Verses 100–108

Chapter 11: Hūd · Printed edition: Volume 21, pp. 1–49

This section of verses refers back to stories of the prophets recounted above, providing a holistic overview of them that expounds God’s habit of dealing with His servants and the destruction in this world and eternal punishment in the Hereafter that are the consequences of idolatry for wrongdoing nations, as a lesson for the attentive.

ذَٰلِكَ مِنْ أَنْبَاءِ الْقُرَىٰ نَقُصُّهُ عَلَيْكَ ۖ مِنْهَا قَائِمٌ وَحَصِيدٌ ١٠٠

(11:100) These are from the accounts of (min) the townships which We recount to you. Of them there are some that still stand, and some that have been mown down.

The demonstrative pronoun, ‘These’ refers to the stories recounted above. The use of the preposition min conveys the meaning of portioning (tabʿīḍ). In other words: ‘What we recounted to you here is just a portion of accounts about the townships, regions, and their inhabitants.’

Of them there are some that still stand, and some that have been mown down—Here, God invokes the metaphor of agricultural crops, where some are still standing and others have been harvested.

If this refers to the cities themselves, it suggests that some of the cities whose stories We have related to you are still standing, their remnants not destroyed. For example, the cities of Lot’s people, at the time their story was revealed in the Qur’an, as stated: Certainly We have left of it a manifest sign for a people who apply reason (), and: And indeed you pass by them at dawn and at night. So do you not apply reason? (). Then there some others that have been completely erased, their landmarks obliterated, such that not even ruins remain—like the cities of Noah’s people and ʿĀd.

On the other hand, if it refers to the inhabitants of these cities, it means that some of these nations and peoples are still standing, their ruin not yet complete, like Noah’s and Ṣāliḥ’s nations. And some have had their end decreed by God, like Lot’s people, from whom only Lot’s family was spared, and Lot was not originally one of them.

وَمَا ظَلَمْنَاهُمْ وَلَٰكِنْ ظَلَمُوا أَنْفُسَهُمْ ۖ فَمَا أَغْنَتْ عَنْهُمْ آلِهَتُهُمُ الَّتِي يَدْعُونَ مِنْ دُونِ اللَّهِ مِنْ شَيْءٍ لَمَّا جَاءَ أَمْرُ رَبِّكَ ۖ وَمَا زَادُوهُمْ غَيْرَ تَتْبِيبٍ ١٠١

(11:101) We did not wrong them, but they wronged themselves. Of no avail to them were their gods whom they would invoke besides Allah, in any wise, when your Lord’s edict came, and they did not increase them in anything but ruin.

This means that God did not wrong them by inflicting divine punishment on them and bringing about their destruction following their idolatry and transgression. Rather, they wronged themselves when they committed idolatry and forsook any obedience to God. If there is an action and there is a punishment prescribed for it, one of the two must be unjust, either the act itself or the punishment it warrants. If the punishment is not unjust, then the action that brings the punishment must be unjust.

In short, the meaning is: ‘We punished them for their wrongdoings.’ Therefore, the statement, Of no avail to them were their gods whom they would invoke besides Allah …, based on the arrangement of the verse, means: ‘We seized them with punishment and their gods, whom they invoked besides God to bring them good and protect them from harm, did not avail them in the least when God’s edict came to pass and they were sentenced to His punishment … or when their Lord’s punishment upon them became due.’

… and they did not increase them in anything but ruin (tatbīb)—Tatbīb, derived from tabb, means to devastate something (tadmīr) or annihilate it (ihlāk). Its original meaning is to ‘to cut.’ This is because their worship of idols was a sin for which they were deserving of punishment. And when they tasted God’s punishment and violence, they turned to their idols and pleaded with them for relief. However, this supplication to their idols was also a sin, so it only served to intensify their punishment and make the penalty harsher for them. Hence, it did not increase them in anything except ruin.

Attributing their ruin to their gods is an example of metaphorical language, as, in reality, it refers to their supplication to these gods, which is the action of the one who is supplicating, not the one who is being supplicated to.

وَكَذَٰلِكَ أَخْذُ رَبِّكَ إِذَا أَخَذَ الْقُرَىٰ وَهِيَ ظَالِمَةٌ ۚ إِنَّ أَخْذَهُ أَلِيمٌ شَدِيدٌ ١٠٢

(11:102) Such is the seizing of your Lord when He seizes the townships that are wrongdoing. Indeed His seizing is painful, severe.

The demonstrative pronoun ‘such’ serves as a reference to past events, specifically to the accounts of the towns presented above, which are some instances of God’s retribution. In this verse, the unlimited divine punishment is being compared with the punishment inflicted upon them, stating: ‘His retribution is universally painful and severe.’ This statement is an example of a simile that compares a general idea to particular instances of it, indicating that the predication it reflects is not solely applicable to the instances mentioned but rather is general, encompassing all individuals. This is a common type of simile. The statement, Indeed His seizing is painful, severe, serves to explain the basis of the simile, which is the pain and severity of His punishment.

Therefore, the meaning of this passage is as follows: ‘Just as God Almighty punished earlier wrongdoing nations—such as the peoples of Noah, Hūd, Ṣāliḥ, Lot, Shuʿayb, and Pharaoh—with a severe and painful punishment, so too will He punish the rest of the wrongdoing towns when He seizes them. Those who reflect should draw a lesson from this.’

إِنَّ فِي ذَٰلِكَ لَآيَةً لِمَنْ خَافَ عَذَابَ الْآخِرَةِ ۚ ذَٰلِكَ يَوْمٌ مَجْمُوعٌ لَهُ النَّاسُ وَذَٰلِكَ يَوْمٌ مَشْهُودٌ ١٠٣

(11:103) There is indeed a sign in that for him who fears the punishment of the Hereafter. That is a day on which all mankind will be gathered, and it is a day witnessed.

The demonstrative pronoun ‘that’ refers to what God has informed us about the stories of those wrongdoing towns that He seized with a severe and painful punishment on account of their misdeeds. Here, He informs us that His punishment of the other wrongdoers will be likewise painful and severe, and says that this is a sign for those who fear the punishment of the Hereafter and an indication that God Almighty will seize the criminals for their crimes after they die. His punishment will surely be severe and painful, which means that people should draw a lesson from this and take precautions against bringing down God’s wrath upon themselves.

That is a day for which all mankind will be gathered (yawmun majmūʿun la-hu al-nās) means that the day on which the punishment of the afterlife occurs is a day when people will be gathered. Therefore, the demonstrative pronoun ‘that’ is a reference to the day indicated by the mention of the punishment of the afterlife. According to some commentators, it is for this reason that it is used in the masculine form (dhālik instead of the feminine tilka), but it could also be that the demonstrative is used in the masculine to match its predicate (‘day’, which is also masculine).

The description of the Last Day as a day ‘for which all mankind will be gathered’ (which is an adjectival construct) rather than saying ‘people will gather for it’ (sa-yajmaʿu la-hu al-nās), is to indicate that the gathering of people is one of the day’s definitive characteristics, which it possesses inherently without needing to be associated with it through a predicate.

The distinctive characteristic of this day is that people are gathered for it, and the lām in la-hu, indicates purpose. Therefore, this day has a purpose that can only be achieved by gathering humankind in a way that leaves no one absent. Equally, people have a role which connects each one of them to the totality. In doing so, the first intermingles with the last and the last with the first, and all are mixed with some and some with all. This role is the reckoning of their deeds in terms of faith and disbelief, obedience and disobedience, and generally in terms of happiness and misery.

It is clear that a single action of a single human being is derived from all his previous actions related to his internal states, and all his subsequent actions also depend on his heart’s condition. Similarly, one’s action is related to the actions of the rest of his species in terms of influencing others and being influenced by them. Similarly, the deeds of the first generations are related to the deeds of the later ones, and the deeds of the later generations are related to the deeds of the previous ones. Among the earlier generations are the leaders of guidance and misguidance, who are responsible for the deeds of the later ones, and among the later ones are the followers and dependents, responsible for the delusions and conceitedness of their predecessors. God Almighty says, We will surely question those to whom the messengers were sent, and We will surely question the messengers. (), and He said, “ Indeed it is We who revive the dead and write what they have sent ahead and what they left behind, and We have figured everything in a manifest register ().

Divine retribution, then, inevitably follows from God’s decisive judgement.

And this matter, as described here, only comes about when a group of people gathers in such a way that none are excluded.

From this, it appears that the issue of individual human beings in their graves and their recompense therein with some form of reward or punishment—as indicated by the verses of the Qur’an on the isthmus (barzakh) and detailed in the reports from the Prophet and the Imams of the Household of the Prophet —is distinct from what God Almighty has told us about the account on the Day of Resurrection and the recompense decreed therein in the form of eternal Heaven or Hell. What awaits a person in the isthmus is the completion of the record of their deeds, to be kept in store for the Day of Judgement. And what they experience there in the isthmus, whether in the form of a paradise or a fire, is but a precursor to the final judgement and recompense that awaits them thereafter. What is there is not a complete accounting, nor a final judgement, nor a full recompense. This is hinted at in verses such as the Fire, to which they are exposed morning and evening. And on the day when the Hour sets in Pharaoh’s clan will enter the severest punishment (), and they are dragged into scalding waters and then set aflame in the Fire (). The first verse describes their punishment as being exposed to the fire, and then on the Day of Resurrection, entering it fully, which is described as ‘the severest punishment’; while the second verse speaks about their being punished by being dragged through boiling water and then being set aflame in the Fire.

Consider the verse about those slain in the way of God: rather they are living and provided for near their Lord, exulting in what Allah has given them out of His grace, and rejoicing for those who have not yet joined them from behind them that they will have no fear, nor will they grieve (). This verse is explicitly about the world of the grave that comes before the Day of Judgement, as it does not mention a reckoning or an eternal paradise, but it mentions some enjoyments generally.

Now consider the verse: When death comes to one of them, he says, ‘My Lord! Take me back, that I may act righteously in what I have left behind.’ ‘By no means! These are mere words that he says.’ And ahead of them is a barrier until the day they will be resurrected (). This verse says that, after death, people find themselves in an interstitial life that exists between the worldly life, which is play and amusement, and the afterlife, which is the real life. As He says: The life of this world is nothing but diversion and play, but the abode of the Hereafter is indeed Life, had they known! ().

In summary, the earthly life is the realm of action, the intermediate realm (known as barzakh or the isthmus) is the domain of preparation for the final judgement and recompense, and the afterlife is the domain of judgement and recompense. As God has said: on the day when Allah will not let the Prophet down and the faithful who are with him. Their light will move swiftly before them and on their right. They will say, ‘Our Lord! Perfect our light for us, and forgive us! (). They arrive there, with the light they earned in the earthly life, which they prepared in the intermediate realm, and then, on the Day of Resurrection, they ask for the completion of their light and the removal of whatever remains upon them of the world of diversion and play.

The phrase, and it is a day witnessed (), appears to follow on from the previous sentence, That is a day for which all mankind will be gathered, because the gathering of people on that day necessitates the presence of witnesses. However, this phrase does not only refer to humankind. The fact that it is used without any qualification suggests that this is a day witnessed by all of those who have the capacity to witness: humans, angels, and jinn alike. There are many verses indicating the presence of the jinn and devils and the presence of the angels on the Day of Judgement, and these support the most general meaning of witnessing that we have mentioned here.

وَمَا نُؤَخِّرُهُ إِلَّا لِأَجَلٍ مَعْدُودٍ ١٠٤

(11:104) And We do not defer it but for a determinate term.

This means that there is a set time for that day, which God has ordained not to occur before its due time. Now, God judges, and none can repeal His judgement or resist His decree, therefore it must come to pass. Note that, according to the verse, God only delays the Day of Judgement for a preordained period, so when the time is complete and the term arrives, His decree is realized, and the day sets in.

