him, he did not know what should he do with him. Then came two crows, and they came forward fighting and combating with one another; so one of them killed his companion; then the survivor dug into the land with his claws and buried his companion in it. Qābīl said, “Woe me! Do I lack the strength that I should be like this crow and cover the dead body of my brother? So he became of those who regret.” Then he dug for him a ditch and buried him into it; thus it became a custom to bury the dead bodies.
“‘Thereafter Qābīl returned to his father, and he did not see Hābīl with him. Adam said to him, “Where have you left my son?” Qābīl told him, “Had you sent me as his guardian?” Adam said, “Come with me to the place of offering.” And [Adam] had a fore boding of what Qābīl had done. When he arrived at the place of offering, Hābīl’s murder became clear to him. Then Adam cursed the land that accepted Hābīl’s blood [that is, drank the blood, leaving nothing above]; and Adam ordered that Qābīl be cursed, and Qābīl was called from the sky: “You are cursed as you killed your brother.” It is for the above reason that the earth does not drink blood.
“‘Then Adam returned, weeping for Hābīl forty days and nights. When he felt grief for him, he complained to God about it. So God revealed to him: “I am going to give you a male child who will be a replacement of Hābīl.” Thus Hawwāʾ gave birth to a son, pure and blessed; when it was the seventh day, God revealed to him: “O Adam! This son is my gift to you; therefore you name him Hibatullāh [that is, God’s gift]; so Adam gave him the name Hibatullāh.’” (al-Tafsīr, al-Qummī)
Author’s comments: This is the most moderate of the traditions narrated about this story and the matters connected with it. Even so, it is not free of some confusion in the text; as it shows that Qābīl threatened Hābīl to kill him, and then he did not know how to kill him; it is an unimaginable idea, except if it is taken to mean that he was perplexed which method he should use to kill his brother, so Iblīs (may God curse him!) advised him to crush his head with rock. There are other traditions, narrated through the Shīʾah and Sunnī chains, whose theme is nearer to this tradition.
It should be noted that many diverse traditions have been narrated about this event with astonishing themes, like:
The one that says that God took the ram of Hābīl, and kept it in the Garden for forty autumns, then offered it as Ishmael’s ransom, so Abraham slaughtered it:
Or that which says that Hābīl surrendered himself to Qābīl’s control and desisted from stretching forth his hand towards his brother;
Or that which says that when Qābīl killed his brother, God bound one of his legs to its thigh from the day of murder to the Day of Resurrection, and turned his face to right side, wherever he turns it turns; on him is a hedge of ice in winter, and a hedge of fire in summer; there are with him seven angels, when one of them goes, another one comes;
Or that which says that he is undergoing punishment in an island in sea; God has hanged him upside down, and he will remain in the same condition up to the Day of Resurrection;
Or that which says that Qābīl son of Adam hangs by his hair in core of the sun; it takes him with it in its circulation—in winter and summer—up to the Day of Resurrection; when that day comes. God will send him into the Fire;
Or that which says that the son of Adam, who killed his brother, was Qābīl who was born in the Garden;
Or that which says that when Adam came to know of the murder of Hābīl, he elegized him in a few lines of Arabic poem;
Or that which says that according to their shariah if someone intended to attack another person, the victim left him free to do whatever he wanted, without resistance.
In addition to other such traditions, most or all of these and other similar traditions are weak; they go against the dictates of reason, and the Book does not support them. Some of them are clearly forged; others are distorted, while many are the result of the narrators’ mistake who tried to narrate them in their own words.
- Ibn Abī Shaybah narrates from ʿUmar that the Messenger of God said, “Does one of you lack the strength, if a man comes to him to slay him, to say like it?”—He said it pointing with one of his hands to the other—“Then he would be like the good one of the two sons of Adam; he would be in the Garden and his killer in the Fire. (al-Durr al-manthūr)
Author’s comments: It is among the traditions describing civil strifes and trials. There are many others like it, and al-Suyūtī has narrated most of them in al-Durr al-manthūr. For example, the following one which he has quoted through al-Bayhaqī, from Abū Moses from the Prophet that he said: “Break your swords”—that is, during civil strife—“and cut your strings, and stay inside the houses, and be in it like the good one of the two sons of Adam.”