يَوْمَ يَأْتِ لَا تَكَلَّمُ نَفْسٌ إِلَّا بِإِذْنِهِ ۚ فَمِنْهُمْ شَقِيٌّ وَسَعِيدٌ ١٠٥

(11:105) The day it comes, no one shall speak except by His leave. Some of them will be wretched and some felicitous.

The pronoun ‘it’ in ‘the day it comes’ refers back to the ‘determinate term’ mentioned in the previous verse. In other words, on the day when the determinate term, to which the resurrection has been deferred, comes, no soul will speak except by His permission. As God has said: Whoever expects to encounter Allah, Allah’s time will indeed come ().

Some, like al-Ṭabrisī in Majmaʿ al-bayān, have understood ‘the day it comes’ as a referring to ‘the day the Resurrection and divine recompense comes’, based on the fact that the previous verse also refers to these. However, this is a rather tortuous reading of the verse, and one which is not necessary given the explanation we have presented.

Others, such Rashīd Riḍā writing in al-Manār, have read the verse as meaning, ‘at the time that particular day arrives, no rational soul will speak except by God’s permission.’ Therefore, the intended meaning of ‘day’ in the verse is a time in the general sense of the word, rather than a specific duration thereof, because this is the time when a the specific day described in the verse will come to pass, and this specific day is what the pronoun ‘it’ refers to in ‘the day it comes.’

However, this reading is incorrect because it necessitates that ‘the day’ (in the sense of ‘the time’) be an adverb for ‘the day’ (the specific day, or the Day of Judgement), which essentially reduces the meaning of the verse to ‘at the time when that particular time comes’ or ‘the day when that particular day comes.’ Now, while one could differentiate between the two days to make one of them specific and the other general (as Rashīd Riḍā does in his commentary), this does not help to avoid the problematic implication of something being an adverb for itself, and time (which is an adverb in itself) being the adverb for another time. After all, this is impossibility that cannot be resolved by merely changing the wording.

Distinguishing between ‘day’ in the general sense and ‘day’ in the specific one results in a purely conceptual distinction that does not provide any substantive value for our understanding of the verse. This is because, when we say ‘the day when the specified day arrives’, the first and second days both refer to the same thing, as they are co-extensive with one another.

However, it can happen that a specific time is associated with an event that occurs during that time, such that the time itself can be spoken of as one event among others. This negates its adverbial aspect, and then such a time is considered the adverbial for another time. For instance, one might say: ‘The Day of Sacrifice during the month of Dhū al-Hijja’ and ‘The Day of Ashura in the month of Muharram.’ As God says, and when the Hour sets in (). So, if this specific concern is valid in the verse, it is possible that the pronoun ‘it’ in ‘the day it comes’ refers to the day itself.

… no one shall speak except by His leave (lā takallamu nafsun illā bi idhni-hi)—This means that no soul amongst those assembled will speak except by the permission of God. Note that the verb takallamu was originally tatakallamu, but the first ta- was omitted, as is a common convention in the Arabic language.

The preposition bi in illā bi idhni-hi (‘except by His leave’) signifies accompaniment. Therefore, in reality, the exception applies to the speech rather than the speaker. This is evident in His saying, None shall speak except whom the All-beneficent permits (). The implication here is that no soul will utter anything unless its speech is accompanied by His permission, unlike worldly speech in which one can say whatever they please, whether or not God has granted them moral permission to do so.

The attribute, namely no soul will speak except by His permission, is mentioned as one of the special characteristics that define the Day of Resurrection. Yet, it is not exclusive to it. Indeed, no soul ever speaks, nor any incident occurs, except by His permission, without this being specific to the Day of Resurrection.

It has been mentioned in some of our previous discussions that the majority of the distinctive qualities of the Day of Resurrection presented in the Qur’an are not, in fact, limited to it alone. This includes the verses: The day when they will emerge, nothing about them will be hidden from Allah (); … a day when you will turn back, not having anyone to protect you from Allah (); It is a day when no soul will be of any avail to another soul and all command that day will belong to Allah ().

There are other verses besides these also.

However, none of these qualities are unique to the Day of Resurrection. After all, it is obvious that nothing is ever hidden from God, nor can anything ever offer protection from Him, and neither does any soul have power over any other except by His leave, and He has eternal authority over creation and command.

However, something else becomes apparent when we contemplate on other verses.

For example, God quotes His own speech on the Day of Resurrection: ‘You were certainly oblivious of this. We have removed your veil from you, and so your sight is acute today’ (); And the speech of the guilty ones: ‘Our Lord! We have seen and heard. Send us back so that we may act righteously. Indeed we are now convinced.’ (); On the day when We gather them all together, We shall say to those who ascribe partners, ‘Stay where you are—you and your partners!’ Then We shall set them apart from one another… There every soul will examine what it has sent in advance, and they will be returned to Allah, their real master, and what they used to fabricate will forsake them ().

Reflecting on these verses, we note that the Day of Resurrection is an event in which God will assemble His servants and remove the curtains and veils that are in front of them, thereby revealing truths fully, and unveiling what is behind the cover of the Unseen in this creation. At this point, there will be no longer any doubt or hesitation in their breasts, nor will any whisper of disbelief stir in their hearts. They will witness utterly that God is the Manifest Truth, they will see that all power belongs to God, and that dominion, protection, command, and control belong to Him alone with no partner having any share in them.

The system of causes and effects, which they once perceived as existing independently of God, now cease to exist, severing the links and dissolving the causal relations between different things. At this point, the stars of causation scatter and the constellations that previously guided their suppositions in their darkness vanish. No sovereign retains any independent rule, no person of authority or power has anything to reinforce their status, no object has a refuge or sanctuary to which it can turn or with which it can take shelter in order to seek its protection. There is no veil that can hide one thing from another or obscure it. Every matter is under the control of the One, All-dominant God, and no one else possesses sovereignty.

This is the meaning of His saying: The day when they will emerge, nothing about them will be hidden from Allah; His saying: … not having anyone to protect you from Allah; and His saying: It is a day when no soul will be of any avail to another soul and all command that day will belong to Allah. This is reflected in many other verses of the Qur’an, all of which all deny the illusions with which people’s minds adorn this worldly existence, which is nothing more than diversion and play. Indeed, in their conjectures, these causes assume the meaning of causation, and are garbed with the attributes of sovereignty, authority, power, protection, honor, and dignity in a genuinely independent manner. They are considered the givers, the preventers, the beneficial, and the harmful, with no goal beyond them and no goodness apart from them.

Based on this, we can infer the real meaning of His saying: The day it comes, no one shall speak except by His leave. This meaning is reiterated in other verses with similar phrasing such as His saying: None shall speak except whom the All-beneficent permits and who says what is right (), and His saying: This is a day wherein they will not speak ().

This is because God describes this Day in the following terms: on the day when the secrets are examined (), and: whether you disclose what is in your hearts or hide it, Allah will bring you to account for it (). Thus, it is evident that the reckoning on the Day of Resurrection is based on what is in peoples souls, of good and evil states and attributes, not what is revealed by means of discovery as is the case in this worldly existence.

Therefore, whatever is hidden beneath the veils of secrecy in this world, including the inner depths of human souls and the hidden aspects of peoples’ hearts, will be revealed and stripped of any covering on the Day of Resurrection. What is unknown today will be evident tomorrow. The language we, as a society, use in our interactions, is nothing more than a series of sounds joined to one another. They point, as a matter of convention and thought, to meanings that reside in our consciousness. We adopt and exchange these sounds primarily due to our societal need to understand what is in the minds of others, due to our inability to perceive this directly through our senses.

Our use of language is a societal mechanism to which we resort in order to reveal the ideas hidden in our respective consciousness. This mechanism allows us to express what lies within our minds that would otherwise be beyond human comprehension. Had we been endowed with a sense that enabled us to directly perceive intellectual meanings in the same way as our sight enables us to perceive light and colors, or the way our touch enables us to sense heat and cold, roughness and smoothness, then we would not need to fashion languages and communicate through them. There would be no words or speech among us. Similarly, if human life was solitary rather than social, there would be no concept of speech or even a seed of its existence.

This is because worldly life is composed of both what is perceivable and what is beyond perception—the visible and the Unseen. People are in dire need of revealing what is in their minds, their intentions, and having these understood by others. If we imagine a purely observable existence, where life consisted only of matters that could be perceived, there would be no need for speech and language whatsoever. If we were to apply the term ‘speech’ to any existing state in such a life, it would merely refer to some of what is in people’s minds being made apparent to others, and those others becoming aware of it.

This kind of existence, characterized as such, is the existence of Resurrection Day, as God describes it in phrases such as the day when the secrets are examined (). This is further evidenced by God’s words: On that day neither humans will be questioned about their sins nor jinn … The guilty will be recognized by their mark; so they will be seized by the forelocks and the feet (). If you argue that, in such a scenario, there would be no sense in lies and deceit taking place there, the Qur’an affirms precisely the opposite in the following verse: On the day when We gather them all together, We shall say to those who ascribed partners (to Allah) ‘Where are your partners that you used to claim?’ Then their only excuse will be to say, ‘By Allah, our Lord, we were not polytheists.’ Look, how they forswear themselves, and what they used to fabricate has forsaken them! (); as well as in the verse: The day when Allah will raise them all together, they will swear to Him, just like they swear to you (now), supposing that they stand on something. Look! They are indeed liars! ().

Author’s comment: This refers to the manifestation of inner characteristics, just as a person, when thinking, perceives the depths of his own mind without needing to inform himself about his thoughts or reveal his innermost feelings to himself verbally. This is because he bears witness to his own inner self, not to something unknown or foreign to him. Nonetheless, he conjures an image of speech that signifies the meanings he perceives in his mind. Perhaps he even verbalizes these thoughts, articulating the components of the idea that crosses his mind with language. His motivation for doing so is his habit of speaking and pronouncing the thoughts that exist in his mind to others.

The polytheists and hypocrites portrayed in these verses, having grown accustomed to deceit and falsehood in their worldly life and having lived this life on the basis of such delusions, reveal their true nature on the day when inherent characteristics and traits of the soul became apparent. Otherwise, it is impossible to imagine a person standing before his Lord—God the Most High—who scrutinizes his inner and outer self, with his deeds clearly presented, his record laid bare, in the presence of witnesses, his body parts testifying to what they did while he was alive, and all the means to which a person might take recourse besides God—including lies—vanishing into nothingness, and his secrets made public, and yet he continues to lie in the hope of deceiving God, presenting a false, deceptive argument and hoping to escape through this.

This is like when, on the Day of Resurrection, they are commanded to prostrate themselves, but they are unable to do so. God says: The day when the catastrophe occurs, and they are summoned to prostrate themselves, they will not be able to do so. With a humbled look (in their eyes), they will be overcast by abasement. Certainly, they were summoned to prostrate themselves while they were yet sound (). Their inability to prostrate is due to the fact that arrogance has become entrenched in their souls. Had it been due to God preventing them from doing so on that day, this would have been an argument in their favor against Him rather than an argument in His favor against them.

Poser: If it is as you say it is, and there is neither any need for speech nor any occurrence thereof, then what is the meaning of the exception in the verse, no one shall speak except by His leave, and other similar statements we find in the Qur’an? And why does God recount what they will say on the Day of Judgement in various parts of His Book?

Reply: There is no doubt that a person, in his existence, has a choice in his actions, including speech. He has an equal propensity to perform an action and to abstain from it, which are equivalent relative to him. When he commits an act, one of the options has inevitably been chosen. There is no choice after that. The inevitable consequences that follow from the action, including the recompense that the person has earned through the action, are just like the action itself after it has been realized in external reality—all follow inevitably from it.

Now, the Hereafter is a realm of recompense, not a realm of deeds. There, human free will does not exist; what remains is the individual and the actions they have performed, which are now inseparably attached to them as a matter of necessity. Along with these actions are the written records of their deeds, the witnesses to these deeds, and their Lord, to whom all matters return, and by whose decree all judgements are made. When summoned, they respond out of compulsion, as God says, On that day they will follow a summoner in whom there will be no deviousness (). In the worldly life, they were called to the truth, but they did not respond.

If they are asked to speak in the Hereafter, their speech does not resemble the worldly speech which originated from their own free will and revealed what was hidden in their souls. Their mouths are sealed; there is no way for them to express what they wish. And how could they, when God has said, Today We shall seal their mouths, and their hands shall speak to Us, and their feet shall bear witness concerning what they used to earn (), and “ This is a day wherein they will not speak, nor will they be permitted to offer excuses. ().

Excuses only make sense when it comes to recompense that involves an element of choice, for such recompense could either exist or not exist. However, the bad deeds that one has unquestionably committed, and the inevitable punishment that follows, cannot be a subject of excuses, because there is no choice involved. As God says, “‘O faithless ones! Do not make any excuses today. You are only being requited for what you used to do’ (). In other words, your recompense is identical with the actions you have performed; no excuse or argument can change that. It would only be different if the recompense were taking place in this world and in the hands of a judge who can decide what they see as most appropriate.

In sum, if one speaks out of being asked on the Day of Resurrection, their speech is out of compulsion and aligns with their deeds, which have been made manifest and, therefore, cannot be hidden at all in that realm. If they lie in their speech, this would be nothing more than an expression of their innermost nature, as we have previously mentioned, and it would be considered one of their deeds that will be revealed—not a genuine response to a question. Their mouths will be sealed, and their hearing, sight, skin, hands, and legs will be made to speak. The deeds they have performed will be brought forward, the witnesses will testify, and God is a witness over everything.

To summarize all the preceding points, the meaning of God’s statement, no one shall speak except by His leave, is that people’s speech on that day will not be like their speech in this world. It will not be a voluntary disclosure of their inner thoughts that permits the speaker to either lie or tell the truth. This volitional control, which is an integral part of the realm of deeds (this world), is abolished in the Hereafter. A person has no free will in their speech because it is tied to God’s permission and His will. If you contemplate deeply, you will find that the outcome of this feature—the removal of human free will concerning speech and all other actions, and the encompassing nature of compulsion—leads back to what we initially discussed: the characteristic feature of the Day of Resurrection is the unveiling of the realities of all things and the transformation of the Unseen into the seen.

We advise the reader to pay close attention to the insights offered by the divine discourse about the Hereafter, for it is a complex and profound puzzle.

Some scholars have suggested that the meaning of the phrase, “ no one shall speak except by His leave, is that speech is only allowed if it is decent and permitted under religious law. People would naturally refrain from indecent speech in that realm, hence only decent and permissible speech occurs.

However, this is an arbitrary restriction of the verse’s meaning. After all, as we have already discussed, the Day of Judgement is not a day of action to permit good deeds or forbid bad ones. The refuge here, born out of the circumstances of recompense rather than action, does not distinguish between good and bad actions, even though both are choices, because the moral categories of good or bad can only apply to actions in which the person doing them has free will.

However, God Almighty says, no one shall speak except by His leave, and it is well known that presenting excuses is not in of itself a morally blameworthy act.

Other commentators have said that the meaning of the verse is that no one will speak beneficial words in the hereafter, such as words of intercession or mediation, except by His permission.

This reading of the verse understands it along similar lines to verses such as, Intercession will not avail that day except from him whom the All-beneficent allows and approves of his word (). However, this also narrows the meaning of the verse without any evidence to support such a restriction. If this was indeed the intended meaning, it would have been more appropriate to say: ‘no soul speaks on behalf of another soul or about it, except by His permission,’ similar to His saying, no soul will be of any avail to another soul ().

What we have presented above provides a way to reconcile verses that appear to affirm that people will speak on the Day of Resurrection with those that appear to deny the same thing.

This is as follows: The verses that concern the matter of speaking on the Day of Resurrection fall into two categories:

The first category denies speech or affirms it for all people without exception, as in His saying, On that day neither humans will be questioned about their sins nor jinn (), and His saying, The day when every soul will come pleading for itself ().

The second category denies any form of speech, whether truthful or false, as we see in the verse, This is a day wherein they will not speak (), and His saying, quoting the wrongdoers: ‘Now we have no intercessors, nor do we have any sympathetic friend’ ().

Verses of the first category can be reconciled through reference to verses such as, None shall speak except whom the All-beneficent permits and who says what is right (). While the apparent conflict between verses of the second category can be resolved by the verse presently under discussion, no one shall speak except by His leave (). However, based on the explanation given above, this suggests that they are bound in their speech to say only what God permits: they cannot freely choose and express what they wish as they could in this world. This is one of the unique attributes of the Day of Resurrection.

Based on this, the shortcomings of the explanation offered by Rashīd Riḍā in al-Manār become evident. For example, he says of the present verse: ‘The denial that any speech will occur on that day, except by His permission, explains the reconciliation between verses categorically negating it and those affirming it. He had mentioned verses such as, This is a day wherein they will not speak (), and, Today We shall seal their mouths ().

However, the problems with his explanation are, first of all, that he failed to distinguish between the two different categories of verses on this topic. This suggests that the denial that any speech will take place except by God’s permission, as mentioned in the present verse, suffices to resolve the apparent conflict between the different verses, which is not the case.

Secondly, he did not explain what it meant for someone to speak by God’s permission, which means that the verse is presenting something as a unique feature of the Day of Resurrection, when this does not appear to be something exclusive to it.

One way to address this apparent contradiction is to say that the Day of Resurrection consists of situations where people are permitted to speak in some of them but not in others. And this reading is supported by some narrations.

However, while this answer might appear to differ from the previous one at first glance, it does not, in reality, eliminate the question of what is meant by God’s permission, and essentially returns to it.

Another answer might be that what is meant by the absence of speech is that people will not speak with arguments sound, rather they will speak by confessing their sins. Some may also blame others, and some may ascribe sins to others. According to this reading, the phrase, no one shall speak except by His leave is a akin to telling someone who has spoken at length without presenting any convincing argument, ‘You have not said anything.’ Those who speak without presenting a sound argument are considered not to be speaking, because they do not meet the requirement of speech, which should include an argument. It is as though their speech isn’t considered genuine speech. So the negation of speech refers to the dismissal of speech that serves no purpose besides making empty claims.

However, if this explanation was correct, it would only apply to verses such as, This is a day wherein they will not speak (). However, in the case of verses like, None shall speak except whom the All-beneficent permits (), it still does not solve the problem.

Another possible answer is the one presented by al-Alūsī, which he quotes from al-Ghurar wa al-Durar of Sharīf al-Murtaḍā, that the Day of Resurrection is an exceptionally long day. Hence, it is possible that speaking would be forbidden in certain times and places but permitted at others.

However, the problem with this explanation is that in referring to the Day of Judgement in terms of its length, it renders the meaning of the verse, This is a day wherein they will not speak () as ‘This is a day wherein for a part of it they will not speak.’ However, this reading of the verse contradicts its apparent meaning. The same problem arises with the second explanation, which focuses on the differing stages of the Day of Judgement. In fact, both of these explanations—that is the second and the fourth of those presented here—ultimately lead back to the same problem. The difference between the two is that the second one resolves the contradiction by distinguishing between different locations on the Day of Judgement, while the fourth one resolves it by distinguishing between different times therein, just as the third one resolves it by distinguishing between different kinds of speech—some beneficial and some not.

A fifth possible response can be derived from the claim some scholars make that the exception in the verse, no one shall speak except by His leave () is discontinuous. In other words, it means that no soul can speak of its own ability, except by God’s permission. Essentially, this reading posits that the forbidden speech on the Day of Judgement is the speech that originates from human capacity, while the permissible speech is that which occurs by God’s permission.

However, the problem with this is that human speech, like all other voluntary actions, does not solely depend on the capability of the human being. Instead, it is attributed to human capacity, which is itself derived from God’s power and permission. So, whenever a human speaks or performs an action using their own capacity, this is produced through their capability that is accompanied by God’s permission. The meaning of the exception in this context is the elimination of all the factors contributing to speech on the Day of Judgement except for one, that is, God’s permission.

Consequently, the exception is connected and goes back to what we initially proposed: The prohibited speech is voluntary, similar to worldly speech, while the permissible speech is that which is solely based on divine causation, which is with His permission and will. In the scenario the situation is one of compulsion and taking recourse to God. However, proponents of this explanation believe that the reason for this compulsion on the Day of Judgement is witnessing its horrors, as people, when faced with these horrors, are compelled to confess, admit, speak honestly, and follow the truth. We have already discussed that the reason for this is the situation being one of recompense rather than free-willed actions, and the fact that it is merely the unveiling of realities rather than the choice of human beings.

The passage, Some of them will be wretched and some felicitous, presents felicity (saʿāda) and wretchedness (shiqāwa) as two opposing states. The felicity of any being is to attain the goodness which completes its existence and brings it delight. For human beings, who are composed of both a body and a soul, this means attaining goodness according to both their physical and spiritual powers, experiencing pleasure and satisfaction from it. Conversely, their misery arises from the loss or deprivation of this goodness. These two states, as per common parlance, relate to the existence or non-existence of a trait (malaka), and the difference between felicity and goodness is that happiness is a specific good for a species or individual, while goodness is more general in nature.

The apparent meaning of the verse, Some of them will be wretched and some felicitous, does not indicate that all beings must fall exclusively into these two categories. However, it does fit with God’s division of people into believers, disbelievers, and those who have diminished capacity, such as children and the mentally ill, or those who have not received clear guidance in this life. However, the main aim of these verses is not to categorise people according to their deeds and deserved outcomes, but to emphasize the nature of the Day of Judgement. It is a day when all people will be gathered and none will be absent, and it ends in either Paradise or Hellfire.

Those who are of diminished capacity may represent a third category, distinct from those who earn Paradise through their deeds and those who deserve Hellfire through theirs. However, it is necessary that these individuals do not simply vanish or remain in an intermediate state of waiting forever. In the hereafter, they will ultimately join one of the two groups: the felicitous or the wretched, entering either Paradise or Hellfire. As stated in Sūrah al-Tawba: others waiting Allah’s edict: either He shall punish them, or turn to them clemently, and Allah is all-knowing, all-wise (). Therefore, the gathering of humankind on the Day of Judgement ultimately includes only these two groups: the felicitous and the wretched, with everyone being either one or the other.

This passage is similar to another verse in the Qur’an, and warn of the Day of Gathering, in which there is no doubt, a part will be in paradise and a part will be in the Blaze (). Here, the statement, a part will be in paradise and a part will be in the Blaze implies exclusivity, especially in the given context, even though it doesn’t necessarily imply so on its own.

The verse suggests that among the people gathered on that Day, some will be wretched, characterized by misery, while others will be felicitous, imbued with happiness. As for when these descriptors become firmly attached to the individuals and whether these attributes are inherent or determined by an irrevocable divine decree, or if they are established through personal actions and deeds, with the individuals originally free from either set of characteristics, the verse does not specify. However, the placement of the verse in the context of calling for faith and righteous deeds and urging people to choose obedience and avoid sin, indicates that the path to happiness or misery can be facilitated by one’s deeds, as stated in Sūrah ʿAbasa (), Then He made the way easy for him.