Another tradition he has quoted through Ibn Jarīr and ʿAbdu al-Razzāq from al-Hasan that he said, “The Messenger of God said, ‘Verily the two sons of Adam have been offered as an example for this ummah; so adhere to the good one of them.’” There are other narrations like them.
These traditions apparently are not consistent with correct consideration, which is supported by correct traditions, which command people to defend themselves and fight in support of truth. God has said: And if two parties of the believers quarrel, make peace between them; but if one of them acts wrongfully towards the other, fight that which acts wrongly until it returns to Allah’s command ().
Moreover, all of these traditions purport to explain the words of Hābīl in this story: “If you will stretch forth your hand towards me to slay me, I am not one to stretch forth my hand towards you to slay you,” and try to show that Hābīl gave his brother power over himself enabling him to kill him without any attempt to defend himself. And you have seen that this idea is not in conformity with the Qur’anic text.
Apart from that, what makes one suspicious of these traditions is the fact that they have been narrated by people who sat during turmoils that led to ʿUthmān’s murder, and during ʿAlī’s reign they joined Muʾāwiyah, the Khārijites and Talhah and al-Zubayr. Therefore, it is necessary to interpret them in a sensible way if possible, failing which they should be discarded.
- Ibn ʿAsākir has narrated from ʿAlī that the Prophet said, “There is a mountain in Damascus, called Qāsiyūn; son of Adam killed his brother in it.” (ibid.)
Author’s comments: There is no objection to this tradition. However, Ibn ʿAsākir has narrated through one chain from Kaʾb al-Ahbār that he said, “The blood, which is on the mountain of Qāsiyūn, is that of the son of Adam.” Also he narrates through another chain from ʿAmr b. Khabīr al-Shaʾbānī that he said, “I was with Kaʾb al-Ahbār on the mountain, Dayr al-Murrān; and he saw a flowing chasm in it; so he said, ‘Here the son of Adam had killed his brother, and this is the trace of his blood; God has made it a sign for the worlds.’”
These two traditions show that there was there some firm sign, which was claimed to be the blood of Hābīl. In all probability, it looks like so many myths which crafty people have invented, so that people should come there to visit it, bringing with them large votive offerings and precious gifts, not unlike so many palm-prints and footprints on stones, and the grave of the grandmother and other such things.
- Ahmad, al-Bukhārī, Muslim, al-Tirmidhī, al-Nasāʾī, Ibn Mājah, Ibn Jarīr and Ibn al-Mundhir have narrated from Ibn Masʾūd that he said, “The Messenger of God, said, ‘No soul will be slain unjustly but a portion of its blood shall be apportioned to the first son of Adam, because he was the first to establish the custom of killing.’” (ibid.)
Author’s comments: This theme has been narrated through other Sunnī and Shīʾah chain.
- Humrān said, “I said to Abū Jaʾfar, ‘What is the meaning of the words of God, the Mighty, the Great: For this reason did We prescribe to the Children of Israel that whoever slays a soul, unless it be for manslaughter or for mischief in the land, it is as though he slew all men?’” He [Humrān] said, “How can it be as though he slew all men, while he had slain a single soul? He said, ‘He will be put in a place in Jahannam (Gehenna) where the punishment of the people of the Fire reaches its utmost limit; if he had killed all men, he would have entered the same place.’ I said, ‘Then if he killed another (man)?’ He said, ‘It will be increased for him.’” (al-Kāfī)
Author’s comments: al-Sadūq too has narrated a similar tradition in Maʾāni al-akhbār from Humrān.
Humran’s question, “Then if he killed another (man)?” points to the above-mentioned objection that it makes one murder equal to that murder plus all others. The Imam has replied that his punishment will be increased for him.
At this juncture someone may think that this reply of the Imam goes against the equality mentioned in the verse: whoever slays a soul it is as though he slew all men, because increase means that murder of one or many or all is not equal. But this objection is not sustainable, because equality refers to the nature of punishment, that is, all murderers—whether of one or many or all—will be put in one valley of Jahannam, and to this fact refer the Imam’s words: “if he had killed all men, he would have entered the same place.”