From this, it becomes clear that there is a flaw in the explanation some scholars have offered for this verse. They believe that it shows that an individual’s state of felicity or wretchedness is predetermined by God’s decree. As stated by Fakhr al-Rāzī in his commentary on it: ‘Know that God has already determined that some of the people of the Day of Resurrection are felicitous and others are wretched. If God has decreed thus, then it is impossible for it to be otherwise. Otherwise, it would mean that God’s statement is false and His knowledge is ignorance, which is impossible. Therefore, it is established that the felicitous person does not turn into a wretched one, and the wretched person does not turn into a felicitous one.’

He further narrates a report that says ʿUmar asked the Prophet after the revelation of the verse, Some of them will be wretched and some felicitous: ‘O Messenger of God, then why should we do anything? For something already predetermined or for something yet to be decided?’ The Prophet replied, ‘For something already settled, ʿUmar. The pens have been lifted, and the scrolls have dried up, yet everyone will find it easy to do that for which they were created.’ Al-Raẓi continues: ‘The Muʿtazila say, citing a report from al-Ḥasan: “Among them, some are wretched due to their deeds and others are happy due to their deeds.” We argue that these reports cannot refute the decisive evidence (al-dalīl al-qāṭiʿ) we have already presented.

Furthermore, there is no dispute that an individual is miserable due to his deeds and happy due to his deeds. But because these actions occurred by the decree and predestination of God, the argument we have presented remains valid.’

One of the extraordinary fallacies in this argument lies in what al-Rāzī terms ‘decisive evidence.’ There is an error in taking the time of the judgement as the time for its result and effect. It is obvious that a truthful judgement now about attributing a characteristic to a subject at a future time does not entail this attribution except at that future time, not at the time when the judge makes the judgement, which is now. For instance, our judgement that at night that the sky will grow brighter in a few hours—a true judgement—does not necessitate the sky being light at night when we make that judgement. Equally, our judgement that a boy will become an old man in eighty years does not require him to be an old man at the time of the judgement.

So when God says, Some of them will be wretched and some felicitous, God is informing us that a group of them will be wretched on the Day of Resurrection and others will be felicitous on the Day of Resurrection. If this is a judgement about their wretchedness and felicitousness, then it is a judgement made by Him now that they will be one or the other in future, on the Day of Resurrection. And it is assumed that this judgement will not change from what it is in its context, otherwise, it would mean that God’s information is false and His knowledge is ignorance. However, this is not a judgement made by Him now that they are either wretched or felicitous now, or a judgement made by Him now that they are either wretched or felicitous permanently. This is self-evident.

After all, if al-Rāzī actually believes this, then what prevented him from making such a claim regarding everything that God Almighty has informed us about people’s characteristics on the Day of Resurrection. Why not judge them as being either eternally believers or disbelievers, or being in Paradise before the Day of Resurrection, and in Hell before the Day of Resurrection? This is because his evidence applies equally to these and other cases, such as wretchedness and felicitousness.

As for the narration cited by al-Rāzī, in which the Prophet says, ‘… yet everyone will find it easy to do what they were created for’, this has no relevance to what he mentioned in the first place. A clarification of this will come in our explanation of the narrations.

Finally, when al-Rāzī says, ‘there is no dispute that an individual is miserable due to his deeds and happy due to his deeds. But because these actions occurred by the decree and predestination of God, the argument we have presented remains valid’, he means that the divine decree’s attachment to action necessitates its permanence. This would mean that the action is forced upon the person, not a choice in which with the performance or non-performance of the act are both equally possible for the person, and that they had no say in it and no influence on the action in bringing about wretchedness or felicitousness. In fact, according to this model, there is a purely coincidental association between the person and the action, and between the action and the consequence of either misery or happiness. In other words, all of these elements are linked merely by virtue of God’s placing one thing after another, without any real causal connection between them or any influence on one another.

This is another fallacy arising from the confusion between the attribute of necessity and the attribute of contingency. The action has a sufficient cause (ʿilla tāmma) that necessitates its existence, such as the combination of the human will, the readiness of the means of action, the existence of material receptive to action, time, place, and the absence of obstacles and impediments, among other things. When all of these factors are gathered together, completed, and fulfilled, there exists a sufficient cause and the action’s occurrence becomes an ontological necessity. Thus, the action has the attribute of necessity in relation its sufficient cause as a whole and the attribute of contingency in relation to each part of its sufficient cause, including the human will.

The action that is realized by the necessity of the sufficient cause, at this moment, has the attribute of necessity in relation to the sum of the sufficient cause (whose constituent factors are detailed above), and an attribute of contingency to the human will. The attribute of the action’s necessity in relation to the sufficient cause does not negate its attribute of contingency in relation to the human will (which is a necessary cause, but not a sufficient one by itself), nor does it shift it from possibility to actuality. Rather, the action’s relationship to the human being is always one of contingency, just as its relationship to the sum of the human and the other components of the sufficient cause is always one of necessity. The two possibilities of the performance and non-performance of an action are always equal with respect to the human being, just as one of the two possibilities of performance and non-performance is always determined with consideration to the sufficient cause.

Hence, we can conclude that human actions are voluntary in essence, as their existence cannot be devoid of a sufficient cause. The irrevocable divine decree is one of God’s active attributes, which are abstracted from the station of action, which is a chain of causes arranged according to the cosmic order. Now, the ontological necessity of effects in relation to their causes, or that of every decreed thing in relation to its divine decree, does not contradict its voluntary nature of actions for human beings, and the relation of actions to human beings is one of contingency. Al-Rāzī has understood the relation of an act to human beings as one of ontological necessity rather than contingency, by assuming that an action being necessitated by the divine decree entails the necessity of its occurrence in relation to humans, rather than its mere contingency.

To put it another way, suppose that God had knowledge that a certain piece of wood will burn in fire, does this entail that the wood will necessarily combust, regardless of whether there is fire? No, because the truth of God’s knowledge depends on the wood being burnt by fire, not it burning regardless of external factors. Similarly, God’s knowledge that a human will perform a certain act out of his or her own free will and volition, or that he or she will suffer a certain consequence due to a voluntary action he or she has performed, necessitates the inevitability of the action through human choice, not the inevitability of a certain action regardless of whether the human being chooses to do it or not, or whether there is a human being or not, which would sever the causal connection between the human and their action. Therefore, God’s knowledge that a particular human being will suffer due to their own voluntary disbelief necessitates the suffering caused by their disbelief, not suffering regardless of whether there is disbelief or not.

Hence, it is clear that God’s knowledge of human action does not necessitate the nullification of free will or the affirmation of predestination, even though His knowledge does not deviate from His decree, and there is no way to repel His decree.

فَأَمَّا الَّذِينَ شَقُوا فَفِي النَّارِ لَهُمْ فِيهَا زَفِيرٌ وَشَهِيقٌ ١٠٦

(11:106) As for the wretched, they shall be in the Fire: their lot therein will be groaning and wailing (zafīr wa shahīq).

In Majmaʿ al-bayān, al-Ṭabrisī writes: “Zafīr denotes the beginning of a donkey’s braying, and shahīq denotes the end of it.”

In al-Kashshāf, al-Zamakhsharī writes: “Zafīr means the exhalation of breath, while shahīq means its inhalation.”

In his Mufradāt, al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī says: “Zafīr refers to inhalation that causes the ribs to expand noticeably … shahīq is the prolongation of this. Therefore, together zafīr and shahīq denote taking violent breaths in-and-out. God says, their lot therein will be zafīr wa shahīq; they will hear it raging and roaring (zafīr) (), and they hear it blaring, as it seethes (), and the root of the word shahīq is from shāhiq, which means ‘a towering mountain.”’

As you can see, the meanings of zafīr and shahīq are very close to one another, and the verse here is using them figuratively. The intended meaning is that the wretched will suck air into to their lungs, then exhale it, lengthening their cries and groans due to the severe heat of the fire and the magnitude of the disaster and misfortune they have suffered, producing a sound similar to that made by a donkey when it brays.

At first glance, it seems that following from the statement, Some of them will be wretched and some felicitous, the present verse should have read: ‘As for he who is miserable (singular), he is in the fire, and in it he has gasping and panting.’ However, the prior context which opened with a description of the Day of Judgement, That is a day for which all mankind will be gathered, and it is a day witnessed, which emphasized the fact that there would be a multitude of people gathered together. The implication of this is that there will be groups on that day: those who are miserable and those who are happy. Now, in the previous verse, God uses the term wretched (shaqī) and felicitous (saʿīd) in the singular and indefinite form because the prior expression in the same verse, no one shall speak except by His leave, also uses the singular indefinite form to convey the comprehensiveness of tis negation. However, once that aim has been achieved in the full verse, The day it comes, no one shall speak except by His leave. Some of them will be wretched and some felicitous, the discourse returns to using the plural form for the next three verses to emphasize the fact that there are many people gathered together: As for the wretched …

خَالِدِينَ فِيهَا مَا دَامَتِ السَّمَاوَاتُ وَالْأَرْضُ إِلَّا مَا شَاءَ رَبُّكَ ۚ إِنَّ رَبَّكَ فَعَّالٌ لِمَا يُرِيدُ ١٠٧

(11:107) They shall remain in it (khālidīn fī-hā) for as long as the heavens and the earth endure—except what your Lord may wish; indeed your Lord does what He desires.

This expounds the term that the inhabitants of Hell will serve therein, paralleling the following verse, As for the felicitous, they will be in paradise. They will remain in it (khālidīn fī-hā) for as long as the heavens and the earth endure—except what your Lord may wish—an endless bounty (), which explains the term that the inhabitants of Paradise will dwell therein, and this supports the notion that both groups will reside permanently in these abodes.

Al-Rāghib says in his Mufradāt:

“Khulūd (from whence khālidīn is derived) means for something to endure without being affected by corruption, and its remaining in the condition it is in. Anything that change and corruption are slow to effect, the Arabs describe as khālid, which is why they call stones used around their cooking fires khawālid. However, this is due to their long-lasting existence, not because they are genuinely perpetual or eternal. God says, You set up structures as if you will be immortal (takhludūn) ().”

The term khald refers to whatever part of the human being remains unchanged so long as they are alive, unlike the rest of his parts. The original meaning of the term mukhallad, is something that endures for a long time—for example, a rajul mukhallad, is a man who appears slow to show signs of ageing, or a dāba mukhallada, is an animal which does not lose all of its second set of teeth until its fourth set begin to show. Then, this came to be used metaphorically for something that endures eternally.’

Eternity in Paradise refers to the persistence of things in the state they are in without being affected by corruption. God says, they shall be the inhabitants of paradise; they shall remain in it (hum fī-hā khālidūn) (); such shall be the inmates of the Fire, and they shall remain in it (); Should anyone kill a believer intentionally, his requital shall be hell, to remain therein (khālidan fī-hā) ().

Elsewhere, God says, They will be waited upon by immortal youths (wildān mukhalladūn) (). It is said that mukhallad here means these youths will remain in their young state without ageing. Another interpretation states that it means they will be wearing a type of anklet called khulda.

The verb ikhlād means to make something last or believe that it will endure. Therefore, the verse, but he clung to the earth (wa lakinna-hu akhlada ilā al-arḍ) means that he relied upon the earth because he believed he would live on it eternally.

The phrase, as long as the heavens and the earth endure, is a phrase that qualifies the statement, they shall remain in it, in a way that emphasizes the meaning of perpetuity. The implication is that they will remain in that state for as long as the heavens and earth continue to exist. However, other verses of the Qur’an explicitly state that the heavens and earth will not endure eternally, while others still affirm that both Heaven and Hell will continue to exist without ending or fading.

Verses that affirm the former include: We did not create the heavens and the earth and whatever is between them except with reason and for a specified term (); The day We shall roll up the sky, like the rolling of the scrolls for writings. We will bring it back as We began the first creation—a promise binding on Us. That indeed We will do (); … yet the entire earth will be in His fist on the Day of Resurrection, and the heavens, scrolled, in His right hand (); And: When the earth is shaken violently, and the mountains are shattered into bits and become scattered dust ().

Verses that affirm the latter include: … gardens with streams running in them, to remain in them forever. That is the great success. (); Indeed Allah has cursed the faithless and prepared for them a blaze, in which they will remain forever. They will not find any guardian or helper ().

Therefore, two issues arise out two verses:

The first is the fact that they connect their perpetuity to the persistence of the heavens and the earth, which is not perpetual according to the above cited verses.

The second issue is that it links the eternal reality that begins on the Day of Resurrection—the fact that the two groups are in Heaven and Hell and destined to remain therein—with something whose existence ends on the Day of Resurrection—the heavens and the earth.

This second issue is more problematic than the first because it is relevant even to those who do not believe in eternity in either Hell or both Heaven and Hell, unlike the first issue.

The resolution to this dilemma lies in the fact that God, in His Book, mentions that in the Hereafter there are an earth and heavens, even if they differ from what we know in this world. God says, The day the earth is transformed into another earth and the heavens, and they are presented before Allah, the One, the All-paramount (). He also states, relating the words of the inhabitants of Paradise, They will say, ‘All praise belongs to Allah, who has fulfilled His promise to us and made us heirs to the earth, that we may settle in paradise wherever we may wish!’ How excellent is the reward of the workers (). And He describes the believers, saying, For such will be the reward of the ultimate abode ().

Thus, the Hereafter has its heavens and earth, just as it has a Heaven and Hell, each with its own inhabitants. God the Sublime describes all of these as being with Him, stating, That which is with you will be spent but what is with Allah shall last (). With these words, He decrees that they are everlasting and not fleeting.

God links the permanence of Heaven and Hell and their inhabitants to the persistence of the heavens and earth because the heavens and earth, in their general sense (in that they will be transformed into a new heavens and a new earth in the hereafter), are eternal and not transient. However, these heavens and earth that we experience in this world will come to an end based on the observable order. As for the heavens that shade Heaven, for instance, and the earth that carries it, which are illuminated by the light of their Lord, they are permanent and never fading. The universe will never be devoid of them. In this way, both of the aforementioned dilemmas are resolved.

In Tafsīr al-Kashshāf, al-Zamahsharī alludes to this perspective, saying: “The evidence that there are heavens and earth in the Hereafter is His saying, The day the earth is transformed into another earth and the heavens () and His saying, and made us heirs to the earth, that we may settle in paradise wherever we may wish (). This is because the land of the Hereafter must have something beneath it and something above it, either a heaven that God creates or the Divine Throne that overshadows it. Anything that overshadows something else can be referred to as a samāʾ.”

However, the second perspective al-Zamakhsharī mentions appears nonsensical, as it establishes the existence of the heavens and earth in relative terms, namely that both Heaven and Hell must conceptually have an ‘above’ and a ‘below.’ Thus, Paradise and Hell are primary in existence, while their heavens and earth are secondary. According to this conceptualization, the permanence of their heavens and earth is determined by the permanence of Paradise and Hell, not the reverse, which is what is indicated in the verse. This perspective necessitates that Heaven and Hell must have an earth beneath and a heaven above them. However, regarding the heavens in the plural form (samāwāt), as in the verse, this argument does not apply, leaving the complication regarding the heavens unresolved.

The above refutes the explanation given by al-Qāḍī al-Bayḍāwī in his commentary, in which he says: “This point of view is problematic because it draws a comparison with something that most of creation does not recognise in terms of its existence and permanence. And for those who recognise it, they understand it only in terms of the continuation of reward and punishment, so the analogy doesn’t hold value for them.”

What he means by this is that the verse draws a parallel between the permanence of Paradise and Hell and their inhabitants with the persistence of the heavens and the earth. If the heavens and earth in the verse refer to those of the Hereafter, and most of the creation doesn’t recognise their existence and permanence, then this analogy would be trying to explain what is clear by comparing it to something obscure, which violates the rules of rhetoric.

To this I respond: We only understood the permanence of Paradise and Hell and their inhabitants from the words of God, just as we have understood the existence of a heavens and an earth for them and the eternity of all of these from His words. So, what prevents someone from defining one revealed truth in His words in terms of another found in His words, especially if one truth is better known among the people than the other after both have been taken from His words and not from an external source?

This also refutes what al-Ālūsī has said concerning the same topic, that what comes to mind from the heavens and the earth are the familiar celestial bodies we know and that, therefore, it is more fitting to seek another explanation for the verse other than the one presented.

The reason what we have said refutes al-Ālūsī’s statement is that the meanings of Qur’anic verses are based on the understanding of competent speakers of the language concerning the general connotations that are conveyed by the lexical meaning (lugha) and common usage (ʿurf) of words. However, regarding the specific intents and the particular realities upon which these connotations operate, this is not the case. Instead, the preferred approach is to contemplate upon the Qur’an (tadabbur), which God has commanded, and returning the ambiguous verses to the clear ones, and comparing one verse with another, because the Qur’an confirms some parts of itself with others, and some parts speak, prove, and validate the others, as we find in the traditions. Hence, when we hear God describe Himself as ‘One, Unique, Omniscient, Omnipotent, Living, Willing, Hearing, and Seeing’ or other attributes, we should not understand them based merely on the apparent meanings determined by the common usage of the Arabic language, but based on what the very words of God explain and what deep contemplation reveals to us about their meanings. We have already discussed this in our discourse on the clear and ambiguous verses in our commentary on Sūrah Āl ʿImrān.

Other explanations of the verse have been offered in various traditions and in the commentaries of other exegetes. We will detail what we have found of these here, following on from the first explanation, given above.

The second explanation is that what is meant by the heavens are the heavens of Paradise and Hell and their earth—meaning whatever it is that shades them and whatever it is they rest upon. Anything that is above and shades them is considered a heaven (samāʾ), and whatever your foot rests upon is considered an earth (arḍ). In other words, what is meant is whatever is above them and what is below them.

This is the explanation that al-Zamakhsharī proposed at the end of the section of his commentary we quoted above, and the reader is aware of the problems inherent in it, as this explanation does not make clear why the term ‘heavens’ (samāwāt) is mentioned in plural in the verse, rather than the singular, as we have already noted.

The third explanation is that as long as the heavens and the earth endure means ‘as long as the Hereafter exists,’ and it is eternal, just as the permanence of the heavens and the earth in this life is determined by the extent of their lifespan. Perhaps the intended meaning of the phrase as long as the heavens and the earth endure is a as a simile, just as one might say, ‘He spoke the words of one who mocks’, meaning he spoke in the same manner as those who mock and ridicule.

However, if this sort of simile was what was intended by the verse, it would convey the opposite of the desired meaning, which is impermanence. And if something other than this was intended, the phrasing of the verse would not suffice.

The fourth explanation is that it the phrase is intended to convey the meaning of ‘a very long time’—in the sense of eternity—rather than to actually specify the duration of the heavens and the earth’s existence. The Arabs have numerous expressions they use to convey perpetuity, without meaning the literal sense of those expressions. For example, they would say, ‘The matter will remain thus, as long as night and day continue to alternate,’ or ‘as long as the east wind blows,’ or ‘as long as stars rise,’ or ‘as long as breezes blow,’ or ‘as long as the heavens exist.’ They turned to these phrases, assuming that these things are eternal and unending. They then used them as if they were coined to convey the idea of perpetuity.

However, the problem with this explanation is that the Arabs only used these expressions to convey the meaning of eternity—and frequently did so—because they believed these phenomena were indeed eternal. On the other hand, if there is someone who explicitly states that they have a limited and finite existence and believes that considering them as only existing temporarily is an essential doctrine of faith, then it is inappropriate for such a person to employ such phrases to convey the meaning of eternity, no matter the context. How could it be otherwise when God has said, We did not create the heavens and the earth and whatever is between them except with reason and for a specified term ()? How then could it be correct to say that heaven and hell will exist eternally ‘as long as the heavens and the earth endure’?

The fifth explanation is that it means they will live so long as the heavens and the earth (whose end is known) endure, after which God will extend their existence, granting them eternal life and perpetuating their state. This is akin to saying, ‘They will live for such-and-such number of years,’ after which God adds to that an immeasurable span of time, as in the verse, to reside therein for ages (), meaning they will live for ages, and then they will be given an even longer term than that.

However, the problem with this perspective is that it appears to be based on interpreting some phrases, such as, ‘as long as the heavens and the earth endure’ as denoting a specified period of time, while reading others, such as, ‘except what your Lord may wish,’ as signifying a limitless duration. However, such an explanation requires the reader to make assumptions that have no basis whatsoever in the text itself.

The sixth explanation is that the reference to Paradise and Hell in this verse is to the paradise and hell of the intermediate realm (Barzakh). In other words, these will endure as long as the heavens and the earth endure. When the duration of the heavens and the earth comes to an end with the Day of Resurrection, people will be brought out of this temporary paradise and temporary hell and mustered for final judgement.

However, this reading does not accord with the context of the verses, which start by mentioning the Day of Resurrection and describing it with certain attributes. This discourse begins by mentioning ‘a day for which all mankind will be gathered’ and ‘a day witnessed’ on which ‘no one shall speak except by His leave’, and then highlights its most specific and distinctive qualities, namely the clear descriptions of reward and punishment in the eternal Paradise and Hell. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that, after all of this, such a discourse would then divert to discussing the temporary paradise and hell of the intermediate realm.

In addition to this, God describes the punishment of Barzakh as being exposed to the Fire, not entering it: the Fire, to which they are exposed morning and evening. And on the day when the Hour sets in Pharaoh’s clan will enter the severest punishment ().

The seventh explanation is that entering Hellfire in his verse refers to being under the influence of Satan, while being in Paradise refers to being under the guardianship of God. This is because God’s guardianship is made manifest in the Paradise of the Hereafter, in which the felicitous receive His blessings. By contrast, Satan’s influence becomes tangible in the form of the flames of Hell, in which the wrongdoers are tormented on the Day of Resurrection. This is supported by those verses that discuss the tangible manifestation of people’s deeds in the afterlife (tajassum al-aʿmāl).

Therefore, the wretched enter Hell because of their wretchedness, but they might be taken out of it if they receive God’s blessings and grace, like a disbeliever who believes after his disbelief or a criminal who repents. Equally, the felicitous enter Paradise due to their felicitousness, but they might be led astray by Satan to cling to worldly desires, and follow their whims, like a believer who becomes a disbeliever or a righteous person who turns corrupt.

However, the problem with this reading is the same as what has already been mentioned, namely that it goes against the grain of this section of verses. These verses detail the unique, awe-inspiring, and astounding attributes of the Day of Resurrection that melt hearts and boggle minds upon hearing and reflecting upon them. They serve as a warning to the arrogant and deniers among the disbelievers and act as a deterrent for the sinful.

Therefore, it is highly improbable that the verses would mention that it is a day when all people are gathered, a witnessed day, and a day in which no one speaks unless permitted, and then mention that the disbelievers and sinners are in Hellfire from the moment they disbelieved and sinned until the Day of Judgement, and that the believers and those who perform righteous deeds are in Paradise from the moment they believed and acted righteously. Firstly, this account doesn’t fit the context because the verses describe the unique features of the Day of Judgement, not what precedes and leads to it. Secondly, the verses are intended as warnings and glad tidings. Such concealed truths would not concern the arrogant and tyrannical disbelievers; they would not value them, nor would they be deterred by fear of such misery or hope for such spiritual happiness, as should be obvious. However, this interpretation is still valid within the deeper layers of the Qur’an’s meaning.