The evidence for this explanation is found in a tradition narrated by al-ʿAyyāshī in his al-Tafsīr, from the same Humrān from Abū ʿAbdillāh about this verse, that the Imam said, “There is a place in the Fire where the punishment of all the people of the Fire reaches its utmost limit, so he will be put in it.” “I [that is, Humrān] said, ‘And if he had killed two?’ (The Imam, a.s.), said, ‘Don’t you see that there is no place in the Fire more severe in punishment than this?’ Then he said, ‘[His punishment] will be increased according to his deed ‘”
The Imam has joined negative and positive in his reply; it points to what we have already explained that equality is in the nature of punishment and difference will be in intensity of punishment and the effect it will have on the killer.
Some more evidence may be found in what Hannān b. Sudayr has narrated from Abū ʿAbdillāh that he said about the verse: whoever slays a soul, it is as though he slew all men. “There is a valley in Jahannam, if he slew all men, he will be (put) in it, and if he slew one soul he will be (put) in it.” This too is narrated in al-Tafsīr of al-ʿAyyāshī.
Author’s comments: It is as though the verse is quoted not verbatim in this hadīth.
- [al-Kulaynī] narrates through his chain from Fudayl b. Yasār that he said, “I asked Abū Jaʾfar, about the word of God, the Mighty, the Great, in His Book: and whoever keeps it alive, it is as though he kept alive all men. He said, ‘(It is saving) from burning or drowning.’ I said, ‘He who takes him out from error to guidance?’ He said, ‘That is its greatest taʾwīl.’” (al-Kāfī)
Author’s comments: al-Shaykh has narrated it in his al-Amālī, and al-Barqī in his al-Mahāsin, through Fudayl from Abū Jaʾfar; and it has been narrated by Sumāʾah and Humrān from Abū ʿAbdillāh.
The statement that saving from error is the greatest taʾwīl of this verse means that it is its finest and most subtle explanation. In early period of Islam the word, taʾwīl, was often used as a synonym of tafsīr.
This explanation of ours is supported by what has been narrated in al-Tafsīr of al-ʿAyyāshī from Muḥammad b. Muslim from Abū Jaʾfar that he said, “I asked the Imam, about the word of God: whoever slays a soul, unless it be for manslaughter or for mischief in the land, it is as though he slew all men. (The Imam) said, ‘For him there is a place in the Fire, if he killed all men, his punishment will not increase on it.’ He said, ‘and whoever keeps it alive, it is as though he kept alive all men. He did not kill him, or saved him from drowning or burning; and the greatest of this all is that he takes him out from error to guidance.’”
Author’s comments: The Imam’s saying, “He did not kill him,” means: ‘He did not take revenge against him (the victim) though he could do so after the killing has been proved.’
- al-ʿAyyāshī also says in his al-Tafsīr that Abū Basīr narrated from Abū Jaʾfar that he said, “I asked him (the Imam, about the verse): whoever keeps it alive, it is as though he kept alive all men; he, said, ‘Whoever saves one from the unbelief (kufr) to belief (īmān).’”
Author’s comments: This theme has been mentioned in many traditions narrated through Sunnī chains.
- Abū Jaʾfar said, “Extravagants are those who regard unlawful things as lawful and shed blood.” (Majmaʾ al-bayān)
Discourse
The discussion “An Academic Discourse and Application” appears here in the printed volume. Read it in the Al-Mizan App.
Offerings among the Jews are of various types: slaughtering an animal for sacrifice, presenting flour, oil, frankincense, and first fruits. Among the Christians, it is the bread and wine taken at the Eucharist, which according to their belief, really turns into Christ’s flesh and blood. (Auth.) ↩︎
al-Mīzān (Eng.), vol. 4. (Trans.) ↩︎
It is attributed mostly to the Prophet. (Trans.) ↩︎
In Jeddah (Saudi Arabia) there is a large grave, which public attributes to Hawwāʾ (Adam’s wife); they even claim that this was the reason the town was named Jaddah (grand-mother)! (Trans.) ↩︎