There are still other explanations of the verse, which revolve around the phrase, except what your Lord may wish, whose discussion we have eschewed here for the sake of brevity. They share common problems with the explanations proposed for this phrase, which we will detail below.

God’s statement, except what (mā) your Lord may wish, is an exception to what was previously mentioned about the wretched dwelling eternally in the fire. It corresponds to the statement following the mention of the felicitous dwelling eternally in Paradise. The word mā in ‘what your Lord may wish’ is commonly understood as being an infinitive modifier, which shifts the meaning of the phrase thus: ‘unless your Lord wishes that they do not dwell therein eternally.’ However, this reading is undermined by the subsequent phrase, indeed your Lord does what (mā) He desires, where mā is used as a relative pronoun (in the sense of ‘whatever’), and the meanings of ‘what your Lord may wish’ and ‘what He desires’ should be one and the same.

Alternatively, the word mā in except what your Lord may wish can be a relative pronoun, signifying an exception to the duration that is understood from the context to be perpetual. This means that they will dwell in it for all future times, perpetually, except for what your Lord may wish. Or, the exception might relate to the collective pronoun in they shall remain in it. This means all of them will dwell therein except those whom God wills to remove from Hell and admit to Paradise. This aligns with reports that sinful and disobedient believers will not remain in Hellfire forever; they will eventually leave and enter Paradise due on account of receiving intercession. The exit of some people from Hellfire at a future time is sufficient to both preserve the general meaning of the verb while maintaining the validity of the exception.

One point that must addressed in this case is that the verse uses the relative pronoun mā (‘what’) to refer to rational beings (when it is commonly used for non-rational beings). However, there is no problem with this, even if it is not commonplace. We can find other examples of this usage in the Qur’an. For example: … then marry such women as you like … ().

The explanation of the following verse, As for the felicitous … (), parallels that of the present one, as they both share the same context and structure. However, the exception, except what your Lord may wish, in the verse about Paradise is followed by the clause, an endless bounty. This indicates that the exception here does not concern the certainty that they will dwell in Paradise forever, as such an exception would not cohere with the fact that the reward of Paradise is an unending gift. On the contrary, it only points to the mere possibility of occurrence. Therefore, the meaning is: ‘the people of Paradise will be there forever, unless God removes them from it. But the gift of Paradise is everlasting, and they will never leave, because God would never will such a thing!’

Thus, this exception serves to safeguard God’s omnipotence. Indeed, God’s power over them is not depleted by His admitting them to Paradise, His sovereignty is not nullified, and His kingdom does not fade. His omnipotence and control over time remains as they were before. To Him belongs the power to remove them from Paradise, despite His promise that they will dwell there permanently. However, He will not remove them due to this promise, for God does not break His promises.

Now, the discussion of the exception in the present verse (), meaning the verse of Hellfire, is identical to that of the exception in the verse of Paradise, given the shared context and obvious parallels between the two verses in terms of structure. However, the difference is that God follows the exception of this verse with the phrase, indeed your Lord does what He desires, which carries an obvious indication that whatever He wills will certainly transpire.

Therefore, the inmates of the Fire, like the inhabitants of Paradise, will never leave, unless God wills so, because He is capable of all things. No action of His, whether conferring or withholding, can entail the negation of His power or the situation getting out of His control, for His power is absolute, unbound by any limitation, nor prevented from accomplishing one thing by another. He said, and Allah does whatever He wishes () and Allah effaces and confirms whatever He wishes (), among other verses.

There is no contradiction between this explanation and what is narrated in the reports about some of the guilty being removed from the Fire by God’s will, as should be clear.

This is one explanation of the exception, and there are other interpretations that are collectively summarized in Majmaʿ al-bayān, up to ten. What we have outlined here is only the first of these.

The second explanation of the exception posits that it refers to an increase in punishment for the inhabitants of Hell and an increase in bliss for the inhabitants of Heaven. Thus, except what your Lord may wish could be understood signifying an increase beyond the established degree, just as a man might say to another, ‘I owe you a thousand dinars, except (illā) for the two thousand that I loaned you at a particular time.’ In this case, the two thousand would indeed be an addition to the original thousand. Here, the exception signified by the preposition illā takes the meaning of ‘in addition to’, as in ‘in addition to what your Lord wills’, akin to the phrase, ‘No man was with us except Zaid’, meaning ‘in addition to Zaid.’

This view is built on the premise that God’s statement, as long as the heavens and the earth endure, does not imply perpetuity or eternity, and the reader is already are of the arguments against this.

The third explanation is that the exception refers to their status at the place of Resurrection, as they are neither in Heaven nor in Hell, but rather in a state of limbo, known as the Isthmus (Barzakh), which lies between death and resurrection. For, if God had said ‘they will abide therein forever’, without making an exception, one might assume they would be in Hell or Heaven from the moment the verse was revealed or after their time of moral responsibility comes to an end. Thus, the exception serves a purpose here.

If it one was to ask, ‘How can an exception be made from their dwelling eternally in Hell before they have even entered it?’, the answer is that it is possible if this announcement is made prior to their entering it.

However, this interpretation has no basis in the wording of the verse, and it appears to be based on reading the previous statement, some of them will be wretched and some felicitous, as being an affirmation of some people being predestined to be wretched and others to be felicitous, without them having any free will or moral choice in the matter. The fallacy of such a reading should be obvious.

The fourth explanation sees the first of the two exceptions as connected to His saying, their lot therein will be groaning and wailing. Here, except what your Lord may wish, is assumed to refer to forms of punishment other than these two types, with the exception not relating to the eternal duration of the punishment. Equally, for the inhabitants of Heaven, it is connected to an implicit corresponding meaning. It is as if God had said, ‘They will have such a blessing therein, except what your Lord wills of other types of blessings.’ This interpretation is implied by His saying, an endless bounty.

However, this reading assumes that the two exceptions belong to different contexts without any evidence for this. This is evident in the fact that it understands the first exception to mean ‘in addition to’, while it understands the second exception as a genuine exception. However, there is no evidence that the first exception is related to his saying their lot therein will be groaning and wailing, nor that an endless bounty implies what proponents of this reading claim. The latter verse only indicates the perpetuity of the gift, without specifying whether this means all types of gifts or only some of them.

Subsequently, one may inquire about the utility of distinguishing some types of blessings in paradise and exposing this to the listeners, given that the context is one of assurance and joyful news, and the circumstance is one of invitation and encouragement. This is among the most absurd aspects of the reading.

The fifth explanation is that illā (‘except’) means ‘and’, otherwise, the discourse would be self-contradictory. Therefore, the meaning of the phrases would be: ‘they will dwell therein as long as the heavens and the earth endure, and as your Lord wills in addition to this.’

However, it has not been established that the particle illā can indeed be read with the meaning of ‘and.’ Indeed, this is something that has only been mentioned by the medieval grammarian al-Farrāʾ, and it is an opinion that experts have considered weak. Furthermore, this reading is baed on the assumption that the phrase, as long as the heavens and the earth endure, does not convey the meaning of eternity or perpetuity, and the reader is already familiar with the debates concerning this.

The sixth explanation is that the wretched refers to those monotheists who have been consigned to Hellfire. They are those who have combined belief and obedience with acts of disobedience that necessitate their imprisonment in Hell. Therefore, God Almighty has said that they will be punished in Hellfire except what your Lord may wish, namely except when God removes them from it to take them to Heaven and reward them for their acts of obedience.

As for the exception for the inhabitants of Paradise, it is an exception that applies to those monotheists who have been released from Hell and admitted to Paradise, because anyone transferred from Hell to Paradise and granted eternal life therein must be described as dwelling there eternally, but with an exception because they were elsewhere before they arrived. It is as if to say: ‘they are in Paradise, and they will dwell therein forever, except what your Lord willed concerning the time they were consigned to Hell.’

According to the proponents of this reading, the wretched ones are identical with the felicitous ones, and both designations apply to them depending on their situation. When they are cast into Hell and punished therein, they are the wretched ones. However, when they are admitted to Paradise a granted its blessings, they are the felicitous ones. This explanation is attributed to the Companions Ibn ʿAbbās, Jābir b. ʿAbd Allāh, and Abū Saʿīd al-Khudrī, as well as a group of the Successors.

However, this reading does not accord with the context, because God Almighty, after describing the Day of Resurrection as a day when people are gathered together, divided the people who will be gathered into two groups with his statement: Some of them will be wretched and some felicitous. It is obvious that his statement, As for the wretched …, and his statement, As for the felicitous …, each introduce a separate point, as evinced by the fact they begin with the prepositional phrase ‘as for’ (fa ammā), which indicates that what follows it is an exposition of the statement, Some of them will be wretched and some felicitous. Therefore, based on the fact that this statement is an exhaustive division of all the people gathered on the Day of Resurrection, this means that the wretched are all of the people of Hell, and not merely a particular group of them, and the felicitous are all the people of Paradise, and not only those who were freed from Hell and admitted to Paradise.

That is, unless one were to say that the phrase, Some of them will be wretched and some felicitous, is also a description of a specific group in the same vein as they claim that the phrases, the wretched and the felicitous, both refer to the same group. Read like this, the verse’s meaning becomes: ‘Some of those gathered on the Day of Resurrection will be both wretched and felicitous, and they are the ones who will be consigned to Hell and abide therein so long as the heavens and the earth endure, except when your Lord wishes to bring them out from it, admit them to Paradise, make them felicitous therein, and cause them to dwell therein for as long as the heavens and earth endure, except for the time when they were wretched aforehand and dwelt in Hell before entering paradise.’

However, the problem we raised earlier would then apply to the purported meaning of His saying, Some of them will be wretched and some felicitous. The apparent context, which portrays the gathering of humankind as a whole on the Day of Resurrection, does not support the idea that His saying, Some of them will be wretched and some felicitous, refers to a specific group of people. As this would mean that this single group are then apparently divided into two groups to describe their situation while remaining a single group in essence, and presenting them in the form of two separate subjects for two separate categories, with two specific references to the endurance of the heavens and earth, followed by two separate exceptions that are intended to represent only one. If this were indeed what was meant by the verse, then what is the benefit of such a specification, when it leads to so much unnecessary ambiguity and complexity in the wording of the verses?

One could also argue for this reading by appealing to a more general meaning. For example, one might say that the phrase, Some of them will be wretched and some felicitous, is a general division of humanity on the Day of Judgement into those who are wretched and those who are felicitous, while As for the wretched … refers to the people of Hell, and As for the felicitous … refers to the inhabitants of Paradise, while the exception in both instances refers to the sinful monotheists, who God will take out of the Fire and admit to Paradise. In this way, most of the problems that arose against the previous standpoint are resolved.

The seventh explanation is that invoking the contingency of this on the Divine Will is actually to emphasize that the inhabitants of Hell and Paradise will dwell in each eternally and make the prospect of them ever exiting these seem distant, because God does not will anything other than their perpetuity and eternity, which He has ordained. It is as if this is contingent on what will not be, because He does not will to take them out of either.

This reading shares in common with the first one the claim that the exception in both instances is not intended to negate the eternal duration of Paradise and Hell. However, the first reading makes the specific claim that the exception is to safeguard God’s omnipotence, while this explanation makes the specific claim that the exception is to demonstrate that eternity cannot be disrupted by any means, unless God wills to disrupt it, and He will not will that in the first place.

The eighth explanation is that what is intended here is the exception of the time when a group from the inhabitants of Hell entered before another group, and the same in the case of groups who enter Heaven. God Almighty says elsewhere, The faithless will be driven to hell in throngs … Those who are wary of their Lord will be led to paradise in throngs (). Thus, one group of them among them enters after another, and there must be a delay between the two of them. According to this explanation, it is this that God is excluding when He says, except what your Lord may wish. This explanation has been transmitted from Salām b. al-Mustanīr al-Basrī.

However, the problem with this explanation is that the phrase, They shall remain in it for as long as the heavens and the earth endure, in both the case of Hell and of Paradise, is that this description appears to concern the length of their stay in each from the aspect of its ending point rather than its starting point.

In any case, the beginning of the duration of their imprisonment in Hell or inhabitation of Paradise is the Day of Judgement, and this is not affected because one group enters Paradise or Hell after another group or before it and the time difference that results from that.

The ninth explanation is that what is meant is that they will dwell in Hell, being tormented therein for the duration of their existence in the graves as long as the heavens and the earth last in this world. When they perish and cease to exist, their punishment will be interrupted until God resurrects them for the Final Judgement. God’s saying, except what your Lord may wish, is an exception that applies to what will happen in the Hereafter. This interpretation has been reported in Majmaʿ al-bayān from Shaykh Abū Jaʿfar al-Ṭūsī in his own Tafsīr, quoting from a number of Shīʿī scholars in their own commentaries.

However, the issue with this explanation is the same as that of the second one, which is based on taking the particle illā to mean ‘aside from’, and the reader will already be familiar with the problems inherent in this.

The tenth explanation is that what is meant by except what your Lord may wish is ‘whoever your Lord wishes to forgive and hence will not let them enter Hell.’ Therefore, the exception is from the pronoun that refers back to As for the wretched. The apparent meaning of the exception God directs towards the inhabitants of Paradise in the passage, As for the felicitous, … except what your Lord may wish, refers to the monotheists who come out of Hell and are admitted to Paradise, as has already been mentioned in some of the previous points. The meaning is that the felicitous ones are in Heaven, dwelling therein eternally, except for the transgressors from the monotheists who are in Hell and then they are brought of there and lodged in Paradise. This explanation has been attributed to Abū Majāz.

However, what has been stated applies only to the first exception; the second exception must necessarily be directed in a different way, which in any case would necessarily disrupt the unity of the context that exists between the two verses.

Consider that sinners among the faithful, whom God forgives and thereby does not send to Hell, are not pardoned unconditionally, but rather are forgiven due to good deeds they performed or the intercession of others on their behalf. Thus, they become blessed and are included in the second verse: As for the felicitous, they will be in paradise …, without first being included among the wretched and then being exempted from entering hell. In short, they are not wretched to be exempted; rather, they are felicitous and will enter paradise from the beginning.

… indeed your Lord does what He desires—serves as a rationale for the exception while simultaneously affirming God’s omnipotence through its unrestricted meaning, as previously mentioned.

وَأَمَّا الَّذِينَ سُعِدُوا فَفِي الْجَنَّةِ خَالِدِينَ فِيهَا مَا دَامَتِ السَّمَاوَاتُ وَالْأَرْضُ إِلَّا مَا شَاءَ رَبُّكَ ۖ عَطَاءً غَيْرَ مَجْذُوذٍ ١٠٨

(11:108) As for the felicitous, they will be in paradise. They will remain in it for as long as the heavens and the earth endure—except what your Lord may wish—an endless bounty (ʿaṭāʾan ghayr majdhūdh).

This can be read in one of two ways: the passive voice (‘those who are made felicitous’) and in the active voice (‘those who are felicitous’). The latter seems more linguistically appropriate because the verb saʿāda is intransitive in everyday usage. However, reading the felicitous in the passive voice, while reading the wretched in the previous verse in the active voice, subtly implies that happiness and goodness come from God, while the evil that afflicts them is self-imposed, as stated in Sūrah al-Nūr (): Were it not for Allah’s grace and His mercy upon you, not one of you would ever be pure.

The adjective majdhūdh is derived from jadhdh, meaning ‘to cut off.’ Therefore, describing God’s gift as ghayr majdhūdh means that it is never cut off and never ends. In other words, Paradise is a never-ending divine gift, in spite of the previous exception of except what your Lord may wish. This is one of the most beautiful indications that the purpose behind this exception is to affirm God’s absolute omnipotence and sovereignty and show that the reins of power are never out of his His hands.

Everything that was discussed in relation to the preceding verse applies to the present verse, except for the explanations based on the assumption that the exception in His statement, except what your Lord may wish, refers to those who first entered Hell and then moved to Paradise. That is because it is possible for some who enters Hell to later exit it, but no one who enters Paradise, which is the eternal Paradise, will ever exit it as a form of otherworldy punishment. This is an essential principle that is established in the Qur’an and traditions. There is such an abundance of verses and narrations in this regard that no one can possibly deny their implication, even if the Qur’an’s statements about some people leaving hell are not as clear.

In Majmaʿ al-bayān, al-Tabrisī says about the necessity of the virtuous entering Paradise and the impossibility of them ever leaving it: ‘It is a consensus of the Muslim community that whoever deserves divine reward must enter Paradise and that He will never leave it after He has entered it.’

The idea that those people worthy of divine reward must necessarily enter Paradise is based on the universally accepted rational principle that fulfilling a promise is obligatory, unlike fulfilling a threat. This is because the one to whom promise is made is conferred a right to what is promise, and not fulfilling this promise equates to neglecting another’s right, which is an act of injustice. As for the threat, it is making a right for the issuer to act against the person to whom the threat is made. It is not obligatory for the holder of the right to claim his right, but he may choose to do so or to forgo it. God, the Glorious, has promised His obedient servants Paradise as a reward for their obedience, and He has threatened the disobedient with Hell for their disobedience. Therefore, it is obligatory that the obedient enter Paradise in fulfilment of the right that He has made incumbent for them upon Himself. As for the punishment of the disobedient, it is a right He has made for Himself against them, so He has the choice to punish them, thus fulfilling His right, or to leave them, forgoing His right.

As for the issue of not exiting Paradise once entered, this is supported by numerous verses and narrations. The consensus mentioned is based on what is accepted from the implications of the scripture and tradition, or reason, and is not a separate argument.

Examining Narrations

1. In al-Durr al-manthūr, al-Suyūṭī cites al-Bukhārī, Muslim, al-Tirmidhī, al-Nasāʾī, Ibn Māja, Ibn Jarīr, Ibn al-Mundhir, Ibn Abī Ḥātim, Abū al-Shaykkh, Ibn Mardawayh, and al-Bayhaqī’s al-Asmāʾ wa al-ṣifāt, all of whom report from Abū Mūsā al-Ashʿarī that the Messenger of God said: ‘Indeed, God allows the wrongdoer respite, but when He seizes him, He does not let him escape.’ Then he recited: Such is the seizing of your Lord when He seizes the townships that are wrongdoing. Indeed His seizing is painful, severe ().’
2. In the same source, he cites al-Tirmidhī—who declares the tradition good (ḥasan)—and Abū Yaʿlā, Ibn Jarīr, Ibn al-Mundhir, Ibn Abī al-Ḥātim, Abū al-Shaykh, and Ibn Mardawayh, all of whom narrate from ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb: ‘When the verse was revealed, Some of them will be wretched and some felicitous, I said: “O Messenger of God, then why should we do anything? For something already predetermined or for something yet to be decided?” The Prophet replied, “For something already settled, ʿUmar. The pens have been lifted, and the scrolls have dried up, yet everyone will find it easy to do that for which they were created.”’

Author’s comment: This wording is narrated from the Prophet through multiple channels in Sunnī sources, as in Sahih Al-Bukhari from ʿImrān b. al-Huṣayn, who said: ‘I asked: “O Messenger of God, what do people labour for?” He said: “Everyone will find it easy to do that for which he was created.”’

3. In the same source, it is also reported from ʿAlī , from the Prophet that he was at a funeral and took a stick and began to poke the ground. He said: ‘There is none among you who has not had his seat assigned either in Paradise or in Hellfire.’ They asked: ‘Shall we not then rely upon this and cease working?’ He replied: ‘No, carry on doing good deeds, for everyone will find it easy to do that for which he was created.’ He then recited the verse: As for him who gives and is Godwary ().

Author’s comment: To clarify this, we say: It is obvious to anyone with a grain of sense that all events occurring in this world, both in their existence and their effects, are potential until they are garbed of certainty and existence. This potential means that existence and non-existence are equal in relation to them. For example, a piece of wood has the potential to become ash through burning, and a semen has the potential to become a human if it effectively becomes part of the necessary causes for a human being, and also the potential to remain as non-human if these necessary causes cease to exist.

Once something has put on the garb of existence, such as when wood has actually become ash or semen has actually become a human, the potentiality that was attributed to it ceases, as it no longer holds the potential to become both ash and not-ash, or human and non-human. It simply becomes a human and nothing else, or ash and nothing else, other possibilities are negated with this actuality.

In this context, it becomes clear that when we take actualized events and attribute them to their underlying causes and, by the same token, attribute these causes to the causes of causes, the world in this perspective appears as a chain of actualized events with nothing changing from its original state of potentiality to a state of actuality. The possibilities, preparations, and alternatives all cease to exist. Conversely, when we look at things from the aspect of potentialities and possibilities that they hold latent within themselves with respect to their final forms, no physical entities escape the realm of possibility and the domain of choice.

Thus, the universe has two aspects: one of necessity and actuality, where every part of it—whether a substance or the effect of a substance—is determined and admits no ambiguity or hesitation, no changes or alterations. This is the aspect where effects rely on their originating and sufficient causes, which are inseparable from their corollaries, and whose effects always result from them, and no trick can change them from what they are, nor any effort or motion can alter them.

The other aspect is the realm of possibility, the form of preparedness and susceptibility, where nothing is determined except after occurrence, and nothing moves from ambiguity and generality until it becomes a reality. On this plane, the laws of choice exist, and with it arises efforts and movements, work and acquisition take place, and it is to this that education, upbringing, fear, hope, aspirations, and desires have their influence, and where the call to action, and moral commands and prohibitions are effective, and reward and punishment become valid.

It is self-evident that these two aspects do not conflict in reality, and that one of them does not invalidate the other. Actualized phenomena have their context, and possibility and potentiality have theirs, just as the ontological ambiguity of a particular event does not prevent its realization after it has occurred, and its subsequent realization does not render its prior ambiguity void.

The first aspect—that of ambiguity—corresponds to Divine Decree, and the actuality of events according to it does not invalidate their indeterminacy in the context of invitation, work, and acquisition. We will conclude the discussion on this when we address the topics of Divine Decree and Destiny at the appropriate place, God willing.

Now, let’s return to our discussion of the traditions:

Reflecting on their context, it appears that what the listeners understood from the Prophet’s statement about felicity and wretchedness, paradise and hell, and the writing of the pen to that effect, that these were predestined and unavoidable fates. Based on this, they arrived at the misconception, first, that the ways that led people to one fate or the other were irrelevant, and that the laws of causality no longer applied, such that, if a person is destined for heaven, this will inevitably happen, regardless of whether they do good deeds or whether they commit sins.

Secondly, they believed that these ways and means are analogous to the ends and effects that fall under the Divine Decree, which is written and determined, rendering human free will meaningless and leaving no room for effort and moral responsibility.

Consider the questions posed in these traditions:

‘O Messenger of God, then why should we do anything? For something already predetermined or for something yet to be decided?’

‘O Messenger of God, what do people labour for?’

‘Shall we not then rely upon this and cease working?’

What the questioners are in fact asking is: ‘Should we not stop doing deeds and rely instead upon what God has written for us in His Book that can neither be changed nor altered?’ All of this points to their first misconception, and it is as though their own experience of free will and the ability to act prevented them from recognizing the second one. However, these two misconceptions are intrinsically linked, and even though the second may have been deeply rooted in their hearts, they did not express it.

In response to their questions, the Prophet said: ‘everyone will find it easy to do that for which he was created.’ This is an allusion to God’s description of the creation of the human being: Then He made the way easy for him (). This means that those created for Heaven and those created for Hell, as stated in the verse, Certainly We have created for hell many of the jinn and humans (), each have a purpose in their creation. God has made the path to these ends easy for them and facilitated their journey to their ultimate destination.

Between a person destined for Paradise and Paradise itself, there lies a path that they must inevitably follow in order to reach it. Similarly, between a person destined for Hell and Hell itself, there lies a path. The path to Heaven is faith and piety, while the path to Hell is idolatry and sin. The person for whom Heaven has been decreed must tread the path of faith and piety. He cannot simply be granted Heaven regardless of whether he acts righteously or not, or whether his actions are good or bad. The same applies to the person for whom Hell has been decreed: his path is that of idolatry and sin, not merely an unconditional decree.

For this reason, the Prophet followed his statement, ‘everyone will find it easy to do that for which he was created’, by reciting God’s words, As for him who gives and is Godwary and confirms the best promise, We shall surely ease him into facility. But as for him who is stingy and self-complacent, and denies the best promise, We shall surely ease him into hardship ().

Expecting one of these two outcomes without following its respective path is like hoping to be filled without eating, or to quench one’s thirst without drinking, or to move from one place to another without actually moving. In this life, which is a realm of striving and activity, one can only achieve their goals by undertaking a journey. As God says, and that nothing belongs to man except what he strives for, and that he will soon be shown his endeavour, then he will be rewarded for it with the fullest reward ().

However, even though his audience might not have explicitly voiced it, the Prophet did not fail to address the second misconception, which are expressed in the idea of ‘making easy.’ To make something easy (taysīr) means to facilitate it, and it is well known that such facilitation can only occur in matters that are not already inevitable or foreordained. If the path to Heaven were absolutely and inevitably predestined for those for whom it has been written, it would be fixed and unchangeable. There would be no meaning in facilitating or easing their journey, as should be obvious.

Therefore, the Prophet’s saying, ‘everyone will find it easy to do that for which he was created’, implies that the matters which human beings incline towards, such as felicity or wretchedness, have two aspects. The first aspect is the inevitability and predetermination that cannot change its course, and the second aspect is the possibility and choice that is made easy for humans to follow through deeds and moral responsibility. The divine call to humankind is only directed to the second aspect, not the first.

We have previously discussed predestination and free will in our commentary on the verse, and He leads no one astray thereby except the transgressors () in the first volume of this commentary.

4. In al-Durr al-manthūr, al-Suyūṭī cites Ibn Jarīr, Abū al-Shaykh, and Ibn Mardawayh, who narrate that Qatāda recited the verse, As for the wretched … (), then said: ‘Anas narrated that Messenger of God said: “A group of people will come out of the Fire.” and we do not say as the People of Harūrāʾ say.’

Author’s comment: The statement, ‘… we do not say as the People of Harūrāʾ say’, is the comment of Qatāda, not the Prophet . The People of Harūrāʾ are a sub-sect of the Khawārij, who asserted that whoever enters Hell will remain there forever without the possibility reprieve.

5. Ibn Mardawayh narrated from Jābir that the Messenger of God, peace and blessings be upon him, recited, “So those who were unfortunate - to His saying - except as your Lord wills,” the Messenger of God, peace and blessings be upon him, said: “If God wills to take people out of the Fire - from those who were unfortunate - and admit them into Paradise, He will do so.” (al-Durr al-manthūr)
6. In Tafsīr al-Burhān, it is narrated from al-Ḥusayn b. Saʿīd al-Ahwāzī’s Kitāb al-Zuhd, via chain of narrators from Muḥammad b. Muslim: ‘I asked Abū ʿAbd Allāh about the Hellish (jahanummiyyīn). He said: “Abū Jaʿfar used to say: ‘They will come out of it and arrive at a spring at the gates of Paradise that is called “the Spring of Life” (ʿAyn al-Ḥaywān). Its waters will sprinkle on them and they will flourish, just as plants flourish, their skin and hair will flourish.’”’

Author’s comment: It is also reported via a chain of narration from ʿUmar b. Abān from him . The meaning of jahannumiyyīn are a specific group of the inmates of Hell who are believers in monotheism (ahl al-tawḥīd) who will be saved from Hell through intercession (shafāʿa). They are the ones called jahannumiyyīn, not everyone who dwells in Hell, as will become clear from the other traditions below.

7. It is narrated from Abū Baṣīr, who said: ‘I heard Abū Jaʿfar say: “Indeed, there are people who will leave Hell behind. When they have become ashes, intercession will reach them.” He said, “They will be taken to a river that flows out of the land of the inhabitants of Paradise. They will bathe there, and their flesh and blood will recover. The scorching effects of Hell will disappear from them. They will enter paradise and the inhabitants of Paradise will call them ‘the Hellish’ (jahannumiyyīn). They will unanimously call out, ‘O God, remove this name from us!’” He said, “And it will be removed from them.” Then he said, “O Abū Baṣīr, indeed the enemies of ʿAlī are the ones who will dwell in Hell forever, and intercession will not reach them.”’ (Tafsīr al-Burhān)
8. It is narrated on the authority of ʿUmar b. Abān who said, ‘I heard a righteous servant say about the hellish: ‘”Indeed, they enter Hell because of their sins, and they will exit due to God’s pardon.”’ (ibid.)
9. It is narrated on the authority of Ḥumrān who said, ‘I said to Abū ʿAbd Allāh : ‘They say, “Do not be amazed by a people who claim that God will bring some people out of Hell to make them dwellers of paradise along with God’s allies.” He replied, “Do they not read God’s statement, Beside these two, there will be two other gardens ()? That is a garden beyond a garden, and a hell beyond a hell. They will not dwell with God’s allies.” He then said, “Between them, I swear by God, there is a station, but I cannot discuss it. Their condition is more narrow than a ring. When the Riser (Qāʾim) rises, he will start with these.”’

Author’s comment: When he says, ‘When the Riser rises…’, he means that, when he appears, he will first exact retribution upon those who mocked the people of truth.

10. In Tafsīr al-ʿAyyāshī, it is narrated from Ḥumrān, from Abū Jaʿfar : ‘I asked him about the verse, They shall remain in it for as long as the heavens and the earth endure—except what your Lord may wish (). He said, “This is about the ones who leave Hell behind.”’
11. It is narrated from Abū Baṣīr, from Imām al-Bāqir , concerning the verse, Some of them will be wretched and some felicitous (): ‘In the description of the people of Hell, an exception was made, but there was no exception in the mention of the description of the people of Paradise: They will remain in it for as long as the heavens and the earth endure—except what your Lord may wish—an endless bounty ().’ (ibid.)

Author’s comment: Here, he points out that the exception of divine will in the case of the people of Paradise, which God followed with the statement, ‘an endless bounty’, is not an exception indicating the expulsion of some of the inhabitants of paradise from it, rather it is there to preserve God’s absolute power, unlike the exception in the case of the people of Hell, which is followed by His statement, indeed your Lord does what He desires (), suggesting that this had actually taken place, as we have already discussed previously.

12. In al-Durr al-manthūr, al-Suyūṭī narrates from Abū al-Shaykh, who narrates from al-Sudayy, about the verse, As for the wretched … (): ‘Later, by the will of God, the verse was abrogated, and God revealed in Medina: Indeed those who are faithless and do wrong, Allah shall never forgive them, nor shall He guide them to any way … (). Thus, any hope of release for the inhabitants of Hell was removed, meaning that they were condemned to remain there eternally.’ Regarding the verse, As for the felicitous …, he said: ‘Later, by the will of God, the verse was abrogated, and God revealed in Medina: As for those who have faith and do righteous deeds, We shall admit them into gardens with streams running in them, to remain in them forever … (), meaning that they would dwell there eternally.

Author’s comment: What this tradition says about the abrogation of these two verses implies that they indicate that they meant people would reside in Paradise and Hell only temporarily, which contradicts what we know to be the case. In such contexts, abrogation does not correspond with reason or with revelation. It also does not agree with the explicit meaning of verses concerning Paradise. Furthermore, the idea that both groups will remain in Paradise and Hell eternally is established in many Meccan chapters, including al-Anʿām and al-Aʿrāf. Therefore, there is no sense in saying that this was only revealed later, in Medina.

13. Ibn al-Mundhir reports from al-Ḥasan, who reports from ʿUmar: ‘If the inhabitants of Hell remained in it for as long as there are grains of sand, there would come a day when they would leave it.’ (al-Durr al-manthūr)
14. Isḥāq b. Rāhawayh narrates from Abū Hurayra: ‘A day will come upon Hell when no one will remain in it.’ Then he recited the verse, As for the wretched … (). (ibid.)
15. Ibn al-Mundhir and Abū al-Shaykh narrate from Ibrāhīm, who said: ‘There is no verse in the Qur’an more hopeful for the inmates of Hell than this one: They shall remain in it for as long as the heavens and the earth endure—except what your Lord may wish (). Ibn Masʿūd once said: ‘There will come a time when its gates will be thrown open.’ (ibid.)

Author’s comment: The three above mentioned narrations are all opinions of the Companions and, as such, do not constitute a conclusive proof (ḥujja) for anyone other than themselves. If they are assumed to have interrupted chains of narration, they would be dismissed due to the fact that they contradict the Qur’an. God has said of the disbelievers: and they shall not leave the Fire ().

16. In Tafsīr al-Burhān, it is transmitted from al-Ḥusayn b. Saʿīd’s Kitāb al-Zuhd, via a chain of narrators going back to Ḥumrān: ‘I said to Abū ʿAbd Allāh : “It has reached us that there will come a time when the gates of Hell will be thrown open!” He said: “No by God, it is for eternity.” I quoted the verse, They shall remain in it for as long as the heavens and the earth endure—except what your Lord may wish. He said: ‘This is about those who will be released Hell.

Author’s comment: The narrations indicating that the disbelievers will be consigned to Hell eternally, according to the narration of the Imams of the Prophet’s Household , are extremely numerous. We have previously presented a philosophical discussion on the perpetuity of punishment and its cessation in our commentary on the verse, and they shall not leave the Fire ().

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1. Translator’s note: Maḥmūd Shihāb al-Dīn al-Ālūsī (1217–70/1802–1854), an exegete and jurist from an illustrious family of Sunnī scholars in Baghdad. His Rūh al-Maʿānī was a voluminous commentary on the Qur’an. ↩︎

2. Translator’s note: al-Qāḍī Nāṣir al-Dīn ʿAbdallāh b. ʿUmar b. Muḥammad al-Shīrāzī al-Bayḍāwī (d. 719/1319), was a scholar of the Shāfiʿī legal school, the Ashaʿrī theological school, and a commentator of the Qurʾān. His commentary, Anwār al-tanzīl wa-asrār al-taʾwīl was one of the most popular commentaries in the pre-modern Sunnī world. The Shīʿī scholar Fayḍ Kāshānī also refers to it in his commentaries on the Qur’an, al-Ṣāfī and al-Aṣfā. ↩︎

3. In essence, this discussion clarifies that in Islam, while certain aspects of life are predetermined, human beings are endowed with the ability to choose their path. Their actions, good or bad, play a crucial role in determining their final destiny. This balance between divine decree and human agency forms a core principle in Islamic theology, emphasizing the importance of personal responsibility in the journey of life. (Ed.) ↩︎